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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON NETWORK DYNAMICS AND LIMINALITY 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 2018 
 
DIEGO F. LEAL, B.A., UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE COLOMBIA – BOGOTÁ 
 
M.A., UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES – BOGOTÁ 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS – AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor James A. Kitts 
 
 
 
 This dissertation focuses on the emergence and evolution of social networks by paying 
particular attention to the spanning of cultural boundaries that segregate actors in the context 
of specific societies. In particular, I use systems science methods to study the bridging of 
cultural holes in small and relatively dense artificial societies, as well as in an American high 
school. I also study the significance of local triadic configurations in giving rise to the highly 
hierarchical system of aggregate-level migration flows in place in the Americas during the late 
20th century. I use the concept of liminality as a way to analyze these disparate social systems. 
More precisely, I focus on the role of cultural brokers seen as actors at the limen – i.e. at the 
border – of symbolic boundaries, actors that can act as bridges between culturally disconnected 
worlds. In this context, this dissertation explains key network dynamics behind two emergent 
phenomena that are the direct result of liminal agents’ behaviors: the diffusion of innovations 
(Chapters 1 and 2) and a system of international migration flows (Chapter 3). Finally, I also 
put forward a critical view on brokerage based on different cases mentioned in the literature 
(e.g. 1.5 generation migrants or multiracial individuals) that show how the spanning of cultural 
holes can put brokers at an increased risk of being socially and/or psychologically harmed.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“I, for one, choose to use some of my energy to serve as a mediator.” (Anzaldúa 1999: 107) 
 
 
 
In this dissertation I use network science to understand a set of structural dynamics 
that emerge at the limen, at the border, of prominent symbolic boundaries. In particular, I 
focus on emergent phenomena that result from people’s behaviors at the interstices of 
“bright” (Alba 2005) symbolic boundaries that are either computationally designed (Chapter 
1) or empirically given, like those of gender (Chapter 2) or nationhood (Chapter 3). Liminality 
and network dynamics are thus the touchstones of this document. 
A key assumption in this dissertation is that when individuals have to, or decide to, 
traverse disparate cultural worlds, their transgressive behaviors become an important means 
to understand relevant system-level dynamics of the societies in which they are immerse. 
Indeed, I submit that we can use the structural traces derived from liminal agents’ behaviors 
in order to understand how to make segregated networks more compact (Chapters 1 and 2), 
or to investigate how the political economy of international migration flows is hierarchically 
structured (Chapter 3).  
This dissertation is eclectic both theoretically and substantially. Theoretically, I draw 
from scholarship on international migration (Menjívar 2006; Durand and Massey 2010), 
symbolic boundaries (Anzaldúa 1999; Lamont and Molnár 2002), race and ethnicity (Bonilla-
Silva 2002; Alba 2005), culture and networks (Pachucki and Breiger 2010; Lizardo 2014), 
adolescent friendship segregation (Moody 2001; Goodreau, Kitts and Morris 2009), social 
simulation (Schelling 1971; Axelrod 1997); social contagion theory (Christakis and Fowler 
2013), and the diffusion of innovations (Valente 1991; Centola 2015). The eclecticism of this 
dissertation is also evident in the heterogeneity of the actual systems under analysis. Indeed, I 
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study relatively small artificial societies (Chapter 1), an American high school (Chapter 2), and 
migration flows among all the countries in the Americas (Chapter 3).  
Methodologically, I consistently use systems science methods like agent-based models 
(Chapter 1), stochastic actor-based models (Chapter 2), and temporal exponential random 
graph models (Chapter 3), in order to characterize the dynamics and evolution of the disparate 
systems mentioned above. This dissertation can thus be understood as a tripartite document 
in which network science tools and theories are employed to make sense of the dynamic 
implications of (cultural) liminality in social systems of varying nature. 
The aim of Chapter 1 is to produce a parsimonious computational model in which a 
bright symbolic boundary is, by design, the source of different levels of cultural segregation. 
More specifically, I put forward a theoretical model to understand how liminal agents can act 
as cultural brokers that have the potential to make segregated networks more compact by 
means of bridging cultural holes (Pachucki and Breiger 2010). In this context, I first develop 
a critical perspective on liminality and cultural brokerage, always emphasizing that the capacity 
to span cultural holes is a socially – and usually painfully – learned skill (Anzaldúa 1987; Wang 
and Collins 2016; Myers and Williamson 2001; cf. Burt 2004). I then combine the principles 
of consolidation, influence, and selection to generate artificial societies with tunable levels of 
segregation across a bright symbolic boundary (Blau 1977; Blau and Schwartz 1984; Latané 
1981, 1996; Macy, Kitts, Flache and Benard 2003; Centola 2015). After doing so, I simulate 
diffusion dynamics based on a threshold model (Schelling 1978; Granovetter 1978; Macy 
1991). Results show that, due to their cross-cutting ties, cultural brokers are more effective 
than popular agents (agents with high degree centrality), structural brokers (agents with high 
betweenness centrality), or random agents, to diffuse an innovation widely. The 
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interrelationships between culture and social network positions are discussed in the final part 
of the chapter. 
In Chapter 2, I advance an empirical test for the hypothesis that cultural brokers are 
especially well-equipped to span cultural holes. From a methodological point of view, I build 
on both published social simulation studies (Shoham et al. 2012; Zhang et al. 2015a, 2015b) 
and on my previous work with James Kitts, in order to configure an empirically-calibrated 
agent-based model that mimics the computational experiments developed in Chapter 1. 
Results show that agents with a high capacity for cultural brokerage across key symbolic 
boundaries like gender or age do show an enhanced ability to spread an innovation across 
people culturally different from themselves; thus, allowing them (i.e. cultural brokers) to make 
segregated networks more compact. I then discuss the implications of the results for the 
analysis of the spreading of innovations across in-group and out-group alters in light of the 
critical theory of liminality I developed in Chapter 1. In the final part of Chapter 2 I discuss 
future lines of work vis-à-vis the idea of liminality and examine the empirical limitations 
inherent to the research design used in this specific chapter. 
Finally, in Chapter 3, I study a liminal population par excellence, namely, international 
migrants (Menjívar 2006; Mann 2016; Huang et al. 2008). More precisely, I advance an 
unprecedented description and explanation of international migration flows in the Americas 
based on the network inequalities that sustain them over time. Building on previous work with 
Joya Misra and Ragini Malhotra (Malhotra, Misra and Leal [2016]), I estimate migration flows 
between all the countries in the Americas using novel data and state-of-the-art statistical 
techniques (Özden et al. 2011; Abel 2010, 2013, 2017; Abel and Sanders 2014). I then provide 
a detailed historic account of these flows by focusing on the following migratory subsystems: 
Central America and the Caribbean, North America, and South America. Lastly, going beyond 
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my previous collaborative work, I combine network and migration theories, as well as 
Temporal Exponential Random Graph models (Hanneke, Fu and Xing 2010; Desmarais and 
Cranmer 2012b; Liefeld, Cranmer and Desmarais 2017), to explain the evolution of migration 
flows over time. In particular, I show that international migration in the Americas exhibits 
very strong network inequalities at the level of triads. These local configurations are a structural 
signature of the highly unequal nature of the migratory exchanges in the Americas and of the 
political economy that sustains them. 
I conclude the dissertation with a discussion on the implications of my findings for 
future scholarship on cultural brokerage and network dynamics. In particular, I discuss the 
role of a critical perspective on brokerage as the foundation for a relational sociology of 
diffusion dynamics across culturally segregated networks. 
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CHAPTER 1 
DIFFUSION AS THE BRIDGING OF CULTURAL HOLES: AN AGENT-BASED 
COMPUTATIONAL MODEL  
Introduction 
The fact that individuals tend to imitate each other is a fundamental characteristic of 
human social interactions (Bandura 1977). Importantly, when individuals imitate one another 
a process of (social) influence is said to take place (Meltzoff 2005; Hurley and Chater 2005; 
Christakis and Fowler 2011). Influence is by definition a relational process in which at least 
one of ego’s characteristics is shaped or impacted by being exposed to one or more socially 
immediate alters over a period of time (Latané 1981, 1996). Influence is far from being a 
random process. Humans deliberately tend to adopt certain behaviors and norms (e.g. clothing 
style) because they are associated with specific traits (e.g. socioeconomic status) (Galak et al. 
2016). It is precisely because of this relational and dynamic nature that the adoption of 
innovations is a classic topic in the study of network dynamics (Rapoport 1953; Coleman, 
Katz, Menzel 1957).  
People not only influence each other, however. Homophily is another bedrock of 
human behavior (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1964). Homophily is the tendency to interact with 
similar (e.g., same-status) instead of dissimilar (e.g., different-status) partners. Put simply, 
homophily implies that individuals who are already alike tend to select each other as associates 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001; Barnett, Khanna and Onnela 2016). Like influence, 
(homophilous) selection is by definition a relational process. One partner must choose another 
based on their preexisting similarities in order for a selection process to occur. Supporting 
evidence of the tendency of humans to be part of homophilous relationships has been found 
in very different settings, from gene-set analyses (Christakis and Fowler 2014) to large-scale 
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interactions in humanity’s largest gathering, the Kumbh Mela festival in India (Barnett, 
Khanna and Onnela 2016). 
At the macro level, when selection and influence unfold over time, they can potentially 
give rise to societies in which the empirical distributions of the different traits exhibited and/or 
assigned to individuals (e.g. education, race, or religion) are highly correlated (Latané 1991, 1996) 
or, in Blau’s (1977) terms, consolidated. Critically, given the tripartite forces of influence, 
selection, and consolidation, the networks of social connections between individuals in a given 
society typically become a key vehicle to (re)produce segregation (Macy, Kitts and Flache 2003; 
Centola 2015). In a nutshell, if individuals are inclined to be both selected and influenced by 
similar others, then more and more positive correlations between their traits (i.e. higher levels 
of between-individual similarity) are likely to emerge as a result of their interactions. Over 
time, repeated interactions between similar people tend to crystallize in the form of highly 
clustered social structures (e.g. social networks); which in turn reinforce and (re)produce 
clustering; that is, segregation. 
A corollary of the ideas mentioned above is that, when an innovation emerges, it is 
likely to be confined within the boundaries that segregate similar (e.g. same-race) from 
dissimilar (e.g. different-race) actors in a given social network (DiMaggio and Garip 2011). In 
a word, networks can be expected to (re)produce high levels of inter-group inequality in the 
adoption of innovations (DiMaggio and Garip 2001; Centola 2011; Chang and Lauderdale 
2009). Given that social networks are proven conduits of information and social support 
(Barefoot et al. 2005; Santini et al. 2015), differential access to innovations can be highly 
consequential for individuals’ outcomes. For instance, there is strong evidence suggesting that 
social networks, and particularly the social reinforcement they entail, are causally related to the 
adoption of health-related innovations (Centola 2011).  
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Based on that fact that empirical networks tend to be highly segregated, I argue that 
leveraging the role of culturally liminal individuals might prove crucial to help overcome the 
powerful societal forces behind segregation. By culturally liminal individuals I refer to people 
located at the interstices of symbolic boundaries drawn along cultural lines (e.g. race & 
ethnicity, gender, or religion) (Romo 2011; Turner 1967; Wimmer 2013; Malkki 1992). More 
precisely, I submit that identifying and mobilizing individuals that tend to be located at the 
cultural interstices of society could make segregated networks more compact by spanning 
“cultural holes” (Pachucki and Breiger 2010; Lizardo 2014), that is, by bridging people that 
tend to be located in culturally different worlds. 
 In this Chapter, therefore, I focus on individuals’ capacity to widely diffuse an 
innovation based on their position as cultural brokers along prominent symbolic boundaries. 
For ease of exposition, I will tend to use two rhetoric examples throughout this Chapter. First, 
I will continuously refer to race & ethnicity (i.e. the ethnoracial symbolic boundary) as an 
empirical reference to connote a symbolic boundary composed of nominal categories along 
which networks have been observed to be highly segregated (McPherson et al. 2001; Alba 
2005; Moody 2001). Second, I will use the classic notion of “adolescent societies” (Coleman 
1961) – as it refers to the social structures typically observed in American high schools – as a 
prominent empirical example of relatively small, well-bounded, societies. This is important 
because this Chapter focuses on the diffusion of innovation in small societies and adolescent 
societies have proven to be fertile ground for network diffusion processes (Shoham et al. 2012; 
Zhang et al. 2015; adam and Schaefer 2016; de la Haye et al. 2011; Moody 2002; Kreager and 
Haynie 2011). My argument, however, applies to any prominent symbolic boundary along 
which segregation between a relatively small number of mutually exclusive and nominal group 
memberships (i.e. 3 ≤ groups ≤ 10) takes place and to any relatively small society, not only to 
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adolescent societies. Furthermore, my argument applies to relatively dense undirected 
networks in which both social ties and contagion are binary (i.e. a tie between a given pair of 
actors either exists or does not exist; an actor is either an adopter or it is not); contagion is also 
assumed to be permanent (i.e. there is no recovery, that is, once an actor becomes an adopter 
continues to be so until the simulation is over) and local (i.e. non-adopters can only be 
potentially infected by their immediate network neighbors). 
The Chapter is organized as follows. First, I develop a theoretical framework around 
the idea of liminality. Second, I describe the data and methods that structure the Chapter. 
Third, I present the data analysis based on a simulation study. Lastly, I discuss some 
conclusions. 
Theory 
Symbolic Boundaries and (Permanent) Liminality 
Symbolic boundaries, like those drawn along race, class, nationality, and gender are of 
primary interest to social scientists (Lamont and Fournier 1992; Lamont and Molnár 2002; 
Wimmer 2013; Malkki 1992). Far from being orthogonal, symbolic boundaries very often 
intersect (Browne and Misra 2003; Collins 2015). Furthermore, symbolic boundaries are not 
ahistorical, fixed, or natural, they are in fact rather context-dependent and permeable (Mäs, 
Kitts and Flache 2014; Pachucki, Pendergrass and Lamont 2007).  
The idea of liminal populations refers to people located at the interstices of one or 
more symbolic boundaries, that is, betwixt and between them (Turner 1967). In the remainder of 
this document I will understand liminality as “the state of being associated with people who 
are simultaneously members of two or more culturally distinct groups, which allow them 
[liminal individuals] to move beyond an “either/or” to a “both/neither” path of 
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identification.” (Romo 2011: 404). As explicitly noted by Romo, liminality is intimately 
associated with culture. Liminal agents are, by definition, culturally liminal.  
Historically, the concept of liminality has been closely tied with dynamic, rather than 
static, social phenomena. In his classic book Rites of Passage, Arnold van Gennep (1960 
[1909]) describes life as a series of transitions from one point (e.g. childhood) to another (e.g. 
adulthood). Conceptually, he divided life transitions in three kinds of rites: rites of separation 
(preliminal rites), rites of transition (liminal rites), and rites of incorporation (postliminal rites). 
In his work, van Gennep focused on individuals living in small-scale – agrarian or indigenous 
– communities. Because of this, his theoretical framework is mostly adequate to the analysis 
of transitions experienced by individuals in traditional societies. 
Several decades later, Victor Turner revisited and expanded van Gennep’s original 
concept. Turner connected liminality with people being at the interstices of social structure, 
an intuition critical for this Chapter: “If our basic model of society is that of a “structure of 
positions,” we must regard the period of margin or “liminality” as an interstructural situation.” 
(Turner 1967: 93). Importantly, and unlike van Gennep, Turner applied the notion of liminality 
to analyze transitions that individuals undergo in the context of contemporary institutions like 
professions (Turner 1967), millenarian religious movements, or hippie communities (Turner 
1969). It is with the work of Turner, therefore, that liminality starts to be useful to describe 
contemporary social realities. 
By the end of the 20th century, sociologists interested in macro-level transitions started 
to use the concept of liminality. Liminality was introduced to contemporary sociology by 
Zygmunt Bauman and S.N. Eisenstadt in order to describe macro-level changes in 
contemporary societies. On the one hand, Bauman (1992) used the concept of liminality to 
analyze the intricate transitions experienced by post-communist regimes in the late 20th 
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century. On the other hand, Eisenstadt (1995) employed the notion of liminality to theorize 
the emergence of protest groups and movements that were structurally in-between key 
dominant groups. Still within this macro-level perspective, Szakolczai (2014) used the idea of 
liminality to study critical societal changes in Ireland at the turn of the 21st century. 
Importantly, Szakolczai emphasized that liminality can, and indeed had been, used to describe 
not only temporary societal transitions, but also situations in which societies exhibit a 
permanent state of flux. That is, times of societal crisis that seem to be extraordinary and/or 
transitory at the onset, but that become highly routinized in practice (e.g. long-term crisis 
managed by charismatic leaders; see also Agamben [2005]). Szakolczai (2014) denoted these 
particular situations as states of permanent liminality.  
Some of the most recent literature on liminality has returned to the origins of the 
concept by means of focusing on micro-level, rather than on macro-level, situations. 
Importantly, nonetheless, the idea of permanent liminality coined by Szakolczai is also 
prominent in this micro-level literature. Here, however, permanent liminality refers to 
situations in which individuals – not societies – exhibit relatively permanent in-between or 
ambiguous characteristics such as those typically associated with gypsy or migrant populations 
(Clopot 2016; Romo 2011; Anderson et al. 2009; Huang, Yeoh and Lam 2008; Brunsma, 
Delgado and Rockquemore 2013; Rampton 1999). For instance, a clear intuition of permanent 
liminality underlays the concept of liminal legality coined by Menjívar (2006). Liminal legality 
in Menjívar’s framework describes the vicissitudes of the permanently uncertain legal status of 
large numbers of Central American migrants living in the US. In sum, the contemporary 
literature on liminality does allow for both an individual-level analysis of liminality and, more 
specifically, for the theorizing of liminal individuals as susceptible of being in a state of 
permanent liminality. 
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This Chapter is firmly inscribed in this latter tradition since I understand cultural 
brokers as individuals living in a state of permanent liminality. Put simply, I argue that the 
permanent liminality of cultural brokers does not emerge from the fact that they are 
undergoing a specific – mostly temporary – transition (e.g. transition to adulthood or 
parenthood). Quite the opposite, their liminality is a result of their positionality along the more 
or less fixed symbolic boundaries along which society is segregated, and more specifically, a 
result of their tendency to be connected with people located in different nominal categories 
(e.g. different racial categories) along such boundaries. 
Cultural Brokerage and Liminality 
Not all symbolic boundaries are equally important for the (re)production of cultural 
segregation in a given society and, therefore, for the emergence of cultural holes. For instance, 
religious affiliation was more important than skin color (or any other symbolic divide) to define 
and segregate the (non-Christian) others in the pre-colonial West (Omi and Winant 1986; 
Bonilla-Silva 1997). In such a specific historical context, I argue that a person at the interstices 
of the religious boundary likely was both more readily perceived as a liminal individual and 
better positioned to span cultural holes than a person at the interstices of any other symbolic 
boundary. Think, for instance, about the role of the pre-colonial Christian missionary: a liminal 
agent whose job was to find ways to act as cultural translator between different religious beliefs 
systems, effectively becoming a powerful vector of cultural syncretism (Ferdinando 1995). 
Prominent Christian missionaries like St. Cyril are indeed critical to understand the 
development, and diffusion, of innovations like the Glagolitic alphabet, the oldest known 
Slavic alphabet – and a powerful example of cultural syncretism in the Middle Ages. 
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An obvious analytical problem in the analysis of diffusion processes across symbolic 
boundaries is how to parsimoniously account for all the boundaries that effectively shape the 
sociodemographic (Blau) space along which a given society is culturally segregated.1 Here, I 
follow a strategy used by Laumann (1973), and mentioned by Blau (1977: 29), as a possible 
solution to this problem: select one social dimension, “considered on a priori grounds to be of 
special importance,” in order to analyze, and eventually model, key societal dynamics. To 
address this issue from a theoretical point of view, I rely on the idea of symbolic boundaries’ 
“brightness”.  
Following Alba (2005), when compared to blurry boundaries, bright boundaries are 
typically difficult to cross since the symbolic distinctions they (re)produce tend to be perceived 
as “unambiguous, so that individuals know at all times which side of the boundary they are 
on.” (Alba 2005: 22). A key implication of misrecognizing bright symbolic boundaries as 
immutable and ahistorical – as “unambiguous” in Alba’s terms – is that every-day social 
interactions tend to become deeply segregated along the lines symbolically demarcated by 
those boundaries (Fields 1999). For instance, an important reason behind the brightness of 
the ethnoracial boundary in contemporary Western societies is related to the fact that it is 
typically misrecognized as rooted in biology (Emirbayer and Desmond 2015; Fields 1999; 
Bonilla-Silva 1997).  
In this Chapter, I focus on cultural brokerage along bright boundaries only. More 
precisely, I analyze the bridging of cultural holes through the diffusion of innovations 
championed by cultural brokers situated at the limen, at the (cultural) border, of a bright 
boundary. All this in the context of relatively small, well-bounded, societies generated through 
                                                 
1 By sociodemographic (Blau) space I mean the multidimensional distribution of individuals’ traits like race & 
ethnicity, gender, class, religion. 
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social simulation methods. An empirical referent close to this kind of ideal scenario in which 
one symbolic boundary is widely known to be preeminently correlated with segregation 
dynamics in relatively small, well-bounded, societies is that of segregation along the ethnoracial 
line in American high schools. The studies that support this empirical reference are legion 
(Hallinan 1978; Hallinan and Williams 1987; Joyner and Kao 2000; Moody 2001; Giordano 
2003; Quillian and Campbell 2003; Mouw and Entwisle 2006; Zeng and Xie. 2008; Goodreau 
et al. 2009). 
Towards a Critical View of Liminality 
Before analyzing the spanning of cultural holes along bright symbolic boundaries 
(hypothetically) championed by cultural brokers, a critical view of cultural brokerage, and of 
liminality more generally, is warranted. This is especially true since being able to present 
oneself as belonging to a group – as being in, instead of in-between – offers a wealth of 
advantages. The sense of belonging (i.e. again, of being in) is in fact a proven source of stability, 
well-being, and success (Hurtado and Carter 1997; Faircloth and Hamm 2005). In this section, 
I develop a set of arguments, rooted in the experiences of liminal subjects, in order to advance 
a nuanced and critical perspective on the burdens of (permanent) liminality. I present these 
arguments in the form of three critical qualifications associated with the realities confronted 
by liminal individuals. 
Do not Romanticize Liminality 
Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera (1987) is perhaps one of the best known 
contemporary pieces on liminality. In her book, Anzaldúa describes the life of migrants in a 
liminal geographic space, namely, Aztlán (the ‘borderland’ between Mexico and the US 
Southwest). When international migrants cross over a national border, Anzaldúa argues, they 
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are also crossed over (atravesados) by that very same border. This condition of liminality is 
experienced by migrant populations like international migrants, internal migrants, refugees, 
and gypsies (Mann 2016). Anzaldúa powerfully references this state of permanent liminality: 
“A borderland is a vague an undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an 
unnatural boundary. It is a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forbidden are its 
inhabitants. Los atravesados [the crossed over] live here: the squint-eyed, the perverse, the 
queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulato, the half-breed, the half-dead; in short, 
those who cross over, pass over, or go through the confines of the “normal”.” (Anzaldúa 
1987: 3, emphasis is mine). 
 
Liminality cannot only be an immense burden, as Anzaldúa argues, it can also be a 
highly viscid one. For instance, liminality does not usually die with those who initially 
transgress the symbolic boundaries of nationhood, the so-called first generation migrants. 
Liminality gets transferred to their offspring, and the offspring of their offspring. In fact, 
Anzaldúa provides accounts of fifth generation Mexican Americans living in the borderland 
that are still repeatedly deported to Mexico due to their phenotype.   
The concept of transnational family (Parreñas 2005) also incarnates the complexity of 
liminal identities. A transnational family is comprised of members located in two or more 
nation states. Transnational families typically encounter patent difficulties like those associated 
with the recurrent sense of loss experienced by the children that are left behind in the country 
of origin by their parents, especially by their mothers. “Transnationals, and their family 
members often grapple with a sense of liminality –a state of ambiguity, openness and 
indeterminacy of identity– as they negotiate their transnational life courses.” (Huang et al 2008: 
7). The notion of transnational families has indeed been used to make a call to expand the 
notion of family itself since the literature often assumes that family members enjoy the 
advantages of physical proximity (Mazzucato and Schans 2011).  
Perhaps one of the most complex links between liminality and disadvantage is 
embodied in the experience of refugees and displaced peoples. To be sure, refugees have been 
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repeatedly conceptualized as liminal agents (Malkki 1992; Williams 2006; Chavez 1992). Their 
resettlement in the host society is usually traumatic, which might partially explain why refugees 
tend to be affected by mental health disorders (Fazel, Wheeler and Danesh 2005). In this 
regard, Weil powerfully argues (1987: 41, cited in Malkki (1992: 24): “to be rooted is perhaps 
the most important and least recognized need of the human soul.”  The case of refugees is 
without a doubt a reminder that a state of permanent liminality is not necessarily free of 
burdens (Williams 2006). 
In the literature on adolescent friendship segregation, there is also evidence that guards 
against a purely romanticized view of liminality. A recent study by Boda and Néray (2015) 
collected data from a sample of non-Roma Hungarian and Roma Hungarian secondary school 
students. They found that both minority and majority students tend to dislike students with 
inconsistent ethnic identifications, that is, students for whom self-declared vs. peer-based ethnicity 
identification do not coincide. This finding is important because it reminds us that exhibiting 
ambiguous (ethnoracial) identities could represent an important social burden for individuals. 
In conclusion, being at the interstices of a given social structure is far from being a 
purely positive trait (cf. Burt 2004). More precisely, those who are in-between bright symbolic 
boundaries, like those of race & ethnicity, citizenship, or nationhood, are certainly at risk of 
experiencing the negative effects of liminality (e.g. exclusion, isolation, mental health disorders 
etc.). Moreover, permanent liminality does not necessarily end with the liminal persona. It can, 
for instance, easily extend over the course of several generations. 
Do not Naturalize Cultural Brokerage 
Bridging culturally different others should not be misrecognized as a natural talent of 
liminal individuals. Here a powerful empirical case is that of the so-called 1.5 generation 
migrants (Ang 2001). This subset of international migrants is typically comprised of 
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adolescents that migrated with their parents during their early teens. Indeed, 1.5 generation 
migrants are culturally hybrid by definition since they live in culturally dualistic realities, shaped 
by the culture (e.g. the language) of the origin and host societies. To be sure, these migrants 
have been explicitly conceptualized as in-between or liminal individuals in the past (Wang and 
Collins 2016; Bartley and Spoonley 2008). Critically, Wang and Collins (2016) provide 
qualitative evidence of how 1.5 generation Chinese migrants in New Zealand bridge cultural 
differences with white European New Zealanders (Pākehā) through cosmopolitan cultural 
norms. The authors emphasize, however, that the 1.5 generation migrants they study do not 
have an inherent ability to negotiate cultural differences. Rather, this ability emerges from the 
fact that 1.5 generation migrants are permanently exposed to racialized interactions vis-à-vis 
the dominant group precisely because of their cultural in-betweenness (see aslo Myers and 
Williamson [2001] for evidence on the vicissitudes of Latinos as “interlopers”). 
In a similar vein, Emirbayer and Desmond (2015) discuss the idea of multiracial 
competence. Here they have in mind “skilled code switchers” who can traverse racial 
boundaries with certain ease. They, for instance, mention “the Mexican American executive 
who excels in the majority-white corporation but who speaks Spanish at home.” (Emirbayer 
and Desmond 2015: 175). The authors readily emphasize the idea that this cultural “code 
switching” (e.g. voice inflections, ‘passing’), and the multiracial competence it entails, is socially 
learned.  
Further, albeit relatively indirect, evidence of how cultural brokerage is a socially 
learned skill rather than an innate “talent” of cultural brokers comes from the literature on 
socialization patterns of adolescents. Edmons and Killen (2009), for instance, found that 
parental racial attitudes affected interracial friendship formation in their children. They based 
their findings on a sample of racially diverse high school students located in the U.S. Mid-
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Atlantic region. The authors found that negative parental racial attitudes were associated with 
lack of intimacy in their children’s interracial relationships. Similarly, in a study of German and 
Dutch students, Smith, Maas, and van Tubergen (2014) found that adolescents’ cross-ethnic 
relationships were unlikely to emerge when their parents did not act as role models themselves. 
More precisely, Smith et al. (2014) found that adolescents tended to have more inter-ethnic 
relationships when their parents were less willing to maintain in-group traditions or more 
willing to have out-group friends themselves.  
In sum, bridging cultural holes is typically difficult – and even painful – to learn and 
perform effectively. The case of 1.5 generation migrants, as well as the literature on 
socialization and cross-ethnic relationships prevent us from assuming that liminal individuals 
are naturally inclined to bridge cultural holes, that is, to act as cultural brokers – especially 
along bright symbolic boundaries. Put simply, bridging cultural holes is a social skill rather 
than an innate talent. Finally, bridging cultural holes is also a difficult task since it likely 
involves negotiation of cultural difference in situations where liminal agents typically have to 
interact with higher status peers that might likely see them as inferior due to their symbolic 
hybridity; they are the “outsiders within” (Collins 1986). 
Do not Universalize Bright Symbolic Boundaries 
Bright boundaries are symbolically and socially constructed and because of that heavily 
context dependent (Omi and Winant 1986; Lamont 2000). For instance, the fact that race is a 
bright boundary in the US does not mean a) that this is also the case in other latitudes; and/or 
b) that the way race is experienced in the US is universal. In the context of this example, a 
corollary of this argument is that racial liminality could be especially important to bridge 
cultural holes in the US but not in other places. Alba (2005) for instance, argues this is the case 
in France and Germany where the discourse of difference typically discards the notion of race.  
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Another compelling argument about the relativity of bright symbolic boundaries 
comes from the works of Davis (1991) and Telles and Sue (2009). According to these authors, 
racially liminal individuals can have different status depending on country and time. They 
argue, for instance, that in Korea, Korean Americans have lower status compared to their non-
liminal counterparts; that mulattoes in pre-1960 Haiti had higher status than their non-liminal 
counterparts; and that mulattoes’ status in Colombia and Brazil is highly variable, depending 
more on class than on skin color (see also Telles and Paschel 2014). 
Liminality in general, and the status attached to it in particular, is not universal across 
countries, nor is universal across the history of a given country. For example, different rules 
to classify multiracial people – especially multiracial individuals of African descent – have been 
used in the US for centuries (DaCosta 2007). The dynamism of racial classifications is key to 
remember that bright symbolic boundaries are not material or fixed, and because of that, 
should not be reified. For instance, at certain critical junctures, some liminal individuals accrue 
honorary tickets to enter the dominant group, which in the long run reinforces racial 
boundaries by keeping symbolic distinctions (e.g. Us versus Others) very much alive. We 
know, for example, that white as a racial category was expanded over the course of the 20th 
century to include second and third generation Irish and Italians (Alba and Nee 2009; Portes 
and Rumbaut 1996). More recently, the Latin Americanization thesis (Bonilla-Silva 2002; 2004) 
argues that the racial hierarchy in the US is now tripartite (whites, honorary whites, and 
collective blacks), rather than bipartite (whites & non-whites). Experimental evidence on 
influence processes in task-oriented groups strongly supports this hypothesis (Biagas and 
Bianchi 2015).  
In sum, I argue that liminality is not universal in two main ways. First, the definitive 
centrality of specific bright boundaries in a given society does not always hold in other 
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societies. Even more, when – nominally speaking – the same boundary has attained the same 
preeminence or brightness in two different societies (e.g. race in Brazil today vs. race in the 
US today, or race in the US today vs. race in the antebellum US), the meaning and consequences 
of liminality and cultural brokerage likely differ a great deal. Second, the classifications on 
which symbolic boundaries, and therefore liminality, rest are fluid. For instance, racial hybrids 
in one society might not even be considered hybrids in other society, or have the same 
privileges attached to them. In a word, the primacy, meaning, and consequences of specific 
symbolic boundaries, and of liminality and cultural brokerage in particular, are not universal. 
They are, in fact, context- and time-dependent and could affect actors positively or negatively. 
Any empirical analysis of cultural brokerage must, therefore, be highly aware of the relativity 
of liminality and cultural brokerage.  
Throughout this section I have tried to define liminality and the cultural brokerage 
hypothetically performed by liminal agents. Now, I have enough theoretical traction to revisit 
the key tenet of this Chapter: liminal individuals have higher potentials to span cultural holes, 
that is, to make segregated networks more compact by bridging people of different cultural 
backgrounds. In the following section I turn to describe the data and methods I use to analyze 
this tenet.   
Methods: Measures & Description of the Computational Model 
I contribute an explanation to the existing literature on the diffusion of innovations by 
studying the bridging of cultural holes using agent-based computational models (Schelling 
1971; Axelrod 1987; Epstein and Axtell 1996; Carley 1991; Macy and Willer 2002; Mark 2003; 
Kitts 2006a). In particular, I will model the diffusion of an innovation by paying particular 
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attention to the brokering capacity of agents at the interstices of a bright boundary, that is, a 
boundary along which the sociodemographic (Blau) space of a given society is segregated.2  
Measuring Cultural In-Betweenness: The Capacity for Intercultural Brokerage 
Based on the work of Gould (Gould 1988, Gould and Fernandez 1988), I developed 
a measure of agents’ capacity for intercultural brokerage. I argue that this measure could be 
thought of as a proxy of cultural in-betweenness (i.e. liminality,) that is, of the degree to which 
an agent occupies a boundary-spanning position in the context of a social structure that is 
highly segregated along a bright symbolic boundary. The rationale for my measure is simple: I 
aim to develop a measure to identify egos that have a higher potential to bridge alters situated 
at different sides of a bright boundary; alters that are otherwise socially disconnected precisely 
because of the level of segregation exhibited by their (cultural) worlds. 
I define the capacity for intercultural brokerage of agent j (i.e. the broker/ego) as the 
total number of two-step undirected paths between two alters of two culturally different 
groups (i.e. the ‘terminal’ nodes of the two-step path) on which agent j happens to be the 
‘internal’ node of the two-step path. These are, effectively, triplets with two ties present and 
one tie absent – the famous forbidden triad of Granovetter (1973) – in which the disconnected 
nodes of the triad belong to two different groups. In instances in which a given pair of 
culturally dissimilar alters are connected through more than one broker/ego, the capacity for 
brokerage of each individual broker/ego between the alters under consideration increases by 
1/p, where p is the total number of brokers between the alters. As shown in the robustness 
checks section, the results discussed in this paper do not mechanically depend on the mere 
number of two-step undirected paths in which a given agent acts as a broker; it is an agent’s 
                                                 
2 On the idea of Blau space see McPherson (2004). For a recent theorization and operationalization see Brashears, 
Genkin and Suh (2018). 
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capacity to bridge disconnected actors of different groups that explains the diffusion patterns 
observed in this paper. 
Assuming everything else is constant, I argue that the higher the number of instances 
in which an ego bridges culturally dissimilar and disconnected alters, the higher ego’s cultural 
in-betweenness and, therefore, ego’s potential to act as a cultural boundary-spanner. Formally, 
I define an ego’s capacity for intercultural brokerage IBj as follows: 
                eq. 1 
 
 Where b(ijk) is equal to 1 if actor i is connected to j, j is connected to actor k, and actor 
i is not connected to actor k, and 0 otherwise; p(ik) is the number of two-step undirected paths 
between i and k, and m(ik) equals 1 if i and k are from different cultural groups (e.g. racial 
groups, if the focus is on interracial brokerage), and 0 otherwise. A hypothetical graphic 
example of this measure is presented in Figure 1.1.  
In Figure 1.1, all actors are culture blue, except actor C. Actor F gets a brokerage score 
of 1 because she brokers the relationship between G and C, while no other actor connects G 
and C. On the other hand, actor E gets a score of 0.5 because she brokers the relationship 
between D and C, but she is not the only broker between these two actors (D and C); indeed, 
B also brokers the relationship between D and C. Finally, actor B gets a total score of 1.5 since 
she co-brokers the relationship between D and C (0.5), and she is the only broker between A 
and C (1). 
Critically, the capacity for intercultural brokerage represents a methodological 
advancement in terms of how to approximate the idea of bridging cultural holes, which is in 
itself a contribution to the literature since the theory of cultural holes did not provide concrete 
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measures in its original formulation (Pachucki and Breiger 2010; but see Lizardo [2014] on 
how to measure cultural omnivorousness). 
Description of the Model: Generating Segregated Societies along a Bright Boundary 
A critical component of my analysis is to simulate social structures with theoretically 
informed, and fully tunable, levels of segregation based on nominal group distinctions. In 
order to do so, I follow Centola’s (2015; for an earlier formulation see Macy, Kitts, Flache and 
Benard [2003] and Latané [1981; 1996]) intuition in terms of modeling a society’s overall 
network structure as the result of the interaction between two forces: consolidation and 
homophily (Appendix A.1.1 presents the pseudo-code of the simulation program; the actual 
program is available at www.diegoleal.info). 
I take two steps to model consolidation. First, after populating the model with a given 
number of agents (N), each agent is bestowed with a nominal group membership (G). The 
number of possible groups has to lie in the following range 2 ≤ G ≤ x where {x : x є [3,∞) 
and x є +} and {G : G є +}. Once G is chosen by the user, each agent is randomly assigned 
to one, and only one, of the possible groups. I denote the resulting distribution of agents 
within groups as the primary boundary (PB). The more groups there are, the more 
“heterogeneous” the society is said to be (Blau and Schwartz 1984). Assume, for instance, that 
each agent in a hypothetical society is assigned a value in a tripartite racial categorization (e.g. 
white, black, or brown). The distribution of these three group categories across all agents 
would represent the primary boundary in this hypothetical society. The primary boundary 
always remains unchanged throughout the simulation process.  
Second, a set of secondary boundaries is generated. The number of secondary boundaries 
(B) is chosen by the user from the following range 2 ≤ B ≤ n where {n : n є [3,∞) and n є 
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+} and {B : B є +}. B determines how “complex” the structure society is, that is, the more 
secondary boundaries there are, the more social dimension along which agents traits will be 
distributed (Blau and Schwartz 1984).3  At the outset, these secondary boundaries are exact 
copies of PB. Third, using an iterative approach, the secondary boundaries are partially 
reshuffled in order to induce a specific level of correlation between each one of them and the 
primary boundary, that is, to induce correlations in the group memberships of each agent 
across all boundaries. All these bivariate correlations are measured via the Pearson correlation 
coefficient. When the average pair-wise correlation between all boundaries is equal to a user-
defined (target) level, the consolidation algorithm is said to have converged.4 I denote this 
user-defined (target) correlation level as Consolidation (C). This makes C the first free 
parameter of interest in the model. 
To model homophily, I take two steps. First, the algorithm picks one agent (ego) at 
random and then makes her select one of the social boundaries that comprise the 
sociodemographic (Blau) space of her society. The primary boundary and any of the secondary 
boundaries have an equal probability of being selected by ego. Second, based on a user-defined 
probability that I call Homophily Bias (H), ego creates one tie with a randomly selected alter 
that has her same group membership in the boundary she just selected in the previous step. 
This means that, with probability H, ego will create an in-group tie along the selected 
boundary. Otherwise (i.e. with probability 1 – H), ego is instructed to create a tie with a 
randomly selected out-group alter, that is, an alter that does not share ego’s group membership 
in the boundary under consideration. For instance, imagine a society with four boundaries 
                                                 
3 As a result, the total number of boundaries Btotal (primary boundary + secondary boundaries) will always be: 
Btotal = B + 1. 
4 I use a margin of error (F) of 0.001 to attain convergence. That means, for instance, that if C is set to 0.7, the 
algorithm will converge if the average correlation between boundaries fulfills the following inequality 0.699 ≤ F 
≤ 0.701. 
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comprised of nominal categories: race, class, gender, and religion. Furthermore, assume that 
ego randomly selects the religious boundary as the basis of her decision-making process. 
Assume further that ego happens to be Muslim. Then, with probability H, ego would select 
an alter that is also Muslim, and with probability 1 – H, ego would select as an associate a non-
Muslim alter. H is, therefore, the second free parameter of interest in the model. Finally, all 
the steps mentioned in this paragraph are repeated until a user-defined mean degree (Z) is 
reached. 
When different values of C and H are combined, societies with tunable levels of 
segregation due to varying levels of consolidation and homophily around the primary 
boundary are effectively realized. Since I only model societies where C is ≥ 0, and given that 
H is a probability, the following is always true: 0 ≤ C,H ≤ 1, where {C : C є (R+ U [0])} and 
{H : H є (R+ U [0])}.   
In the results section I will explicitly show how my model can indeed produce tunable 
levels of segregation based on different values of C and H. In order to measure the level of 
segregation along the primary boundary I will use two different measures: Modularity (Clauset, 
Newman and Moore 2004) and Moody’s Gross Segregation Index – GSI – (Moody 2001).  
On the one hand, modularity is a measure of community structure based on the 
fraction of observed in-group ties versus the expected fraction of randomly distributed ties. 
Based on the notation of Muff, Rao and Caflisch (2005), we have: 
Modularity = ∑ (𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 − [𝑎(𝑖)𝑒𝑛𝑑1𝑎(𝑖)𝑒𝑛𝑑2])                                  Eq. 2 
 Where k is the number of communities, eii is the fraction of ties in community i (i.e. Li 
/ Ltotal) and a(i)end1 a(i)end2 is the predicted fraction of ties with both ends in community i (i.e. 
[(Li)end1 (Li)end2] / (Ltotal)
2). High modularity means that ties within communities are more likely 
than one would expect by chance. Modularity lies in the range [-1,1] where positive numbers 
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represent the fact that in-group ties exceed the number expected by chance (Li and 
Schuurmans 2011). 
On the other hand, GSI measures the odds ratio of a tie between nodes of an in-group 
dyad (e.g. same-gender dyad) relative to a tie in an out-group dyad (e.g. different-gender dyad). 
When GSI is equal to 1, the odds of an in-group dyad equal the odds of an out-group dyad. 
This is a perfectly desegregated society. As GSI increases, the relative odds of an in-group tie 
(i.e. segregation) increases by a factor of GSI. Following Moody (2001: 692), I take the natural 
logarithm of GSI (i.e. ln[GSI]) so that the index ranges from -∞ to ∞. An important property 
of GSI is that it is independent of the number of agents in any particular group (Moody 2001). 
This also means that, if two societies (e.g. two high schools) with the same GSI but with 
different sizes were to be combined, the resulting level of segregation after pooling both 
societies – as measured by Moody’s GSI – would be the same (see Bojanawski and Corten 
2014 for a formal analysis of GSI).  
Modeling Diffusion: Adoption of Innovations across Boundaries 
In order to model diffusion, each agent has a binary variable, Ai, which defines if she 
is an adopter (Ai = 1) or a non-adopter (Ai = 0) at any given point in the simulation. In that 
context, I follow four steps to model diffusion. First, a seed agent (i.e. early adopter) is chosen. 
Four possible classes of seeds are available at this stage: popular agent (i.e. agent with highest 
number of ties), cultural broker (i.e. agent with the highest levels of intercultural capacity of 
brokerage), structural broker (i.e. agent with highest betweenness centrality5) and random 
agent (i.e. one agent chosen at random). Then, all the seed agent’s immediate neighbors are 
                                                 
5 Betweenness centrality was formalized by Freeman (1977) and it is proportionate the number of geodesics 
(shortest paths) in the network that pass through a given agent.  
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also activated (i.e. Ai = 1). This set of early adopters (i.e. the seed plus her neighbors) is called 
the seed neighborhood (Centola 2015; Centola and Macy 2007).  
Second, before the simulation of diffusions starts, all agents calculate the distance 
between themselves and all other alters in the society. In order to do so, I use the simple 
matching coefficient (SMC), a measure of similarity for nominal variables (Šulc 2014; Boriah, 
Chandola and Kumar 2008). This coefficient assigns a 1 to instances in which the group 
membership of agent i (ego) and agent j (alter) matches in the context of the kth boundary (Bk). 
Then, after going through all boundaries, the result is divided by the total number of 
boundaries. The SMC thus ranges between 0 (i.e. perfect cultural dissimilarity between ego 
and alter) and 1 (i.e. perfect cultural similarity between ego and alter).6 Formally, 
𝑆(𝐵𝑘𝑖 ,  𝐵𝑘𝑗) = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑘𝑖 =  𝐵𝑘𝑗 
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑘𝑖 ≠  𝐵𝑘𝑗
 
    
SMCij = 
∑ 𝑆(𝐵𝑘𝑖 , 𝐵𝑘𝑗) 
𝑑
𝑘=1
𝑑
 
                       Eq. 3 
Where k represent the boundary under consideration, d is the total number of 
boundaries; and Bki and Bkj represent the group membership of agent i and agent j in the 
context of the kth boundary, respectively. As shown below, the relative cultural similarity 
between j and j will determine the baseline probability of influencing each other. A wealth of 
social simulation work also uses a linear approach to measure social distance (Carley 1991; 
Axelrod 1997; Kitts 2006b; Dimaggio and Garip 2011).7  
                                                 
6 That is, 0 ≤ SMC ≤ 1 where {SMC : SMC є (R+ U[0])} 
7 Since my model intends to generate networks segregated along symbolic boundaries based on nominal 
attributes, and given that social actors tend to perceive these boundaries as comprised by nominal attributes (e.g. 
black, white, Asian in the context of the ethnoracial boundary), the "ultrametric" distance measure of Watts et al. 
(2002; see also Centola 2015), and the assumptions it entails, are not suitable for my purposes. Critically, the 
ultrametic distance measure in the context of Centola’s (2015) simulation work requires a relatively large number 
of groups in the context of any given social dimension. Empirically, however, bright symbolic boundaries like 
those of gender, race, ethnicity, or sexuality are comprised by a relatively small number of categories (e.g. racial 
or gender identities). Indeed, Centola’s (2015) main findings assume that there are 32 different categories along 
any given social dimension. Moreover, even though Centola (2015) mentions that his results are robust to a 
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The actual simulation of diffusion starts in the third step. Here, each simulated round 
one randomly picked non-adopter i (Ai = 0) will change her behavior if a randomly chosen 
neighbor j has already adopted the innovation (Aj = 1) and the cultural similarity between 
agents i (ego) and j (alter) is greater or equal than a random number Ti drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean Tmean and standard deviation Tsd.
8 Ti is generated at the very beginning 
of the simulation process and acts as an individual-level decision threshold throughout the 
entire simulation. The higher the cultural similarity between i and j the higher the chances that 
it (i.e. the level of similarity) will indeed be greater than i’s adoption threshold (Ti), and thus 
the more likely that i will imitate j (for a conceptually similar approach see Carley 1991; Axelrod 
1997; Kitts 2006b).  
This assumption is consistent with the available and extremely robust evidence 
showing that similar individuals do tend to imitate/influence each other (Marsden and 
Friedkin 1993; Christakis and Fowler 2007; Centola 2011). Also, by using threshold effects, I 
follow a longstanding tradition in the literature on social simulation in which diffusion 
dynamics are modeled in the same way (Schelling 1978; Granovetter 1978; Macy 1991; Valente 
1995; Axelrod 1997; Centola, Willer, Macy 2005; DiMaggio and Garip 2011; Acemoglu, 
Ozdaglar and Yildiz 2011). In this body of work, the distribution of adoption thresholds has 
also been assumed to be normal (Granovetter 1978; Macy 1991; Valente 1995; Dimaggio and 
Garip 2011). Diffusion is stopped when a user-defined number of iterations (Q) is reached. 
                                                 
minimum number of 8 categories per social dimension, it is also true that in such a scenario he assumes that there 
are 400 agents in each one of those 8 groups. In sum, therefore, the use of the ultrametric distance in the context 
of Centola's (2015) foundational work is directly related to both network size and the society's level of 
heterogeneity (i.e. number of groups). My analyses, on the other hand, are geared towards much smaller and 
denser networks, thus aiming at expanding the results previously reported in the literature (see results sections 
for more details). 
8 In this case, 0 ≤ Tmean, Tsd ≤ 1 where { Tmean : Tmean є (R+ U [0])} and { Tsd: Tsd є (R+ U [0])} 
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In terms of the outcomes under analysis, the overall proportion of adopters (Aoverall) is 
calculated at the end of the simulation. Critically, based on the seed agent’s (for simplicity, 
“ego’s”) group membership in the context of the primary boundary, the proportion of ego’s 
in-group (Ain) and out-group adopters (Aout) in the society at large is also calculated. Both Ain 
and Aout are direct measures of the ability of a given ego (i.e. a given seed agent) to spread an 
innovation widely. These three outcomes are measured as follows: 
 
Aoverall = ∑ 𝐴𝑖 
𝑁𝑛𝑠
𝑖=1
𝑁𝑛𝑠
                                                                                             eq. 4 
 
Ain = ∑  𝐴𝑖 𝐺𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑
𝑁𝑛𝑠
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐺𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑
𝑁𝑛𝑠  
𝑖=1
                                                                                    eq. 5 
 
Aout = ∑ 𝐴𝑖 ǀ𝐺𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 − 1) ǀ
𝑁𝑛𝑠
𝑖=1
∑ ǀ𝐺𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 − 1) ǀ
𝑁𝑛𝑠
𝑖=1
                                                                             eq. 6 
 
Where Nns is the set of all agents that are not part of the seed neighborhood; Ai = 1 if 
the ith agent adopted the innovation, and 0 otherwise; and Gi,seed = 1 if the i
th agent has the 
same group membership in the primary boundary as the seed agent, and 0 otherwise. 
Results 
Emergence of Segregation in Simulated Networks 
In order to briefly explore the emergence of segregation in the context of the emergent 
networks, I held constant mean degree (Z=5), population size (N=300), number of secondary 
boundaries (B=9), and the number of groups (G=5). I then conducted computational 
experiments in which I systematically varied consolidation (C) and homophily (H). 
Appendices A.1.2 through A.1.6 show robustness checks that are the result of varying Z, N, 
B, and G.  
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As can be seen in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, the algorithm successfully reproduces tunable 
levels of segregation along the primary boundary. See, for instance, mid-level consolidation (C 
=0.5) in Table 1.1. In that context, if the level of homophily is increased from its minimum 
(H=0) to its maximum (H=1), then the overall level of segregation along the primary 
boundary goes from -0.256 to 0.255. This means, for instance, that even when homophily is 
at its maximum (H=1), only half of the time ego ends up selecting an in-group alter as an 
associate precisely because of the structural influence of consolidation (for a graphical 
representation see the mid panel in Fig. 1.2).  
Here it is important to note that Modularity can only reach a maximum of 0.5 in the 
presence of two modules/groups (G=2), which is a constraint imposed to Tables 1.1 and 1.2. 
In other words, when G = 2, a Modularity of 0.5 means that ties are indeed perfectly split (i.e. 
segregated) into two communities. This scenario is achieved when C = 1 and H = 1 (for a 
graphical representation see the right panel in Fig. 1.2). Finally, another interesting feature of 
my model is that random graphs emerge when C = 0 (i.e. no average correlation between 
boundaries) and H = 1 / G. Indeed, as Table 1.1 shows, the average Modularity for C = 0 
and H = 0.5 = (1/G) is 0.001, a level of Modularity very close to 0 (for a graphical 
representation see the left panel in Fig. 1.2).  
As shown in Table 1.2, substantially similar results are achieved if GSI is used to 
measure segregation. Infinity is a possible result in Table 1.2 because the denominator of the 
odds ratio of a tie between nodes of an in-group dyad relative to a tie in an out-group dyad 
can be 0 when there are no instances of out-group dyads (C=1, H=1) or when there are no 
instances of in-group dyads (C=1, H=0). Tables and Figures in Appendices A.1.2 through 
A.1.6 show qualitatively similar results for different values of the secondary parameters. 
Furthermore, Figure 1.3 shows graphic results after changing G (i.e. for G = 3 and G = 4). 
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Once I have shown that tunable levels of segregation along the primary boundary are 
produced by my algorithm, I can focus on the central topic of this study: the role of cultural 
brokers in the diffusion dynamics observed in segregated networks. In this context, I will 
proceed in the same way that I have in the section above. That is, I will systematically vary 
consolidation (C) and homophily (H) while holding constant the other parameters of the 
model (e.g. Z, N, B). After doing so, I will conduct robustness checks in order to show that 
my results do not depend on the specific parameter values I used in the baseline model.  
Diffusion of Innovations 
As mentioned in the introduction, in this study I am particularly interested in analyzing 
the diffusion of innovations in relatively small, well-bounded, societies. In this context, the 
population size (N) of my baseline model will be 300 since that is the average size of high 
schools in the US according to evidence from the Add Health data set (Moody 2001). This 
empirical reference is important because the schools in the Add Health data set have been 
shown to exhibit high levels of segregation along bright symbolic boundaries like the 
ethnoracial boundary (Joyner and Kao 2000; Moody 2001; Goodreau et al. 2009) and, more 
importantly, these schools have also proven to be fertile ground to detect and study network-
based diffusion dynamics (Shoham et al. 2012; Abrutyn and Mueller 2014; adams and Schaefer 
2016; Kreager and Hayynie 2011; Moody 2002). Importantly, a society of 300 agents is small 
but not too small to be considered a community in which all individuals know each other; a 
situation that will likely reduce the role of networks on diffusion dynamics. In the social 
simulation literature such (close-knit) “communities” have been assumed to have an N of 100 
(Mäs, Flache and Helbing 2010).   
 31 
 
In terms of mean degree (Z), I chose a value of 5 for the baseline model, which is the 
average number of close friends that adolescents report in the Add Health data set (Mundt 
and Zakletskaia 2014). Here it is important to note that, given the sizes of N and Z used in 
this study, my results are based on networks with densities that are larger than those typically 
reported in the simulation literature on network topology and diffusion dynamics (Watts 1999; 
Newman 2000; Watts et al. 2002; Centola 2015). Thus, the present study significantly expands 
this literature by studying denser and smaller networks.9                                                                 
As mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, the available evidence clearly shows 
that race is the closest to a bright symbolic boundary in the US in general, and in adolescent 
societies in particular (Christakis and Fowler 2007, 2013; McPherson 2001; Hallinan and 
Williams 1987; Joyner and Kao 2000; Moody 2001; Goodreau et al. 2009). Since race in the 
US is typically described and measured using 5 different ethnoracial groups, I set group 
membership (G) to 5 in the baseline model. Similarly, the number of secondary boundaries 
(B) I use in the baseline model is 9, for a total (Btotal) of 10 boundaries (i.e. 1 primary boundary 
plus 9 secondary boundaries).  
Finally, in the baseline model I assume that adoption thresholds are randomly drawn 
from a normal distribution with Tmean = 0.5 and Tsd = 0.05. I chose these values because they 
represent an intuitive baseline scenario in which the expected value of the similarity between 
ego and alter across all boundaries has to be greater or equal than 50% in order for diffusion 
to be a possibility. However, as mentioned earlier, all the parameters mentioned above, 
including Tmean and Tsd, will be varied when conducting robustness checks. 
                                                 
9 Centola (2015) reports that his results hold in large sparse networks where the density is ~0.006, at a maximum. 
My baseline model (where N = 300 and Z = 5), on the other hand, exhibits a density more than twice as large 
(~0.017). 
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In the context of the baseline model described above, Figure 1.4 shows overall levels 
of adoption after systematically varying C and H using four different ways (i.e. conditions) to 
select the early innovator: random, degree centrality (i.e. popular agents), betweenness 
centrality (i.e. structural brokers), and intercultural capacity for brokerage (i.e. cultural brokers). 
The results are presented using heatmaps where darker colors represent higher levels of 
adoption. For reference, the actual average adoption level in each sampled cell is also included 
in all heatmaps. The results are reported after averaging 100 independent realizations per 
condition.  
The first finding that deserves to be highlighted in the context of Figure 1.4 is that my 
results reproduce the main results reported by Centola’s (2015) paper on the social origins of 
networks and diffusion. That is, on the one hand, I find that highly consolidated populations 
imply relatively low levels of overall diffusion due to the existence of highly segregated groups 
(see the upper-right corner – i.e. where C≥ 9 and H ≥ 9 – of the heatmaps in Fig. 1.4). This 
finding is consistent with classic work that highlights the necessity of cross-cutting ties across 
segregated groups in order for diffusion to emerge (Blau and Schwartz 1984). If groups are 
extremely segregated, these cross-cutting ties are very few to non-existent. On the other hand, 
this classic literature misses the fact that when consolidation is minimal (e.g. when C is less 
than ~0.4 in Fig. 1.4), the levels of clustering (i.e. segregation) that could sustain wide diffusion 
dynamics are in fact eliminated too (Centola 2015).  
Even though all four plots present in Figure 1.4 are qualitatively consistent with 
Centola’s (2015) finding, clearly not all plots support that conclusion to the same extent. 
Indeed, the overall level of adoption when random agents are chosen as seeds (upper-left 
heatmap in Fig. 1.4) is much lower than the overall level of adoption when cultural brokers 
are chosen as seeds (lower-right heatmap in Fig. 1.4). The latter scenario is indeed more 
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consistent with the findings reported by Centola (2015). I argue that this is the case because 
cultural brokers have cross-cutting ties across the groups along which society is segregated. 
Therefore, where segregation is actually likely to be more conducive to sustain diffusion 
dynamics (C > ~0.4 and H > ~0.5), cultural brokers emerge as better prepared to bridge 
agents of (culturally) dissimilar backgrounds. As can be seen in Fig. 1.4, cultural brokers not 
only achieve higher levels of diffusion when compared to randomly chosen seeds; they also 
do so when compared to popular agents (upper-right heatmap) or structural brokers (lower-
left heatmap).  
A way to better understand these results is by explicitly mapping in-group vs. out-
group-adoption. As can be seen in Figure 1.5, in-group adoption – here defined as adoption by 
agents that share the seed agent’s group membership in the primary boundary – is very similar 
across conditions. In general, seed agents of any kind are very successful at diffusing the 
innovation across socially close alters in the network topologies in which social diffusion 
spreads widely (C > ~0.4 and H > ~0.5). 
Figure 1.6 shows very different results, however. In this scenario, out-group adoption – 
here defined as adoption by agents that do not share the seed agent’s group membership in 
the primary boundary – is very different across conditions. More precisely, Figure 1.6 (out-
group adoption) shows very similar levels of variation than those reported in Figure 1.4 
(overall adoption). This provides evidence that the key force behind overall adoption is related 
to the fact that cultural brokers are indeed more successful at spanning cultural holes in 
segregated societies by spreading innovations to socially dissimilar alters (Figure 1.6), not only 
to similar alters (Figure 1.5). As a way to summarize the evidence in favor of the effectiveness 
of cultural brokers, Figure 1.7 subtracts the levels of out-group adoption derived from all the 
least effective strategies (i.e. random, popular agents, structural brokers) from the results 
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obtained by the most effective strategy (i.e. cultural brokers). In Figure 1.7, therefore, larger 
positive numbers (i.e. darker cells) are indicative of the degree to which cultural brokers are 
more effective at diffusing an innovation. Figure 1.7 clearly suggests that selecting cultural 
brokers as seeds has a decisive advantage over choosing seeds at random (upper-left heatmap), 
based on their popularity (upper-right heatmap), or based on their betweenness centrality 
(lower-left heatmap). The effectiveness of cultural brokers is clearly useful in topologies where 
their cross-cutting ties are needed the most (i.e. C > ~0.4 and H > ~0.5).  
Finally, I also tested the importance of intercultural brokerage, as opposed to 
brokerage more generally. In order to do so I created a “null” version of brokerage (see Gould 
1989). In this new measure, any node that bridges two unconnected alters irrespectively of their 
group membership is considered to have capacity for brokerage. This means that null brokerage 
removes the term m(ik) from equation 1. Results are presented in Figure 1.8 (null brokerage), 
which after being compared with the results from Figure 1.7 (intercultural brokerage), show 
that the latter strategy is more effective at diffusing the innovation. In a word, the results show 
that it is the in-betweenness across different groups, not the general (i.e. null) capacity for 
brokerage, what makes cultural brokers successful.  
Robustness Across Group size (G), Number of Boundaries (B), and Adoption 
Threshold (Tmean & Tsd) 
The results reported above show that agents at the interstices of bright boundaries 
have a high capacity of spanning cultural holes, thus potentially having the ability to make 
segregated networks more compact by bridging people located in (culturally) distant worlds. 
My results also replicate key foundational findings regarding the effects of consolidation and 
homophily for the diffusion of innovations. Finally, my results also extend these foundational 
findings to smaller and denser networks than previously reported in the literature, thus 
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expanding the scope conditions of the literature on the effects of (segregated) network 
topologies and diffusion dynamics.   
In this context, I explored the robustness of my results by increasing and/or 
decreasing the number of groups (i.e. 3 ≤ G ≤ 10), the number of total boundaries (i.e. 5 ≤ 
Btotal ≤ 15), the mean adoption threshold (i.e. 0.4 ≤ Tmean ≤ 0.7), and the adoption standard 
deviation (i.e. 0.01 ≤ Tsd ≤ 0.15). Following Centola (2015) I held constant N (300) and Z (5) 
in order to not conflate network density effects with the structural effects of C and H. My 
results hold after all these variations.  
Take for instance the results after manipulating Tmean. Figure 1.9 shows a comparison 
between the diffusion patterns of cultural brokers vs. structural brokers, the most effective 
and second most effective intervention strategies reported in Figures 1.4, 1.6, and 1.7. As can 
be seen in Figure 1.9, going from a relatively low (Tmean = 0.4) to a relatively high (Tmean = 0.7) 
adoption thresholds does not change the qualitative conclusions reached earlier. That is, 
cultural brokers are still more effective than structural brokers at spreading an innovation in 
the context of network topologies that happen to exhibit levels of segregation that are 
conducive to widespread diffusion. Figures in Appendix A.1.7 show similar evidence for the 
other parameters (G, B, Tsd) 
Appendix A.1.7 also incorporates robustness checks for the number of iterations (Q) 
and the introduction of noise (M). On the one hand, robustness checks show that my results 
remain true if the model runs for 50000 instead 10000 iterations. On the other hand, my results 
also remain true after incorporating different levels of behavioral noise (0 < M ≤ 0.1). 
Behavioral noise is the probability that ego will influence one of her (adopter) alters to become 
a non-adopter rather than the other way around (i.e. alter influencing ego to become an 
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adopter). This means that M can also be conceptualized as negative influence (Kitts 2006b; 
Dellaposta et al. 2015). 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The intuition behind this study is relatively simple: liminality, or the state of being in-
between two or more culturally distinct groups, is a key force behind an individuals’ ability to 
span cultural holes in the context of segregated societies. In this context, I have also argued 
that people with liminal identities might be seen as skilled cultural translators that, precisely 
because of their hybrid identities, tend to occupy in-between positions in social structure. In 
turn, these positions allow them to make culturally segregated networks more compact by 
influencing their out-group alters at a significant rate. The results presented in this study 
support this basic intuition. More precisely, I have reported that the intercultural capacity for 
brokerage does help to identify agents with high potential for spreading an innovation in 
societies segregated along bright symbolic boundaries.  
This Chapter complicates the ideas of liminality and brokerage by emphasizing their 
potential burdens (cf. Burt 2004). There is important evidence that shows that subjects with 
liminal identities often struggle in their daily lives precisely because of their cultural hybridity 
(Anzaldúa 1987; Wang and Collins 2016). Taking steps to develop a critical theory of 
brokerage was therefore needed in order to not portray a naïve image of liminal agents in 
general, and cultural brokerage in particular.  
Further empirical and theoretical work must be carried out to identify the conditions 
under which culturally liminal individuals find themselves in structurally-advantageous 
positions to bridge structural holes. In this regard, the literature has very often assumed that 
network positions determine culture and identity. For instance, network positions in exchange 
systems are known to impact how third parties assign potential exchange partners to status 
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orderings and cognitive categories (Podolny 2001; Zuckerman 1999, 2000). However, much 
less is known in the opposite direction, that is, on how culture and identity determine network 
positions in general (Lizardo 2004), and actors’ likelihood of being in structural positions that 
facilitate the brokering of cultural holes in particular. In this Chapter I have shown how 
exhibiting a liminal position across a bright symbolic boundary does put actors at a greater risk 
of bridging culturally segregated networks. It is yet to be determined which specific 
mechanisms push individuals to develop expansive cross-cutting networks, especially knowing 
how costly and sometimes even painful it is to span cultural holes. 
I believe that one possibility in this regard might be related with the overall (group-
level) distribution of cultural identities (e.g. group memberships) observed in a given society. 
Indeed, there is tangential evidence showing that, in the context of US high schools, Latinos 
are more likely to act as bridges between racial groups if they (Latinos) are a significantly large 
group (Goodreau et al. 2009). In that same article the authors show that whites segregate at 
higher rates than any other group when they are a numeric minority.  This could mean, from 
a more general point of view, that when potential (racial) brokers feel that their cultural identity 
is sufficiently represented in a given society, they are more willing to put themselves “out 
there;” that is, to negotiate and broker cultural differences vis-à-vis the culturally 
(economically, politically, etc.) dominant group. 
Finally, in this Chapter I developed a new algorithm to generate relatively small 
artificial societies with tunable levels of segregation. This is in itself a contribution to the 
literature on network topology and diffusion since the existing literature focuses on large and 
sparse networks (Centola 2015; Watts 1999; Watts et al. 2002). In this context, my results show 
that the structural effects of network topology on network-based diffusion dynamics can also 
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be found in relatively small and dense networks; thus expanding the scope conditions of 
previously reported findings. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DIFFUSION AS THE BRIDGING OF CULTURAL HOLES: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
There is a vast literature documenting the existence of an obesity epidemic in the US 
adolescent population (Ogden et al. 2012; Valente et al. 2009; Salvy et al. 2012; Swallen et al. 
2005). Obesity does not only affect the U.S. youth population, however. In fact, it is a disease 
with global prevalence (Malik, Walter and Hu 2013; Ng et al. 2014). The study of obesity is 
critical because it is a determinant of negative health outcomes like cardiovascular risk and 
cardiovascular mortality (Gunnell et al. 1998; Wilson et al. 2002), while also co-occurring with 
depression (Ladwig et al. 2006; Luppino et al. 2010) and stigmatization (Sutin and Terracciano 
2013; Puhl and Heuer 2010; Mooney and El-Sayed 2016).  
In particular, the study of obesity in adolescent networks has opened the door to a 
fairly recent and continuously growing literature that conceptualizes friendship as a key factor 
to explain health outcomes (Couzin 2009; Salvy et al. 2012; Macdonald-Wallis, Jago and Sterne 
2012). This research stream was originally inspired by a series of foundational papers by 
Christakis and Fowler (2007, 2008) and Fowler and Christakis (2009) in which obesity, 
smoking, and happiness were found to spread through friendship networks of adults (for a 
critique see Cohen-Cole and Fletcher [2008]; for a response see Christakis and Fowler [2013]). 
Two key findings in this literature are that obese adolescents tend to be marginalized and that 
adolescent friendship networks are highly clustered by obesity status, that is, obese adolescents 
tend to be connected to one another (Shoham et al. 2012; de la Haye 2011b; Halliday and 
Kwak 2009; Valente et al. 2009).  
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In this context, multidisciplinary teams have acted upon the call made by the National 
Institutes of Health (Halloran et al. 2008; Gortmaker et al. 2011) to apply systems science 
methods – like network analysis and agent-based models – to understand and prevent the 
spread of disease in general, and of obesity in particular. Encouraging advances have indeed 
been made within this literature in terms of developing strategies to effectively model and/or 
shape health outcomes (Esptein 2009; Mabry et al.  2010; Valente 2012; Paluck, Sheperd and 
Aronow 2016), including weight-related behaviors (Bahr et al. 2009; Centola 2010; Shoham et 
al. 2012; Zhang et al. 2015a, 2015b; Mooney and El-Sayed 2016).  
This literature recognizes the ability of agent-based modeling to build sound 
epidemiological models given that this methodology explicitly incorporates complex 
interdependencies among individuals, and between them and their environment (Homer and 
Hirsch 2006; Sterman 2006; Fenichel et al. 2011; El-Sayed et al. 2012; Mooney and El-Sayed 
2016; Bruch and Atwell 2015; Epstein 2009; Burke et al. 1996). In particular, since obesity 
tends to be clustered, the design of effective interventions to control it must take into account 
how obese individuals affect – and are affected by – their social contacts; something that can 
be done rather naturally via agent-based modeling (Bahr et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2015a, 2015b; 
Mooney and El-Sayed 2016). Moreover, social simulation methods can also increase the utility 
of existing empirical network data (e.g. Moody and Benton 2016; Morris et al. 2009; Schaefer, 
adams and Hass 2016); this is critical because network data are typically very expensive to 
collect and/or extend (Marsden 2011).  
The usefulness of simulation methods to design interventions is especially powerful 
when empirically calibrated simulations are theoretically guided by a general model (Bruch and 
Atwell 2015), which is the case in this Chapter. Indeed, my general goal here is to test the main 
conclusion reached in Chapter 1. More precisely, in this Chapter I aim to provide empirical 
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evidence that cultural brokers – understood as individuals with a high capacity for intercultural 
brokerage – are highly capable of making networks more compact by bridging individuals that 
belong to culturally distinct (i.e. segregated) worlds.  
In order to do so, I closely follow the simulation work of Shoham et al. (2012) and 
Zhang and colleagues (2015a, 2015b). More precisely, I first use statistical coefficients obtained 
from applying the stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM) of Snijders (Snijders 1996, 2001; 
Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich 2010) to data on friendship nominations and BMI. Then, I 
use those coefficients as inputs in an agent-based model to simulate the co-evolution of BMI 
and friendship nominations. These coefficients are thus used to calibrate an agent-based model 
aimed to reproduce how both BMI and a network of friendship nominations empirically co-
evolve overtime.10 Critically, once this empirical calibration is achieved, I create a set of 
interventions that mimic, to the best extent possible, the computational experiments I 
conducted in Chapter 1. Because the SAOM is in itself an agent-oriented statistical model, 
empirically calibrating an agent-based model with SAOM-estimated coefficients is a 
methodologically sound decision (Shoham et al. 2012; Zhang et al. 2015a, 2015b; Schaefer et. 
al 2013; adams and Schaefer 2016). 
The analyses in this Chapter will focus on two manipulations: the selection of a class 
of seed innovator (S) (i.e. random agent, popular agent, structural broker, or cultural broker) 
and the effectiveness (E) of the intervention itself. Here the intervention is modeled as an 
artificial diet implemented as a reduction of BMI experienced by the seed agent, and her 
immediate neighbors, at baseline. The more effective the “diet” is, the more weight (i.e. BMI 
units) the agents in the seed neighborhood will lose at the beginning of the simulation. On the 
                                                 
10 I was originally introduced to this methodology, and helped refine it, in the context of the R01 NIH Grant 
HD-086259 (PIs: James Kitts and John Sirard).  
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one hand, I chose the four classes of seed innovators mentioned above in order to create a 
clear comparison between the empirically-calibrated results presented in this Chapter and the 
results from the agent-based model introduced in Chapter 1. On the other hand, following 
Zhang et al. (2015a), I chose effectiveness (E) as a way to model a health-related innovation 
(i.e. a reduction in BMI experienced by the seed innovator). Therefore, this Chapter will be 
devoted to document the impact of this artificial diet on aggregate-level changes in BMI 
exhibited by the population under analysis.  
Methods 
I draw on SAOM parameter estimates reported by Shoham et al. (2012) and Zhang et 
al. (2015a) to empirically calibrate an agent-based model. These two studies use data from the 
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) to model the co-evolution of 
friendship nomination and adolescent body size. Here I focus on data of 621 students 
observed at two time points in one specific high school commonly refer to in the literature as 
“Jefferson High” (Moody 2001). Due to its size and completeness, Jefferson High has been 
the focus of several network-based epidemiological and methodological papers in the past 
(Moody 2002; Bearman, Moody and Stovel 2004; Schaefer, Haas, and Bishop 2012; Shoham 
et al. 2012; Schaefer, adams, and Haas 2013; Zhang et al. 2015a; Rolls et al. 2015; Stadtfeld, 
Hollway and Block 2017).  
Critically, one of the defining characteristics of this school is that it is 95% White (see 
descriptive statistics in Appendix A.2.1). By design, therefore, this leaves gender as an ideal 
candidate to study the emergence of cultural segregation along a bright symbolic boundary in 
the context of Jefferson High. Indeed, studies supporting the role of gender as a cultural trait 
that is key to understanding segregation in friendship nominations in general, and in Jefferson 
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High in particular, are legion (Thorne and Luria 1986; Leaper 1994; Goodreau, Kitts and 
Morris 2009; Mehta and Strough 2009; Faris and Felmlee 2011; Shoham et al. 2012; Zhang et 
al 2005a; Schaefer, Haas, and Bishop 2012; Schaefer, adams, and Haas 2013). To be sure, the 
“brightness” (Alba 2005) of the gender boundary in Jefferson High is important in this 
Chapter since a more direct empirical test of the theory developed in Chapter 1 relies on the 
existence of at least one such bright boundary. 
After doing a brief description of the SAOM estimation method, I will proceed to 
replicate results showing that the SAOM estimated coefficients of Jefferson High reported in 
the literature can indeed be effectively used to simulate the emergence of the empirical 
distribution of BMI in this school. I will do so using my previous work with James Kitts.11  In 
a word, I will show how the agent-based model reported in Zhang et al. (2015a) can reproduce 
the BMI distribution of Jefferson High at Wave 2 after simulating the interactions between 
students based on the network and demographic information contained in Wave 1 only. After 
conducting such empirical validation, I will proceed to report and analyze the experiments 
designed in the context of this Chapter. These experiments will manipulate, at baseline, the 
BMI of purposively targeted agents in Jefferson High. Critically, the characteristics of all agents 
(e.g. gender, friendship nomination ties, BMI, age, grade, etc.) will correspond to those of the 
actual Jefferson High students reported in Wave 1 (for a similar simulation approach based on 
“realistic” agents see DiMaggio and Garip 2012). 
SAOM Estimation 
The SAOM is designed to perform inferential analyses of the stochastic processes 
governing the co-evolution of behavioral and network dynamics as if these dynamics were 
(theoretically) driven by actors’ decisions (Snijders et al. 2010; Snijders 2001; Ripley et al. 2018). 
                                                 
11 See footnote 10. 
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More precisely, the model assumes that discrete unobserved (network or behavioral) 
opportunities for change, also known as “micro steps” (Snijders 1996; Snijders et al. 2010), 
happen in continuous time between empirically observed data points or waves. The first wave 
of data is not modeled but conditioned upon, which means that there have to be at least two 
waves of data in order to use the SAOM (Snijders et al. 2010). Parameters are estimated using 
the method of moments implemented by means of computer simulation in the RSiena 
software (Ripley, Boitmanis and Snijders 2017; Ripley et al. 2018).  
Since the SAOM assumes that ties represent enduring states – instead of events (cf. 
Butts 2008) – changing throughout a series of micro steps, the evolving network is assumed 
to be the outcome of a continuous time Markov process (Snijders et al. 2010; Snijders 2001). 
In this Chapter, the network is a binary directed graph representing friendship nominations 
between students. The behavioral variable is students’ BMI. 
The SAOM further assumes that only one type of change, either network or 
behavioral, can happen at any given micro step (Steglich, Snijders and Pearson 2010). The 
network and behavioral opportunities for change happen at a speed controlled by a network 
rate function and a behavioral rate function, respectively. Moreover, at each micro step, only 
one randomly selected actor (i.e. ego) is deemed the opportunity for change (Snijders 1996; 
Snijders et al. 2010; Snijders 2001). In this Chapter, both rate functions are assumed to be 
constant across actors, which means that the change opportunity processes do not depend on 
actors’ attributes (e.g. their in-degree).  
Once the opportunity for either network or behavioral change is granted to a given 
actor, one of three things can happen, depending on whether it is a network change or 
behavioral change: a) there is a positive change (i.e. the creation of an out-going tie or a one-
unit increase in the behavior variable); b) there is a negative change (i.e. the elimination of an 
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out-going tie or a one-unit decrease in the behavior variable); or c) there is no change. Two 
separate discrete (multinomial) choice functions are used to probabilistically evaluate the 
relative likelihood of these three mutually exclusive possibilities (Snijders et al. 2010; Steglich, 
Snijders and Pearson 2010). These choice functions are known as the network objective function 
(for network changes) and the behavioral objective function (for behavioral changes). These 
functions thus govern the behavioral and network processes being modeled. Once successfully 
estimated, the individual parameter values obtained in the context of these choice functions 
will characterize the role of each effect (e.g. the out-degree effect in the network objective 
function) in the contribution to an accurate reproduction of the network and behavioral 
dynamics observed in the data. 
Continuing with an actor-based interpretation of the model, when given the 
opportunity for either network or behavioral change, the selected ego is assumed to 
“myopically” strive for higher values of her objective (network or behavioral) function in a 
stochastic fashion (Snijders 2005). This is said to be a myopic decision-making process because 
ego is subject to the restrictions imposed by the current state of the “world” (e.g. the state of 
the friendship nomination network and the distribution of BMI at a given micro step). 12 It is 
because of this rather natural choice-based theoretic interpretation of the SAOM that it can 
be in direct communication with agent-based models13.  
                                                 
12 In the standard version of the SAOM (e.g. Snijders et al. 2010) – which is the one used in this Chapter – actors 
cannot coordinate to change their behavior or ties in a given micro step. Only ego is under control of what to do 
regarding her out-going ties. All the information she needs in order to make a decision is assumed to be available 
to her in the context of a given micro step. It is also assumed that, in a given micro step, ego has full information 
about her and all actors’ attributes, as well as about the current state of the network. 
13 This does not mean that SAOM is the only inferential method for the analysis of network dynamics that is 
consistent with an actor-based theoretical interpretation (see, for instance, the relational even history model Butts 
2008, 2017; Kitts et al. 2017). 
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Based on Zhang et al. (2015a) and Shoham et al. (2012), the specific network objective 
function used in this Chapter is determined by three distinct types of effects:  
a) Structural effects (number of out-going ties, number of reciprocal ties, and 
number of transitive triplets) 
b) Homophilous selection effects (sex, grade, age, and income similarity vis-à-vis 
alters); and 
c) Behavior-related effects (ego’s BMI; alters’ BMI; similarity on BMI).  
 
Similarly, the behavior objective function used in this Chapter is determined by three 
effects: 
a) Linear behavior shape; 
b) Quadratic behavior shape; and  
c) BMI average similarity (i.e. peer influence).  
 
The specific functional form and meaning of the effects listed above is explained in 
great detail in Shoham et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2015a). The actual estimated values of 
these effects are presented in Table 2.1 
As a way to check the robustness of the methodology used in this Chapter, I replicated 
the results reported in Table 2.1. Results can be found in Appendix A.2.2 Convergence of the 
replicated model was very good and coefficients indeed had the same direction and similar 
sizes vis-à-vis those reported by Shoham et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2015a). These results 
gave me initial confidence about the robustness of the coefficients reported in Table 2.1 as 
tools to effectively model the co-evolution of BMI and friendship nominations in Jefferson 
High. 
Experimental Manipulation 
I manipulated both the seed innovator type (S) and the effectiveness of the artificial 
diet (E) to evaluate their impact on BMI. Closely following the experimental designed 
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developed in Chapter 1, there are four types of seed innovators available: popular agent (the 
agent with the highest in-degree), structural broker (the agent with the highest betweenness 
centrality), cultural broker (the agent with the highest intercultural capacity for brokerage, or 
IB14), and random agent (an agent picked at random). Again, following the experimental design 
used in Chapter 1, once the top agent in any of the four cases mentioned above is selected 
(e.g. the agent with highest in-degree if the option “popular agent” is chosen), all her 
immediate neighbors are also selected to be targets of the intervention, thus effectively 
reproducing the idea of seed neighborhood used in Chapter 1 (see also Centola and Macy 2007; 
Centola 2015).  
 After selecting a given seed innovator, and her immediate neighbors, all of them are 
subject to an intervention thought of as an artificial diet (Zhang et al 2015a). The effectiveness 
(E) of the diet is measured in the number of BMI units the selected agents (i.e. those in the 
seed neighborhood) will lose as a result of going through a diet. In the present Chapter, the 
effectiveness of the diet is an integer number between 1 and 5. After the agents in the seed 
neighborhood get their BMI reduced by E number of units, the simulation starts. The 
simulation is designed to reproduce a year of interactions between the students in Jefferson 
High. The actual number of iterations within a given simulation run is determined by the 
behavior and network rate functions empirically estimated from the data through the SAOM 
(see Table 2.1).  
More precisely, the number of iterations is given by the sum of the rate parameter for 
network change (12.87) and the rate parameter for behavior change (4.17). In that context, a 
                                                 
14 See Chapter 1, especially equation 1. Since in chapter 1 IB was measured in the context of undirected networks, 
for the present Chapter I measured IB after symmetrizing the network of friendship nominations using the 
“strong” rule (Butts 2016, Goodreau et al. 2009). The original (directed) network was left untouched for all other 
analysis and simulations. 
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random integer is selected from a Poisson distribution with mean 17.04 (12.87 + 4.17 = 17.04). 
The resulting number is then multiplied by the total number of agents (n = 621). The outcome 
becomes the number of iterations (or “micro steps” in SAOM parlance) effectively carried out 
in a given simulation run. An important feature of the Poisson distribution is that it represents 
the probability of a given number of events (e.g. iterations) in a fixed interval of time with a 
constant rate that is independent of the time since the last event (Haight 1967). This property 
– sometimes called memorylessness – is both a signature of exponential distributions (of non-
negative) numbers like the Poisson distribution and a key assumption of the SAOM given its 
continuous time Markov chain nature (Snijders 1996, 2001, 2005).  
After calculating the number of iterations to be carried out in a given run, the agent-
based model uses the network of friendship nominations, BMI, and non-BMI individual-level 
variables (e.g. gender, grade, age, in-degree) reported in Wave 1 as the initial conditions for the 
simulation. All the parameter values reported in Table 2.1, which control the dynamics of the 
simulation model, are held constant throughout the simulation. The critical point here is that 
agents’ behaviors are indeed (stochastically) governed by the coefficients in Table 2.1. More 
precisely, this means that the agent-based model I use in this Chapter is specially designed to 
incorporate the coefficients in Table 2.1 into a customized algorithm that mimics the micro 
steps-based approach of the SAOM described at the beginning of this section (for technical 
details regarding this class of agent-based models see Zhang et al. 2015a, 2015b). In order to 
produce the results reported here I conducted 250 simulation runs per combination of seed 
innovator (S) and effectiveness (E), for a total of 20 possible combinations. 
Outcomes 
First, I measured overall overweight change (OWoverall), the percent change in the number 
of overweight students outside the seed neighborhood after a given simulation run. A negative 
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number in this context represents a reduction in the percentage of overweight agents (i.e. 
agents with BMI ≥ 23) before and after the simulation run. So, for instance, if there were 150 
overweight students outside the seed neighborhood at baseline, while there are only 50 after a 
simulation run finishes, then this will represent a reduction of  ({[50 – 150]/ 150} * 100) -
66.66% in the number of overweight students in the population. For reference, if no 
intervention (S) is implemented whatsoever, after 250 simulation runs OWoverall equals 15.26%, 
on average. To be sure, negative or small positive values of OWoverall represent a successful 
diffusion originated in the seed innovator’s behavior, that is, the successful contagion of a 
reduction in BMI originated in the seed innovator. 
 Second, I measure out-group overweight change (OWout) as the percent change in the 
number of out-group overweight students outside the seed neighborhood after a given 
simulation run. For instance, if the chosen seed innovator happens to be a girl, then OWout 
would represent the percent change in the number of overweight boys outside the seed 
neighborhood before and after the simulation. Finally, I measure in-group overweight change 
(OWin) as the percent change in the number of in-group overweight students outside the seed 
neighborhood after a given simulation run. This means that if the chosen seed innovator 
happens to be a girl, then OWin would represent the percent change in the number of girls 
outside the seed innovator’s neighborhood. Critically, OWall, OWout, and OWin are the 
empirical operationalization of Aoverall, OWout, and OWin derived in Chapter 1, respectively (see 
equations 4, 5, and 6 in Chapter 1). 
Results 
I start by validating the ability of the agent-based model to simulate the evolution of 
BMI in Jefferson High based on the coefficients in Table 2.1. To do so, I averaged the 
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estimated BMI distribution of Jefferson High after 100 (independent) runs of the agent-based 
model described in the Methods section. I then contrasted the simulation results with the 
empirical BMI distribution of Jefferson High in wave 2. Results in Figure 2.1 show that the 
agent-based model can indeed reproduce the BMI distribution of Jefferson High in Wave 2 
with very high fidelity. 
Once the ability of the agent-based model to reproduce the evolution of BMI in 
Jefferson High has been corroborated, the remaining of this section will focus on describing 
the results from the computational experiments. First, I report the results related to overall 
overweight change (OWoverall). To be sure, this outcome measures the percent change in the 
proportion of overweight agents by taking into account all agents outside the seed 
neighborhood. Figure 2.2 shows how OWoverall varies by effectiveness (E) and by seed 
innovator type (S). Importantly, Figure 2.2 includes a condition labeled “Gender Broker” 
which represents the selection, as the seed innovator, of the agent with the highest capacity 
for intercultural brokerage across the gender boundary (see Equation 1 in Chapter 1 for more 
details). As discussed earlier, the gender boundary is an ideal candidate to operationalize the 
idea of a bright symbolic boundary in Jefferson High. As can be seen in Figure 2.2, no relevant 
change can be inferred from these initial results.  
Interestingly, however, when out-group overweight change (OWout) is brought into 
the equation, a relevant pattern does emerge. Here it is critical to remember that out-group 
(and for that matter, in-group) membership is determined by the specific symbolic boundary 
under analysis. In the particular case of Figure 2.3, gender is the symbolic boundary being 
evaluated. This means, for instance, that if the seed innovator happens to be a girl, then those 
in her out-group would be the boys in Jefferson High that are not part of her seed 
neighborhood. 
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In this context, Figure 2.3 shows that when cultural brokerage based on gender 
identities is the method used to select the seed innovator, a significant lower proportion of 
his/her out-group alters end up being overweight vis-à-vis the scenarios in which other types 
of seed innovators (i.e. popular agents, structural brokers, or random agents) are selected. This 
represents initial and important evidence in favor of the theory developed in Chapter 1 since 
cultural brokers along the gender boundary seem to be more effective at stopping 
overweightness from spreading among their out-group alters in Jefferson High.  
Further evidence supporting the findings reported above is provided in Figure 2.4. In 
this case, two boundaries different from gender are used to evaluate the ability of cultural 
brokers to influence OWout. In particular, Figure 2.4 shows how when grade or age are used 
to determine out-group membership, agents with a high capacity of intercultural brokerage 
across these two boundaries are also consistently better equipped to influence in a downward 
fashion the BMI of those of different age or grade than themselves (i.e. than the seed 
innovator).  
Put simply, cultural brokers (across gender, grade, and age lines) do seem to be well-
prepared to make segregated networks more compact by leading diffusion patterns across 
people culturally different from themselves. This is very important evidence in favor of the 
main hypothesis developed in Chapter 1. 
The final piece of evidence relevant to this chapter is related to the effect of the seed 
innovators’ artificial diet on the BMI of their in-group alters (OWin). In this scenario, depicted 
in Figure 2.5, cultural brokers (across gender, grade, or age lines) are not as effective at 
stopping overweightness from spreading among their in-group alters when compared to 
popular agents or structural brokers. 
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Even though my main hypothesis only speaks to the ability cultural brokers to make 
segregated networks more compact by leading diffusion processes among alters different from 
themselves – an assertion supported by my theoretical model in Chapter 1 and by Figures 2.3 
and 2.4 in this Chapter – more empirical research needs to be conducted to understand the 
implications of Figure 2.5. In particular, it is key to investigate how and why cultural brokers 
might be less successful at diffusing innovations within social contacts that are part of their 
same cultural group (e.g. same gender).  
Here I speculate that it is always possible that cultural brokers’ in-group alters see them 
as too culturally ambiguous; thus exhibiting resistance to follow their lead. Further modeling 
efforts should be carried out to address this possibility. If this in indeed the case, that will 
corroborate the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1 in terms of the importance of 
conceptualizing cultural brokerage, and liminality more generally, as a social position that can 
be a burden; a source of anxiety, isolation, and pain precisely because of the cultural in-
betweenness of liminal subjects (Wang and Collins 2016; Myers and Williamson 2001; Smith 
et al. 2014; Fazel, Wheeler and Danesh 2005; cf. Burt 2004; See chapter 1 for a critical view 
on liminality).    
Discussion and Conclusions 
This Chapter demonstrates how to combine an empirically-oriented agent-based 
model with a general agent-based diffusion model in order to evaluate the empirical validity 
of the claims derived from the latter. In particular, I have shown how agent-based 
computational experiments derived from a formal theoretical exercise can be fruitfully 
translated into an empirically-calibrated agent-based model in order to provide empirical 
evidence supporting general theoretical claims. The connection between these two approaches 
was made by means of the SAOM of Snijders (1996, 2001, 2005), an actor-based statistical 
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framework that allows for a relatively easy transition between theory and empirics in the 
context of network dynamics models based on agents’ behaviors. 
 In particular, in this Chapter I manipulated two mechanisms to understand the co-
evolution of friendship nominations and BMI in a racially homogenous American high school. 
The first mechanism controlled the type of seed agent, that is, the agent bringing an innovative 
behavior to the table. I labeled this mechanism (S), and gave it four different possible values: 
popular agent, structural broker, cultural broker, and random agent. The second mechanism 
was the extent to which the innovation brought by the seed innovator was large or small. I 
labeled this mechanism (E) since it represents the effectiveness of an artificial diet experienced 
by the seed innovator. This “diet” was operationalized as a user-defined reduction in the BMI 
of the seed agent and her immediate neighbors.  
 In general, my results support the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1 in 
two ways, one direct and one indirect. First, the results based on out-group overweight change 
(OWout) show that cultural brokers are indeed the most effective at stopping the spreading of 
overweightness among out-group alters. In particular, three different boundaries that are 
known to be correlated with segregation in networks of high school students (Goodreau et al. 
2009) were tested: gender, grade, and age. In all three cases, cultural brokers significantly 
outperformed popular agents, structural brokers, and randomly selected agents in terms of 
their ability to stop the spreading of overweightness among their out-group alters. This 
constitutes the primary and most direct source of evidence in favor of the hypothesis 
developed in Chapter 1, a hypothesis according to which cultural brokers are well-equipped 
to make segregated networks more compact by bridging cultural holes.  
 In terms of indirect evidence, the second main outcome under analysis, that is, in-
group overweight change (OWin), shows that cultural brokers are the least effective to diffuse 
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the innovation among their own in-group alters when compared to seed innovators chosen 
based on traditional network centrality measures (in-degree popularity – i.e. popular agent – 
and betweenness centrality – i.e. structural broker –). As mentioned in the results section, 
however, these results do not necessarily come as a surprise because liminal agents in general, 
and cultural brokers in particular, can be expected to be subject to all sorts of negative (social) 
punishment by their in-group alters because of their in-between  (i.e. culturally ambiguous) 
positions along prominent symbolic boundaries. This dark side of cultural brokerage and 
liminality was in fact theoretically developed and documented in Chapter 1.  
 Future work should focus on validating the robustness of the results discussed above. 
In particular, one of the primary limitations of this study is that the results are derived from 
one school only, which casts important doubts regarding how generalizable the results are in 
actuality. Even though my analytical strategy was directly derived from a general model, only 
testing this theory in different empirical contexts will allow researchers to validate the 
robustness of the findings reported here.  
For instance, there is solid work demonstrating how the initial prevalence of a given 
health-related behavioral outcome (e.g. smoking) directly affects network diffusion dynamics 
analyzed through agent-based models using data from American high schools (adams and 
Schaefer 2016). Therefore, the dynamics of health-related in-group and out-group adoption 
dynamics by different types of innovators discussed in this Chapter must be tested in several 
empirical contexts to evaluate their robustness and scope conditions. It is my hope to conduct 
such studies in the future. 
We also know that the size of the coefficients used in the simulations reported in this 
Chapter (see Table 2.1) would likely vary between schools (e.g. Goodreau et al. 2009), 
especially knowing that the ethnoracial boundary is a prominent source of cultural segregation 
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among adolescents that does not exert any significant influence in Jefferson High. This is 
important because different coefficient sizes driving the co-evolution of networks and 
behavior can lead to different results. More empirical and simulation work is thus needed to 
explore the validity of the theoretical framework put forward in Chapter 1.  
 Finally, it should be mentioned that the data I used in this Chapter, namely, the Add 
Health data set, might not incorporate current behavioral and cultural tendencies among 
adolescents (e.g. the importance of online interactions). In this regard it is important to keep 
a critical view on the results reported in this Chapter since the adolescents in the Add Health 
sample lived in a significantly different cultural world when compared to boys and girls 
attending high school today. It should be mentioned, however, that my main purpose in this 
Chapter was always to illustrate an approach to connect a general agent-based diffusion model 
with an actor-based empirical analysis of network diffusion dynamics. In this sense, the results 
I presented here are, in light of the general model developed in Chapter 1, a valuable 
contribution to the literatures on social simulation, network dynamics, and the social 
determinants of health. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LIMINALITY ACROSS BORDERS: NETWORK INEQUALITIES AND 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FLOWS IN THE AMERICAS, 1960-2000 
Introduction 
 Over a quarter of a century ago, some of the most prominent scholars on the study of 
international migration in Americas noted that the evidence and theories in this literature are 
overwhelmingly based on bilateral migration dynamics and, especially, on the migration flow 
from Mexico to the US (Massey et al. 1994; see also Massey et al. 1998; Waters and Jiménez 
2005; Cerrutti and Machado 2015). Massey and colleagues made several recommendations, 
including to study both aggregate migration flows and key sending countries beyond Mexico 
like the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Colombia (Massey et al. 1994: 739). 
Despite this call, the flow of Mexicans to the US is still more studied that any other flow in 
the world (Massey, Durand and Malone 2002; Smith 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport 2007; 
Garip 2016; Chávez 2016).  
 I contribute to answering the above call by studying aggregate migration flows for all 
countries in the Americas between 1960 and 2000. I use a novel technique to estimate 
migration flows between 38 countries in the Americas based on newly available global bilateral 
stock tables (Özden et al. 2011). By doing so, I provide an unprecedented picture of decades-
long migration flows in the American continent. I analyze the history of these flows by 
focusing on the most important migratory subsystems in the Americas (Pellegrino 2003; 
Cerrutti and Parrado 2015): North America, Central America and the Caribbean, and South 
America. Flows that are, in fact, the aggregate-level result of liminal agents’ efforts to traverse 
powerful symbolic boundaries of nationhood in place in the Americas. 
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Moving from studies of bilateral migration flows to more multilateral, and truly 
comparative, studies is vital to further develop migration theory (Abel and Sander 2014; Kyle 
and Koslowski 2011; Massey et al. 1993). Focusing on specific regions of the world is a natural 
step to capitalize on the advantages of multilateral research designs (Massey and Aysa-Lastra 
2011; Cerrutti and Machado 2015). This is the case because studying specific regions allows 
for cross-national analyses that traverse several cases with shared socio-cultural features, thus 
providing a firm grounding for comparative analyses.  
I also take advantage of the fact that international migration can be represented by 
networks comprised of countries (nodes) connected by migration flows (ties) in order to 
analyze flows beyond specific subregions in the Americas. In particular, I use Temporal 
Exponential Random Graph (TERG) models to characterize the structural dynamics of 
migration flows over time. The TERGM is a novel simulation-based modeling framework to 
perform longitudinal analyses of the generative processes that give rise to networks. In 
particular, I test predictions about the existence of strong hierarchical patterns in the data, 
patterns that reflect the political economy of migratory exchanges between countries. I derive 
these predictions from the migration literature that has highlighted the importance of chain-
like flows between countries. I formalize these predictions using theories of triadic closure; 
thus building bridges between migration and network theories. 
Finally, given that I focus on the Americas, most of the flows analyzed in this Chapter 
are in fact migratory movements between countries in Latin America. Indeed, it is known that 
Latin American migration is typically intraregional (Cohen 2010; Sporlein 2015). Here, 
therefore, I also contribute to the literature on migration flows within the Global South, which 
are severely understudied (Nawyn 2016; Malhotra, Misra and Leal 2016). Indeed, my analyses 
will include typically neglected countries within the Global South such as Belize, Suriname, or 
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Guyana (Hoefte, Bishop and Clegg 2015; Hoogbergen and Krujit 2006; Everitt 1984). In this 
context, my aim in this Chapter is to provide a thorough description and explanation of the 
evolution of migration flows in the Americas between 1960 and 2000 understood as the 
aggregate-level behavior of individual migrants seen as liminal agents (Menjívar 2006; Mann 
2016; Huang et al. 2008). 
International Migration in the Americas: An Overview 
The past and present of the American continent is inextricably entangled with the 
political economy of migratory movements from Europe, Africa, and Asia. Starting from the 
immigration flows that originated in Western and Southern Europe at the end of the 15th 
century, to the massive incorporation of African slaves – mainly from West Africa and Angola 
– between the 16th and 19th centuries, to the incorporation of Asian slaves and laborers – 
mainly from China and Japan – during the 19th century, many migratory waves have greatly 
shaped the Americas (Cohen 1995; Cohen 2010). Similarly, between the mid-19th century and 
the first half of the 20th century, many Latin American states partook in racialized projects to 
incentivize the migration of Europeans in order to whiten the ethnoracial composition of their 
populations (Loveman 2014; Telles 2004). Some countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Venezuela or Cuba, were relatively successful in attracting European migrants to American 
soil (Pellegrino 1995; Loveman 2014; Telles 2004).  
However, after centuries of being a pole of attraction for international migrants, in the 
late 1960s and 1970s Latin America became a net exporter of emigrants (Zavala and Prieto 
2014; Pellegrino 1995). Durand and Massey (2010: 23) describe this as a major “turning of the 
[migration] tide.” Massive emigration emerged, among other things, due to the increased levels 
of inequality and slow economic growth in Latin American (Durand and Massey 2010). Bad 
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economic times would become even more pressing during the years to come, especially during 
the so-called lost decade of the 1980s (Kliksberg 2001), when Latin America witnessed 
generalized poor economic growth, the implementation of US-sponsored neoliberal reforms, 
and several large-scale economic crises in countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina 
(Martínez and Soto 2012; Portes and Roberts 2005). Increasing economic inequalities between 
countries in the Americas in general, are with Latin America in particular, further stimulated 
migration (Pellegrino 1992, 1995, 2003). Examples of these economically-driven flows are 
legion: Bolivian and Mexican braceros flowing to Argentina and the US, respectively; Bolivian 
and Paraguayan domestic workers going to Buenos Aires; and Haitian coffee harvesters 
flowing to the Dominican Republic (Cerrutti and Parrado 2015; Courtis and Pacecca 2010; 
Massey and Durand 2010).  
Concomitantly, several Latin-American countries endured powerful dictatorships and 
deathly civil wars that forced people to emigrate (Durand and Massey 2010; Cerrutti and 
Parrado 2015). Migration from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Chile, and Peru was indeed 
severely affected by political instability. Lundquist and Massey (2005) show that Nicaraguan 
civil war between the Sandinistas and US-sponsored Contras generated a massive in-flow of 
refugees to the United States. Shellman and Stewart (2007) show strong empirical associations 
between political violence and emigration from Haiti to the United States between 1994 and 
2004. Similarly, Silva and Massey (2015) show that political violence did promote international 
migration of Colombians between 1986 and 2002. Political shocks (e.g. extended electoral 
violence) also incentivized the decision to emigrate in Peru, Nicaragua, and Mexico (Hiskey 
and Orces 2010). 
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A report from the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre, CELADE, 
encapsulates the dramatic changes experienced in the migration dynamics in the Americas 
between 1960 and 2000:  
In Latin America, only considering population movements within the region and towards 
North America, population censuses indicate that the number of migrants grew from 1.5 
million in 1960 to 11 million in 1990. This means that whereas 40 years ago Latin American 
migrants accounted for about 0.7% of the region’s total population, in the past decade [i.e. 
1990s] the proportion is likely to have reached 2.5%, having grown much faster than total 
population (6.6% on an annual average basis compared to 1.8%). (CELADE 2000: 11) 
 
There is a final factor that warrants mentioning in this overview. Starting in the 1960s, 
several economic integration initiatives began to take place within the Americas. In 1960, 
Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador founded the Central American 
Common Market (CACM). The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was also 
founded that same year.15 The Andean Group was founded in 1969, and it was originally 
formed by Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The Andean Group is the direct 
antecessor of the Community of Andean Nations (CAN). The Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) was originally founded in 1973 by Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and 
Tobago. The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was founded in the first half of the 
1990s by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Finally, NAFTA, the free trade agreement 
between Mexico, Canada, and the US, was implemented in the first half of the 1990s. 
All of these integration processes substantially facilitated intraregional migration in the 
Americas (Durand and Massey 2010). A case in point is the CAN, one of the earliest and most 
ambitious integration projects in Latin America (de Villegas 1977). Martínez and Stang (2006) 
report that in the 1990s 74 percent of all international migrants in Latin America born in one 
                                                 
15 Originally comprised by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela. 
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of the five Andean countries emigrated to one of the other four Andean countries.16 In this 
context, the CAN developed novel regulations like the Andean Instrument of Labor 
Migration, also known as Decision 116. This innovative regulation was implemented in the 
1970s in order to facilitate migration of workers within the Andean region (Martínez and Stang 
2006). More recently, CAN’s Decision 504 allows citizens of Andean countries to travel freely 
within the Andean region with no visa. Regulations like these naturally facilitate migration. 
In sum, it is clear that the years under analysis in this Chapter represent both an 
inflection point, in and a distinctive period of, the history of migration flows in the Americas. 
The 21st century would bring important changes in this regard. To an important extent, these 
new changes made migration dynamics in the continent qualitatively different. As Christopher 
(2002) and Mohapatra and Ratha (2010) note, some of the most important changes in this 
regard are related to effects of 9/11 and the economic recession the US experienced in the 
first decade of the 21st century. These events substantially changed migration to the US, by far 
the main destination country in the system. Documented and undocumented migration to the 
US, tourism, remittances, and even the relatively advanced negotiations of a new reform to 
the US migratory system, were indeed negatively affected by the situation of the US (Mitchell 
2002). Similarly, Argentina, the most important destination country in Latin America, also 
went through a devastating economic crisis in 2001. This crisis greatly changed immigration 
to, and emigration from, Argentina (Bastia 2011). Given the magnitude of the changes that 
took place in the 21st century, the aim of the present Chapter is to describe and explain the 
evolution of migration flows in the Americas in the distinctive period between 1960 and 2000.  
                                                 
16 The Andean community was reduced to five members in 1974 after Chile withdrew. In 2006, Venezuela also 
withdrew. 
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Theory and Hypotheses 
Triadic Closure and Migratory Chains: Cyclicality and Transitivity in Migration 
Flows 
On the one hand, there is a relatively new literature in which aggregate-level migration 
flows are understood, and modeled, as social networks (Desmarais and Cranmer 2012a; Chun 
2008; Ke et al. 2006). On the other hand, there is a well-established literature on the 
pervasiveness of triadic closure in social networks (Simmel 1922[1955]; Granovetter 1973; 
Rivera et al. 2010). I aim to combine these two literatures by showing how a local within-the-
network (i.e. endogenous) pattern, namely, the emergence of triadic closure in the context of migratory 
chains, can provide a micro-level explanation to the hierarchical structure of the system of 
migratory flows in the Americas as a whole. I posit that any explanation of a system of 
migration flows that does not fully take into account the hierarchical nature of migratory 
exchanges at a local level is, at best, incomplete. 
Here, I start by pointing out that a long-standing literature in social network analysis 
has shown that non-trivial implications arise when one shifts the analysis of social relations 
from dyads to triads (Simmel [1922] 1955; Cartwright and Harary 1956; Davis and Leinhardt 
1972; Rawlings and Friedkin 2017). There is no a priori reason to expect that the analysis of 
migration flows is an exception to this rule. Indeed, when the analysis of migration dynamics 
is based on dyads – which is typical in the literature –, one should not be surprised to find high 
levels of reciprocity and (geographic) propinquity. For instance, we know that Mexicans tend 
to migrate to the US (Massey, Durand and Malone 2002), but that Mexico is also a top 
destination for US citizens (Croucher 2009a). The same goes for cases like Venezuela and 
Colombia (Pellegrino 2003, 1992) or Brazil and Paraguay (Rochcau 1983). However, when one 
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goes beyond dyads and their bilateral exchanges in order to enter the world of triads, migratory 
exchanges between three or more countries, what I call migratory chains, naturally become part 
of the analysis. In this context, I capitalize on the unprecedented scope of my data to analyze 
closure patterns in all the migratory chains observed between 1960 and 2000 in the Americas. 
As explained in detail below, I expect triadic closure of migratory flows to follow very strong 
hierarchical patterns. 
To be sure, a triad is any set of three nodes (i.e. countries). Similarly, a triangle is a triad 
in which all nodes are connected. In this context, I first argue that migratory flows are likely 
to exhibit a low frequency of horizontal-like triangles, also known as cyclic triangles. Here, a 
cyclic triangle is a triangle in which migration flows exhibit a circular pattern where each one of 
the three countries under analysis sends a flow and receives one back (graphically, ). 
Similarly, following Goodreau et al. (2009), I distinguish between process and pattern by the 
terms cyclicality and cyclic closure, respectively. I also argue that flows are likely to exhibit a high 
frequency of vertical-like triangles, also known as transitive triangles. Here, a transitive triangle 
is a triangle in which one country sends flows to the other two countries and receives none 
from them, while one country receives flows from the other two countries and sends none to 
them (graphically, ). I distinguish between process and pattern by the terms transitivity and 
transitive closure, respectively. Critically, when there is evidence of transitivity and (anti)cyclicality 
occurring concomitantly, that represents strong evidence that hierarchical mechanisms at the 
local level underlie the emergence and evolution of a given (global) network (Kitts et al. 2017; 
see also Windzio 2018).  
Importantly, dyadic reciprocity, propinquity (e.g. countries being in the same 
subregion) or homophily (e.g. countries sharing the same official language) can enhance the 
chances of triadic closure and vice versa (Goodreau et al. 2009). For instance, if an hypothetical 
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triangle with countries sharing the same official language and also located within the same 
subregion exists (e.g. Peru → Ecuador → Venezuela, graphically ), then a tie from, say, 
Peru to Venezuela,  not only would increase the count of observed transitive triangles 
(graphically, ), but also of within-category dyads by region  and by language. A correct 
estimation of either generative process (geographic propinquity, cultural homophily, 
transitivity) must therefore control for the other. In order to take into account these 
overlapping endogenous dependencies, as well as exogenous factors, and the configuration of 
the network at previous points in time, I use the TERG model. 
Once properly isolated, I would interpret the hypothesized existence of triad-based 
hierarchical patterns – i.e. transitivity and (anti)cyclicality – observed in the context of 
migratory flows as indicative of the latent unequal nature of exchanges between countries, not 
as a mere epiphenomenon (cf. Windzio 2018). The existence of these hypothesized 
hierarchical patterns is in line with decades of evidence highlighting the vertical, core/semi-
periphery/periphery, structure of exchanges between countries along dimensions like trade, 
military interventions, diplomatic relations, treaty memberships, and associations through 
intergovernmental organizations (Cardoso and Faletto 1974; Snyder and Kick 1979; Alderson 
and Beckfield 2004; Beckfield 2010). Indeed, I see the existence of hierarchically structured 
migratory flows as (only) one dimension of the political economy of a highly unequal global 
field, a political economy these migration flows help (re)produce (Friedmann 1986; Sassen 
2008; Cohen 2008). Examples of the hierarchical nature of international migration flows, and 
of the inequalities they (re)produce, are legion: from the brain drain of top-level professionals 
to the emergence of “global care chains” to the existence of “global diasporas” (Ehrenreich 
and Hochschild 2003; Parreñas 2001; Sassen 2006, 2008; Cohen 2008).  
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In the following paragraphs, I attempt to provide a topology of chain-like migratory 
flows in the Americas using migration theory and history. These migratory chains are the 
empirical basis of my triadic-based hypotheses, analyses, and methods. During my exposition 
of these ideal types I will use cases from the three migratory subsystems at play in the 
Americas.  
Closure and Top-Down Migratory Chains in the Americas 
As a first example of the hierarchical nature of migratory flows in the Americas I will 
discuss top-down movements described by the chain-like migration pattern known as relay 
migration (Durand and Massey 2010; Segal 1987; McElroy and Albuquerque 1990). Probably 
the best example of a relay migration pattern in the literature is Durand and Massey’s (2010: 
40-41) classic account of the labor migration that connects Haiti to the US:  
The process began at the upper part of the labor ladder, in the United States, and resulted 
from deliberate labor recruitment. After World War II, labor markets in the northeastern 
United States required new workers to replace aging European immigrants who had arrived 
earlier in the century (…) The departure of [Puerto Rican] workers to the United States from 
rural areas created job openings that were then filled by immigrants from the Dominican 
Republic, a short boat ride away, who arrived in significant numbers to cut sugar cane and 
harvest coffee. In this case there was no active labor recruitment because news about the 
availability of seasonal jobs filtered back to the neighboring island, where salaries were lower, 
initiating voluntary undocumented migration. In turn, rural areas of the Dominican Republic 
began to experience a shortage of workers owing to the departure of workers for Puerto 
Rico as well as the capital city and, after 1965, the United States. The shortage of workers in 
the coffee and sugar industries was then met by recruiting workers from Haiti, the poorest 
country in the Western Hemisphere, whose inhabitants viewed seasonal labor in the 
Dominican Republic as an economic opportunity. 
 
I posit that the mobility of international labor migrants as described above can be 
understood and analyzed through a framework rooted in network theory: vacancy chains 
(White 1970). Given that vacancy chains have proved useful to understand the dynamics of 
(internal/domestic) job markets (White 1970; Chase 1981; Smith 1983; Blum, Roth and 
Rothblum 1997), I argue that they can be extended to understand internationally concatenated 
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job markets; which are the backbone of relay migration patterns (Durand and Massey 2010; 
McElroy and Albuquerque 1990). Critically, a key scope condition of vacancy chains is that 
individuals must need or want new “bigger” or “better” resource units (e.g. jobs) from time 
to time (Chase 1981: 135). Put simply, vacancy chains are assumed to be driven by vertical, 
rather than horizontal, movements. This scope condition goes in line with migration theory 
and evidence since we know that migration flows do tend to signal, among other things, 
movements of people looking to improve their – often precarious – living conditions beyond 
their countries of origin, which includes actively looking for better paying jobs abroad (Piore 
1979; Ravenstein 1885, Arango 1985; Sassen 2008; Leal 2014).17 
As shown in Durand and Massey’s account, vacancy chains are top-down by definition 
since they emerge when high-type resource units (e.g. relatively high paying jobs in the US) 
are available (Chase 1981). The logic is simple: individuals occupying middle-type resource 
units (e.g. workers in the Puerto Rico – PR –) are expected to be drawn to newly available 
high-type resource units (e.g. jobs in the US). Once individuals that used to occupy middle-
type resource units leave them to occupy high-type resource units (PR→US), individuals 
occupying low-type resource units (e.g. workers in the Dominican Republic – DR –) are 
expected to be drawn to the newly vacant middle-type resource units (DR→PR). Two triads 
thus emerge (triad 1: [DR→PR]; [PR→US], and triad 2: [HI→DR]; [DR→PR], graphically 
both triads can be represented as follows ).  
                                                 
17 This does not mean that international migrants do always and permanently get better paying jobs in the 
destination country, or that they have perfect information before making the decision to migrate. Indeed, the 
lack of access to better jobs is part of the reasons behind return migration dynamics (Gmelch 1980; Leal 2014). 
The idea of “better” jobs is also necessarily relative, especially when comparing the point of view of native 
individuals and international migrants. In line with dual labor market theory (Piore 1979), better jobs for 
international migrants do mean, more often than not, entry-level jobs in the destination country. In the eyes of 
migrants, however, these jobs represent employment opportunities that will likely translate into important income 
gains for them and their families (Massey et al. 1993).  
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The vertical nature of vacancy-chain migratory flows not only explains the emergence 
of relay migration patterns, it also operates as a relevant force to close the triads (i.e. the explain 
the emergence of triangles) that constitute the structural basis of migratory chains. This means, 
for instance, that the two triads mentioned above are far more likely to be closed by out-flows 
in which individuals in low-type resource units migrate with the intention to occupy high-type 
resource units (i.e. DR→US in triangle 1 or HI→PR in triangle 2) than the other way around. 
This entails that individuals occupying low-type resource units in, say, Haiti are far more likely 
to be drawn to high-type resource units in Puerto Rico; thus potentially giving rise to a 
transitive triangle ([HI→DR]; [DR→PR]; [HI→PR], graphically ), than individuals in 
Puerto Rico to be drawn to low-type resource units left open by emigrants from Haiti; thus 
giving rise to a cyclic triangle (e.g. [HI→DR]; [DR→PR]; [PR→HI], graphically ). I expect 
these two tendencies, namely, transitivity and (anti)cyclicality, to be observed above and 
beyond both outside-the-network (i.e. exogenous) factors and the concurrent and previous 
(endogenous) configuration of the network of migratory flows. 
Closure and Bottom-UP Migratory Chains in the Americas 
 The top-down vacancy chains behind internationally concatenated job markets are, by 
no means, the only instances of chain-like migratory movements in the Americas. Indeed, 
many other structurally similar (i.e. triadic) patterns do not tend to originate at the core of the 
migratory system (e.g. new vacant positions in the US), but at its periphery. A key example of 
this is related to the migratory movements following political or economic crises at the 
periphery – crises many times caused and/or deepened by countries at the core of the system 
(Martínez and Soto 2012; Portes and Roberts 2005; Lunquist and Massey 2005). Take the 
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example of the open triangle between El Salvador – SV –, Belize – BE –, and the US 
([SV→BZ]; [BZ→US], graphically ).  
Here, the civil war that started in the 1970s in El Salvador forced a diversification in 
the flow of middle-class Salvadorians that had been migrating to Belize. More precisely, this 
meant that the economically-driven middle-class Salvadorian migrants that had been flowing 
in previous years to Belize were joined by increasingly large numbers of politically-driven 
peasant migrants (Asomani 1982; Everitt 1984). This in-flow of emigrants from El Salvador 
to Belize happened in the context of a relatively large flow of Belizeans going to the US (Everitt 
1984; Stavrakis and Marshall 1978).  
Over time, however, the economic and political forces behind the existence of this 
bottom-up migratory pattern ([SV→BZ]; [BZ→US], graphically ) became stronger. On the 
one hand, this resulted in a “Latinization” of Belize (Everitt 1986) as evidenced by the fact 
that the formerly English-speaking Belize became a country in which around 50 percent of the 
population spoke Spanish as their mother tongue in the year 2000 (Moreno and Otero 2006). 
On the other hand, the large number of Central Americas in Belize in itself became a strong 
push factor for Belizeans (Cunnin and Hoffmann 2013; Moberg 1997; Palacio 2001), especially 
black Belizeans living in South Belize (Everitt 1984; Medina 1997, Vernon 1990), to leave for 
the US; thus reinforcing the bottom-up character of the migratory chain between El Salvador, 
Belize, and the US.18 In the words of Medina (1997: 773): 
While the threatened military invasion has not occurred, during the first decade of Belizean 
independence tens of thousands of Central Americans, pushed out of their own countries 
by poverty, repression and political violence, migrated to Belize in search of land, peace and 
higher wages (…) Immigration exacerbated high rates of unemployment (estimated at 20 
per cent) and exerted downward pressure on wages, fuelling already high rates of Belizean 
migration to the US primarily by urban Creoles (Vernon 1990). 
                                                 
18 It should also be noted that El Salvador was not the only Spanish-speaking country with large out-flows 
directed towards Belize (see section on the Central American and Caribbean migratory subsystem below). 
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Going back to my theoretical argument, I posit that the triads emerging from bottom-
up migratory chains are subject, by virtue of the political economy of the system, to the same 
underlying vertical forces that shape triadic closure in the context of the top-down migratory 
chains analyzed earlier. Here, therefore, my main prediction remains the same: ceteris paribus, 
the migratory chain [SV→BE]; [BE→US] (graphically, ); is far more prone to be closed by 
large flows from El Salvador to the US than vice versa; thus likely giving rise to a transitive 
triad [SV→BE]; [BE→US]; [SV→US] (graphically, ). Once more, I expect these two 
tendencies, namely, transitivity and (anti)cyclicality, to be observed above and beyond both 
outside-the-network (i.e. exogenous) factors and the concurrent and previous (endogenous) 
configuration of the flows. 
Closure and Mixed Migratory Chains in the Americas 
The final type of migratory chain emerges not due to changes in the upper strata of 
the system, where the most powerful and resourceful countries can be analytically located (i.e. 
the US or Canada), or due to changes in the lower strata of the system, where the most 
disadvantaged countries can be located (e.g. El Salvador or Haiti). In mixed chains, changes 
originate in the middle strata of the system. The middle strata is compromised by countries 
that, due to their relative political and/or economic stability, are large poles of attraction for 
international migrants at the subregional level. As I will show in detail in the results section, 
three countries are part of this middle strata in the Americas: Costa Rica, Venezuela, and 
Argentina.  
An example of this type of migratory chain is related to the triad: Colombia (CO), 
Venezuela (VE), and the US. Throughout the entire period of analysis, the large flow of 
Colombians to Venezuela (CO→VE) is a constant. This flow is in fact one the largest in the 
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Americas after the flow Mexicans to the US (Pellegrino 1993, 1995, Cerrutti and Machado 
2015). Similarly, between the first three decades under analysis, there was a much smaller but 
nonetheless constant migration of Venezuelans to Colombia. During the late 1980s and in the 
1990s, however, large decreases in oil prices took place. As a result, Venezuelans started to 
emigrate at much higher rates that before, mostly outside the Andean region. In particular, the 
emigration of Venezuelans to the US increased by a factor of more than two in the 1990s 
(ECLAC 2006; Freitez 2011). In this context, Colombians also started to migrate to two new 
destinations: the Tri-State area in New York and South Florida (Guarnizo 2006). From a 
networks perspective, this crisis in Venezuela strengthened the transitivity of the flows 
between Colombia (CO), Venezuela (VE), and the US since the traditional out-flows of both 
Colombians to Venezuela and of Venezuelans to the US (Freitzel 2011; Mateo and Ledezma 
2006) were now complemented by renovated and large out-flows of both Colombians and 
Venezuelans to the US ([CO→VE]; [VE→US]; [CO→US] (graphically, ). 
In sum, I argue that strong hierarchical mechanisms underlie local clustering in 
migratory chains, and that taking this into account is necessary to fulfill the main aim of this 
Chapter, namely, to describe and explain the evolution of migration flows in the Americas 
between 1960 and 2000. On the one hand, migration theory and history show how relevant it 
is to think in terms of migratory chains in order to understand the highly stratified and intricate 
system of migratory flows that emerges from bilateral flows. On the other hand, network 
theory and models provide robust ways to study these migratory chains, and more specifically, 
to assess their hierarchical nature via concepts like triads, triangles, and triadic closure. In this 
context, a key strength of this study is that I am able incorporate not only key endogenous 
(e.g. mutuality and reciprocation) and exogenous (e.g. political violence or geography) factors 
into the analysis in the context of novel data, but that I also incorporate time into the analysis; 
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thus reducing the possibility of reporting results that do not take the temporal nature of 
network dynamics, and their particular timing, into account. In the following paragraphs I will 
formalize my theory and hypotheses. 
Formalizing the Hypotheses: Closure in International Migration Flows 
The empirical migration patterns described above using the heuristics of bottom-up, 
top-down, and mixed migratory chains can be formalized using network theory. Here, I will 
explicitly explain the hypothesized probabilistic mechanisms at place, and the statistics I will 
use to measure them. 
Transitive Closure: This is a local closure pattern in which triads tend to describe the 
following relational pattern: [i→j]; [j→k]; [i→k] (graphically, ). This represents a vertical 
closure pattern in which node i tends to close a triad of the form [i→j]; [j→k] (graphically, 
) by sending a tie to node k. This should occur above and beyond other endogenous and 
exogenous influences, including the previous configuration of the network. In more canonical 
terms, the triad [i→j]; [j→k] (graphically, ) is the 021C triad in the standard triad 
classification of Davis and Leinhardt (1972), while the transitive triangle [i→j];  [j→k]; [i→k] 
(graphically, ) is the 030C triad in the same classification system. Table 3.1 shows this 
process schematically. 
Cyclic Closure: This is a local closure pattern in which triples tend to describe the 
following relational pattern: [k→j]; [j→i]; [i→k] (graphically, ). This represents a horizontal 
closure pattern in which node i tends to close a triad of the form [k→j]; [j→i] (graphically, 
) by sending a tie to country k. This should occur above and beyond other endogenous and 
exogenous influences, including the previous configuration of the network. In more canonical 
terms, the triad [k→j]; [j→i]  (graphically, ) is the 021U triad in the standard triad 
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classification of Davis and Leinhardt (1972), while the transitive triangle [k→j]; [j→i]; [i→k] 
(graphically, ) is the 030T triad in the same classification system. Table 3.2 shows this 
process schematically. 
Since the combination of both transitive triadic closure and negative cyclic triadic 
closure is a strong signature of local hierarchy in a given social network (Kitts et al. 2017; 
Windzio 2018), and taking into account that the political economy of exchanges between 
countries tend to be highly  hierarchical (Cardoso and Faletto 1974; Snyder and Kick 1979; 
Alderson and Beckfield 2004; Beckfield 2010; Sassen 2008; Parreñas 2001), I propose the 
following general hypotheses:  
• H1: Ceteris paribus, international migration flows should exhibit a positive tendency towards 
transitive closure.  
• H2: Ceteris paribus, international migration flows should exhibit a negative tendency towards cyclic 
closure.  
It should also be noted that these hypotheses directly engage and complicate the 
findings of Fagiolo and Mastrorillo (2007). Using migrant stock data, these authors report that 
international migration networks only require dyadic covariates (e.g. propinquity or common 
official language) to fully account for the network structure of migration data. On the contrary, 
here I follow recent studies that have explicitly taken into consideration the high-order 
dependencies (e.g. triadic configurations) inherent to aggregate-level migration data. These 
recent studies have shown that higher-order dependencies at the level of triads are critical to 
understand international migration networks. More precisely, in the first methodological 
introduction to the cross-sectional ERG model for weighted networks – also known as GERG 
model –, Desmarais and Cranmer (2012a) used as a test case interstate migration flow data 
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from the US. The authors report cross-sectional evidence, based on internal migration flows, 
that is consistent with the two triad-based hypotheses described above.  
Similarly, Windzio (2018) reports supporting evidence in favor of H2 and indirect 
evidence in favor of H1 using ERGM and TERG models applied to international migrant 
stock data. In this context, the present Chapter is the first effort to combine flow-like (i.e. not 
stock) data with models that explicitly account for the higher order dependencies and dynamic 
nature of international migration processes. Furthermore, this Chapter is also the first one to 
carefully derive hypotheses regarding higher-order dependencies in the context of migratory 
chains by explicitly combining theoretical insights from both network and migration theory 
and empirics. Finally, given the sample size of this study and the nature of the data, this is the 
first comprehensive description and explanation of contemporary migration flows in the 
Americas for the period under analysis. 
Data and Methods 
Migration Flow Data 
I estimated four decades-long migration flows between 38 countries in the Americas 
between 1960 and 2000. The data were estimated using the World Bank Global Bilateral 
Migrant Stock Database (Özden et al. 2011). These data disaggregate the number of 
immigrants living in a given country of destination based on official statistics for a total of 233 
countries.19 This is the most comprehensive migrant stock data set in the world that covers 
the period under analysis in this Chapter (Özden et al. 2011; Malhotra, Misra and Leal 2016).  
Importantly, these data allowed me to use the flows from stocks methodology recently 
developed, and empirically validated, by formal demographer Guy Abel (Abel 2010, 2013, 
                                                 
19 These data excludes refugees and those who are stateless. 
 74 
 
2017; Abel and Sanders 2014). Using a spatial interaction model, this methodology estimates 
the minimum number of transitions (i.e. migration flows) that should have taken place 
between two consecutive migrant stock matrices in order for the row and column totals of the 
observed (stock) matrices to be true. The model is constrained by counts of births, deaths, 
and the total population of the countries under analysis. The model also takes into account 
the geographic distance between all pairs of countries as auxiliary information in the estimation 
process (for a detailed technical explanation of the model see Abel 2010, 2013, 2017). In order 
to use this methodology, I made use of the fss function included in the migest R package (Abel 
2016).  
The demographic data came from the 2017 World Population Prospects produced by the 
United Nations Population Division. In particular, data on total population, total deaths, and 
total births were harmonized and merged with the World Bank migrant stock data. A total of 
192 countries had complete information both in terms of their migrant stock data and their 
demographic data. Appendix A.3.1 enumerates all the countries included in the estimation 
process. The estimation of the migration flows also took into account the costs of migration 
by including the geographic distance between each pair of countries. Using geographic 
distance as a proxy for the costs of migration is common in the literature, and has been done 
both in empirical studies of global migration and of migration in the Americas (Massey and 
García-España 1987; Palloni et al. 2001; Massey and Aysa-Lastra 2011). Geographic distance 
data between the capitals of all 192 countries were obtained from the French research center 
CEPII (Mayer and Zignano 2011). I have already reported elsewhere that my estimates of 
global migration flows do replicate those reported in the work of Abel (Malhotra et al. 2016) 
All of the relevant code and raw data to reproduce the estimation of the global migration flows 
between 1960 and 2000 are available in Appendix A.3.2. 
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Once global migration flows were estimated, I restricted the data in order to only keep 
countries in the Americas. This meant that I had a total of 38 countries with complete 
information between 1960 and 2000. The analyses of the migration flows in the three 
migratory subsystems in the Americas are based on these 38 countries. Out of all the countries 
in the Americas, only two very small independent Caribbean islands were not included in this 
sample: Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis. Both of them had less than 70,000 inhabitants 
in the year 2000, which corresponds to the end of the period under analysis. The name of the 
38 countries can be found in Appendix A.3.3. 
I gathered information on both GDP per capita and the level of political violence of 
each country in order to control for major macroeconomic and political factors when 
conducting the statistical analyses. Unfortunately, complete data on both GDP per capita and 
political violence is available for 32 out of the 38 countries mentioned above. However, the 
six cases without complete data are small countries in the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, 
Aruba, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana. Only two of them, Antigua 
and Barbuda and Grenada, are in fact independent countries. None of these two had a native 
population of more than 95,000 inhabitants in the year 2000. As a result, the statistical analysis 
using is based on a subsample of 32 countries. I do not expect that my statistical analyses will 
be significantly biased given that only four small independent island countries were excluded 
due to data restrictions. Finally, data on political violence was gathered from the Major Episodes 
of Political Violence 1946-2015 Database produced by the Center of Systematic Peace (Marshall 
and Elzinga-Marshall 2017), the same center that develops the well-known Polity IV index. 
Data on GDP per capita were gathered from the Adjusted Income per Capita Index developed by 
Padros de la Escosura (2015). Detailed information on these data sources can be found in 
Appendix A.3.2. 
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Measures 
Dependent Variables. I aim to understand the emergence and evolution of migration 
flows in the Americas over four decades (1960; 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s), therefore, the 
(socio)matrices that record these migration flows are in fact the dependent variables under 
analysis. Given that these networks record estimated migration flows between countries, this 
poses an important methodological restriction since the TERG model has only been 
developed to handle binary ties (Hanneke, Fu and Xing 2010; Desmarais and Cranmer 2012a; 
Liefeld, Cranmer and Desmarais 2017).20 In the ERG model literature this common 
restrictions is solved by means of binarizing the networks under analysis by using a 
thresholding or thinning rule (Faust and Skvoretz 2002; Fowler 2006; Cranmer and Desmarais 
2011). A thresholding rule must be applied because when all positive ties present in a given 
network are automatically recorded as an existing tie, the high density of the dependent 
network(s) tends to produce degenerate results, that is, results where the model produces 
unrealistic networks in which every possible tie exists (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011; for a 
technical explanation of degeneracy see Snijders 2002). 
In order to transform the migration flows into binary ties, I created binary networks 
that are less dense by only coding as a 1 (i.e. as an existing flow) all of the migration flows 
between a given (origin) country and its top 15 destinations countries. Because of this, my 
analyses effectively include the most important destination countries of each country under 
analysis as measured by the size of their respective out-flows. Of course, the selection of this 
threshold is somewhat arbitrary and other threshold values were used in sensitivity analyses. 
Indeed, increasing and/or decreasing the threshold by a third (+/- 5 top destination countries) 
                                                 
20 Recent efforts have been made to put forward the statistical analysis of non-binary (i.e. valued) networks under 
the Exponential Random Graph (ERG) model paradigm (Desmarais and Cranmer 2012a; Wilson et al. 2017), 
none of these tools is suited for the longitudinal analysis of valued networks. 
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produces qualitatively similar model estimates, while also capturing networks that contain 
between 40 percent and 80 percent of all observed ties.21 As part further sensitivity analyses, I 
run models using a completely different estimation technique for the analysis of network 
dynamics, the Stochastic Actor-oriented Model (Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich 2010), and 
a completely different thresholding rule that is purely based on flow size not on top destination 
countries (see results section for details). 
Key endogenous dependencies. As explained earlier, in order to capture hierarchical relational 
patterns at the level of triads, I used the following two variables: (1) Transitive closure 
captures the number of transitive triangles in the network, that is, triples that exhibit the 
following relational pattern: [i→j]; [j→k]; [i→k], see Table 1 for details; (2) Cyclic closure 
measures the number of cyclic triangles in the network, that is, triplets that exhibit the 
following relational pattern: [i→j], [j→k], [k→i], see Table 2 for details.   
Endogenous controls. (3) Mutuality captures the number of pairs of countries i and j for 
which the following relational pattern holds: ([i→j]; [j→i]); (4) Reciprocation this term 
captures whether a tie from country i to country j leads to a tie from country j to country i in 
the next time period; (5) Dyadic stability this is a memory term that captures the number of 
dyads that are stable (persistent ties and persistent non-ties) between two consecutive time 
periods; (6) In-degree popularity measures the tendency of a given country to receive flows 
as a function of its in-degree and it is used to control for inequalities in the distribution of in-
degrees. This term is also known as attractiveness by in-degree. In the context of this Chapter, 
this term represents success-breeds-success dynamics in which popular countries (i.e. 
countries with high in-degree) tend to receive more in-flows precisely because of their high 
                                                 
21 A graphical representation of the effect of different values of the thresholding rule on the number of ties 
present in the networks under analysis can be found in Appendix A.3.5 
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popularity (i.e. high in-degree); (7) Out-degree popularity measures the tendency of a given 
country to receive in-flows as a function of its out-degree and it is used to control for 
inequalities in the distribution of out-degrees. This term is also known as attractiveness by out-
degree. It represents the mirror image of in-degree popularity in the sense that it measures the 
tendency of a given country to receive more in-flows (i.e. to be popular) because of its out-
degree; (8) Absolute difference in out-degree captures homophily based on out-degree, that 
is, the tendency for two countries to be connected as a function of how similar their out-
degrees are. Given that, by definition, a thresholding rule based on top destination countries 
puts a cap on countries’ out-degree (e.g. top 15 destination countries), this term is used to 
control for any unaccounted heterogeneity in out-degree. This is important because even if a 
thresholding rule based on, say, the top 15 destination countries rule is used, not all countries 
do send migrants to 15 countries (or more) in a given decade. 
Exogenous controls. (9) Same region captures nominal attribute-based homophily based 
on the subregions to which any two countries belong (North America, Central America, the 
Caribbean, the Andean Region, and the Southern Cone), thus incorporating geographic 
propinquity into the analysis. The historical analysis of the migration flows conducted in the 
next section will show the importance of these subregions; (10) Same (official) language 
captures nominal attribute-based homophily due to language/cultural (dis)similarity in a given 
dyad; (11) Income * in-degree captures the main effect of income per capita on in-degree. 
Here, I use the Adjusted Income per Capita Index developed by Padros de la Escosura (2015) as 
the data source. Since the original index was calculated for 5-year periods, the final income per 
capita variable of a given country was computed by averaging the beginning, end, and midpoint 
values of this index in a given decade (e.g. 1960, 1965, and 1970); (12) Income * out-degree 
captures the main effect of income on out-degree based on the Adjusted Income per Capita Index 
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mentioned above; (13) Conflict * in-degree captures the main effect of political turmoil 
experienced by a given country on its in-degree. Here, I use the variable civtot included in the 
Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2015 Database, which is a count variable that aggregates 
yearly instances of civil violence, civil wars, ethnic violence, and ethnic wars per country. For 
the analyses in this Chapter, the yearly counts were aggregated by decade; (14) Conflict * 
outdegree captures the main effect of political turmoil on out-degree based on the Major 
Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2015 Database mentioned above. 
TERGM Estimation 
To assess the effect of key endogenous dependencies (e.g. cyclic closure) on the 
temporal evolution of the migration flows in the Americas, I use TERG models with 
exogenous (e.g. income), endogenous (e.g. mutuality), and temporal (e.g. dyadic stability) 
controls. With this design I assess whether hierarchical dynamics at the triadic level can explain 
the structure and evolution of the network over time as predicted in hypotheses H1 and H2. 
All of this, above and beyond the array of controls mentioned above. The TERG model is an 
extension of the now well-established ERG model (Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris 2009; 
Cranmer and Desmarais 2011; Hunter et al. 2008), an extension specially developed to 
incorporate inter-temporal dependencies in a time series of observed networks (Liefield, 
Cranmer and Desmarais 2017). The cross-sectional probability (likelihood function) of 
observing network N under the ERG model is:  
         eq. 1 
Where, h(N) represents a vector of statistics computed on the network (e.g. cyclic 
triads), θ represents a vector of coefficients, and the denominator is a normalizing constant 
representing the odds of all other networks which could be created by permuting the set of 
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nodes under analyses.22 When analyzing a time series with K є {0, 1, …, t-1} measurements of 
network N, and assuming that networks occurring earlier in the time series are independent 
of later outcomes, the TERG model estimates the probability of a given network, Nt, 
conditional on the observed statistics of the lagged networks Nt-K as follows: 
      eq. 2 
  The probability of observing the networks in a given time window can be estimated 
by taking the product of the time specific probabilities described in equation 2.23 ERG models 
and their temporal extension can thus explicitly model the relational dependencies inherent to 
network data. This is something that conventional modeling techniques like logistic regression, 
and their longitudinal extensions, simply cannot fully accommodate. A thorough 
methodological treatment of TERG models is beyond the scope of this study, but the 
interested reader is encouraged to consult the relevant literature (Hanneke, Fu and Xing 2010; 
Desmarais and Cranmer 2012b; Liefeld, Cranmer and Desmarais 2017). 
  In this Chapter, TERG models are fit using the btergm function in the xergm R package 
(Liefeld, Cranmer and Desmarais 2014), which uses bootstrapped pseudolikelihood inference 
methods to calculate confidence intervals as described in Desmarais and Cranmer (2012b). 
The terms included in the model are based on those developed in the ergm R package (Hunter 
et al. 2008). Each time a TERG model was fit a total of 250,000 bootstrap replications were 
used to estimate the confidence intervals of the coefficients being estimated. ERG models use 
                                                 
22 In other words,  = , where η is the set of all possible permutation of N. 
23 For instance, the joint probability of observing the networks between time points K + 1 and T (assuming that 
K fully encompasses the temporal dependencies of Nt), is given by
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simulation-based techniques to estimate goodness-of-fit. Every time a model was estimated, 
goodness-of-fit was evaluated after simulating 500 networks per decade to assess how close 
the distribution of networks simulated under the generative model represents key features of 
the empirical distribution of the observed networks (Cranmer et al. 2017; Goodreau et al. 
2009). Finally, predictive performance was also evaluated through ROC curves. All the data 
and code necessary to produce the inferential results presented in this Chapter are included in 
Appendix A.3.2. 
Results 
Describing Migration flows in the Americas, 1960-2000 
The most prominent migration flows that took place in the Americas between 1960 
and 2000 will be described in this section. Since, on average, there are close to 1,000 flows per 
decade recorded in my data, making the analysis tractable was a primary consideration. The 
first step in this direction was to split the flows based on the major migratory subregions in 
the Americas: Central America and the Caribbean, North America, and South America (for a 
similar approach see Pellegrino 2003; Cerrutti and Parrado 2015). The second step was to use 
the so-called circos plot (Zhang, Meltzer and Davis 2013).  
Circos plots were developed in bioinformatics research to represent relational 
information between genes. Recently, circos plots have also been used to depict migration 
flows (Abel and Sander 2014; Malhotra, Misra and Leal 2016). The circos plots are easy to 
interpret: the relative size of a flow is represented by the size of a given ribbon. The direction 
of the flow is indicated by the existence of a white gap between a given ribbon and the outer 
circle segment uniquely associated with each of the countries. Whenever there is gap between 
a given outer circle segment and a ribbon, that indicates an in-flow. In Figure 3.1, for instance, 
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the largest flow in the 1970s is that connecting Haiti (HT) to the Dominican Republic (DO). 
Note that this ribbon does not touch Dominican Republic’s outer circle segment. This means 
that this ribbon represent in-flows to the Dominican Republic. The largest flows also display 
arrows indicating direction for ease of interpretation. The information to reproduce the circos 
plots in this Chapter is in Appendix A.3.4. 
Figures in Appendix A.3.10 show that the migration of Mexicans to the US 
overshadows all other flows due to its relative size. As mentioned in the introduction, however, 
a key objective in this Chapter is to develop a thorough description of the migration flows in 
the Americas beyond the US-Mexico corridor. In that context, this section is completely 
devoted to studying the history of these flows. By doing so, I will attain one of the two key 
objectives of this Chapter, namely, to produce the first continent-wide description of 
migration flows in the Americas for the period under analysis. The second objective, that is, 
explaining the structural dynamics of these flows, will be accomplished in the next session. 
The Central American and Caribbean Migratory Subsystem 
As evidenced in Figure 3.1, one of the major migration flows in the context of Central 
America and the Caribbean is that of Nicaraguans going to Costa Rica. Figure 3.1 shows that 
even though this flow was small in the 1960s, it grew exponentially in the following decades, 
especially in the 1980s and 1990s. This conforms to the findings reported in the literature 
(Hiskey and Orces 2010). Nicaraguans migrated to Costa Rica during these years especially 
due to the political instability caused by the Nicaraguan Revolution and its spill-over effects in 
the neighboring El Salvador and Guatemala (Durand and Massey 2010; Fernández and 
Narváez 1987). The majority of these migrants were peasants that came from Nicaragua right 
after Somoza was deposed in 1979 (Sporlein 2015). These migrants made heavy use of the 
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original migration networks that economic (labor) migrants had developed in previous decades 
in their seasonal migration to Costa Rica (Wiley 1995).  
Cubans also migrated to Costa Rica for political reasons (Villa and Martínez 2000; 
Fernández and Narváez 1987). A clear example of this flow is that of the Mariel migrants or 
Marielitos. This was a group of Cuban dissidents that in 1980 congregated in the Peruvian 
embassy in Havana in search of political asylum. After negotiations between the Costa Rican 
and Cuban governments, hundreds of Cubans legally departed to Costa Rica from the Mariel 
harbor in Cuba (Fernández and Narváez 1987). An even larger contingent of Mariel migrants 
would arrive later to the US (Portes, Kyle, and Eaton 1992). 
According to Figure 3.1, a prominent flow existed between Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic while at the same time an important contingent of Dominicans migrated to Puerto 
Rico (see, especially, the 1960s to 1980s plots). We also know that a large number of Puerto 
Ricans migrated to the US throughout the same period (Massey and Sana 2003). In fact, based 
on my estimates, on average, more than 250,000 Puerto Ricans flowed to the US per decade 
between 1960 and 2000. These relay migration flows connecting Haiti and the US (Durand 
and Massey 2010) were highlighted as an example of a top-down migratory chain in the Theory 
section of this Chapter.  
The literature suggests that relay migration is actually very frequent in the Caribbean 
(Segal 1987; McElroy and Albuquerque 1990). Indeed, another prominent example of relay 
migration connects Grenada, to Trinidad and Tobago, to Canada/US (Segal 1987). According 
to my estimates, during the 1960s the top destination of emigrants from Grenada was Trinidad 
and Tobago (almost 3,000 migrants). Similarly, the US and Canada were the 2nd and 8th top 
destination countries for emigrants from Trinidad and Tobago in the same decade. This 
particular relay migratory pattern is partially based on Trinidad and Tobago’s ability to attract 
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migrants from countries like Grenada because of the existence of US military bases that were 
built in Trinidanian soil. These bases incentivized the local service and construction industries, 
where migrants from Grenada tended to be hired (Valtonen 1996).  
As mentioned earlier, the existence of internationally concatenated job markets –and 
therefore of vacancy chains– is a key force behind top-down (relay) migration patterns in the 
Americas. However, the emergence of bottom-up migratory chains due to economic and/or 
political crises in the periphery of the system is also quite prevalent. Haitian refugees in the 
Dominican Republic are a case in point since they remind us that Haitians not only migrated 
to the Dominican Republic due to relay migration forces related to vacancy chain processes. 
They also emigrated due to the political instability of Haitian society (Castillo 1994). 
Importantly, large migration flows are not only the by-product of political or economic 
instability. In several instances they create large political and economic instability. An example 
in this regard has to do with a set of small countries that is usually forgotten when it comes to 
the study of the Americas in general, and to the study of migration in the Americas in 
particular. Countries like Belize, Guyana, and Suriname are part of this group. First of all, even 
though Guyana and Suriname are geographically located in South America, culturally they are 
part of the wider Caribbean due to their historical and cultural positionality vis-à-vis the 
Caribbean (Hoefte, Bishop and Clegg 2015; Hoogbergen and Krujit 2006; Pantoja 2008). 
These three countries share two important characteristics: first, they are among the most 
ethno-racially diverse and poorer countries in the Americas. Second, neither of them were a 
Spanish or Portuguese colony.  
These three countries have also been affected by political and demographic 
transformations due to the continuous in-flow of migrants. In the case of Belize, there was a 
continuous immigration of Central Americans during the period under analysis, especially of 
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Salvadorians and Guatemalans (both traditional Ketchi Mayan Indians, as well as Mopan Maya 
and Mestizo people) (Everitt 1984). Based on the small population size of Belize, the estimated 
number of Salvadorians (close to 6,000) and Guatemalans (close to 5,000) flowing to Belize 
was indeed quite significant in the 1990s (see Figure 3.1). These numbers are revealing since 
at the beginning of the 1990s the native (i.e. non-migrant) population in Belize was close to 
only 200,000 people. Not surprisingly, therefore, this in-flow of Spanish-speaking migrants, 
mostly located in Belize’s countryside, encountered important levels of resistance from the 
local population who feared Belize was “Latinizing” (Everittt 1984). These migration flows – 
coupled with the emigration of black-skinned Belizeans to the US (Everitt 1984) – actually 
changed the ethno-racial composition of Belize. Indeed, in the year 2000, more than 106,000 
Belizeans were native Spanish speakers, while the total population of the country was close to 
232,000 (Moreno and Otero 2006). 
Interestingly, a similar situation took place between Brazil on the one hand, and 
Guyana and Suriname on the other. In the 1980s and 1990s, the in-flow of Brazilians to these 
countries was very significant, and it has continued to grow “dramatically” since then (Hoefte, 
Bishop and Clegg 2015: 98). According to my estimates, for instance, more than 2,500 
Brazilians flowed to Suriname only in 1990s, while the total population of the country was 
slightly above 470,000 in the year 2000. Many of the Brazilian migrants are gold miners, known 
as garimpeiros in Guyana and porknockers in Suriname (Hoogbergen and Krujit 2006). Since these 
migration streams from Brazil have been growing steadily, they have added complexity to an 
already intricate ethno-racial structure that include people of British, Dutch, Hindustani, 
Chinese, African, and Javanese descent. Critically, the Brazilian migrants have been gradually 
able to dominate the gold extraction industry, which is one of the main sectors of the economy 
in both Guyana and Suriname; thus, generating important political and social tensions in these 
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countries (Hoefte, Bishop and Clegg 2015). The cases of Belize, Guyana and Suriname suggest 
that when there is a sustained and relatively large in-flow of migrants to small and highly 
diverse countries, the host societies might actually be relatively ill-prepared to incorporate 
(even more) heterogeneity.  
The Bahamas represents a final interesting case in the context of the migration flows 
in Central American and Caribbean. Indeed, since the 1950s, The Bahamas became a 
prominent example of migratory dynamics to inviting paradisiac islands and off-shore financial 
centers in the Caribbean (McElroy and Albuquerque 1988), especially attractive for US and 
Canada retirees (McElroy and Albuquerque 1990). Concomitantly, The Bahamas is also known 
to be a pole of attraction for economic migrants of neighboring islands like Jamaica, Cuba, 
and Haiti (Franco and Di Filippo 1999). My estimates fully support this dual migratory profile. 
First, in terms of North-South flows, US citizens were always among the top 10 largest foreign-
born populations in the Bahamas during the period under analysis. In fact, except for one 
decade (1970s), US citizens were consistently among the top 5 emigrants flowing to The 
Bahamas. Second, in terms of South-South flows, The Bahamas emerges as a net immigration 
country in all four decades under analysis. On average, the number of immigrants from the 
Caribbean that flowed to the Bahamas between 1960 and 2000 is 16.6% larger than the number 
of emigrants from the Bahamas to the Caribbean and Central America.  
In sum, the analysis of migration of dynamics in the Central American and Caribbean 
migratory subsystem has provided four important insights on migration dynamics in the 
Americas: (1) the existence of relay migration processes based on internationally concatenated 
job markets (e.g. Grenada → Trinidad and Tobago → to Canada/US); (2) the existence of 
politically-driven migration flows that typically make use of the social infrastructure built in 
previous years by seasonal (economic) migrants (e.g. Nicaragua → Costa Rica); (3) the 
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existence of relatively large and sustained in-flows to small, highly diverse, and poor countries 
(e.g. El Salvador → Belize); and (4) the existence of North-South flows directed to paradisiac 
Caribbean islands (e.g. US → Bahamas).  
The North American Migratory Subsystem 
In a way, the North American migratory subsystem is the simplest subsystem in the 
Americas since it is comprised of only three countries: Mexico, the US, and Canada. In many 
other ways, this subsystem could be considered the most complex because it includes the 
largest migration stream in the world, the in-flow of Mexicans to the US (Abel and Sanders 
2014; Massey and Sana 2003). The literature is no doubt a reflection of this reality. As noted 
in a prominent review of this literature: “far too much of the research literature is centered in 
Mexico, which because of its unique relationship to the USA may be unrepresentative of 
broader patterns and trends.” (Massey et al. 1994: 739). I will not, therefore, analyze in detail 
the flow of Mexicans to the US since others have analyzed in great detail (Portes and Bach 
1985; Massey, Durand and Malone 2002; Garip 2016).   
In general, the migration of Mexicans to the US has an early important antecedent in 
the bracero program (Calavita 1992), which was in place between 1942 and 1964. A similar 
program is still in place in Canada, the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SWAP), which 
started to admit Mexican workers in 1973 (Díaz 2015). Programs like these are a feature of the 
North American migratory subsystem. The existence of these programs is important in its 
own right, but also because the networks that emerged from them have been used as key 
resources for future migrants. As noted before, the importance of this social infrastructure for 
future migration is also present in the case of early seasonal flows between Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic or Nicaragua and Costa Rica (Baez 1986; Wiley 1995).  
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On average, migration from Mexico to the US is: circular/recurrent, it had a peak 
around 1989, has an average length of 6 years, and it is selective of young, formally uneducated 
– especially peasant – men that have important access to migrant networks due to communal 
and/or familial ties to former migrants (Portes and Bach 1985; Massey and Aysa-Lastra 2011; 
Durand and Massey 2010; Massey and Sana 2005). Migration from Mexico is not purely 
economic, however. As Hiskey and Orces (2010) have shown, systematic electoral violence 
did affect individuals’ decision to leave Mexico. Garip (2016) has argued about the perils of 
understanding the complex US-Mexico flow through the lens of the average migrant. She has 
shown that Mexicans that emigrated to the US since the mid-1960s onwards can be empirically 
classified in four clusters: (1) a group of men of rural origin that migrated in the 1960s and 
1970s; (2) a group of economically advantaged young men that migrated mainly in the 1980s; 
(3) a group of women that migrated mainly for family reunification reasons in the 1980s and 
1990s; and (4) a younger cohort of urban and formally educated people that flowed in the late 
1980s and 1990s.  
The other face of the US-Mexico flow, that is, the migration of US citizens to Mexico 
is much less studied. According to my estimates, on average, close to 100,000 US citizens 
flowed to Mexico per decade between 1960 and 2000, with almost 500,000 flowing in the 
1990s. This made Mexico be consistently ranked among the top 3 destination countries for 
US emigrants in the Americas, even after including Puerto Rico as a destination country. These 
estimates are consistent with the existing literature on out-flows of US citizens around the 
globe (Bratsberg and Terrel 1996). 
US migrants in Mexico have been characterized as migrants of privilege (Croucher 
2009a). A symbolic indication of their privilege is that they tend not to identify themselves as 
immigrants, but rather as Americans (permanently) living in Mexico (Croucher 2009a). 
 89 
 
Migrants of privilege, both from the US and Canada, actively seek to live comfortable lives in 
much less expensive societies like Mexico (Croucher 2009a, 2009b), Ecuador (Hayes 2014) or 
Panama (Benson 2013). These migrants tend to be relatively old, close to retirement or already 
retired. Croucher (2009a, 2009b) also finds that US migrants in Mexico tend to be actively 
involved in the politics of both the US and Mexico. Usually, their lifestyle would be difficult – 
if not impossible – to sustain in their home country, they are lifestyle migrants (Hayes 2014). 
In terms of the number of Mexicans that flowed to Canada, my estimates show that, 
on average, close to 20,000 Mexicans migrated to Canada per decade between 1960 and 2000. 
The 1970s represents the peak in the number of Mexicans flowing to Canada with close to 
70,000 migrants. As was already mentioned, an institutional force behind the Mexico to 
Canada flow is the Canadian bracero program (SWAP) that started in 1973 (Díaz 2015). These 
braceros tend to work in tobacco and fruit farms in Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, and especially, 
Ontario (Basok 2003).  
Migration of Mexicans to Canada between 1960 and 2000 was all but massive when 
compared to the migration of Mexicans to the US. This stark contrast might be at least partially 
explained by the different orientations of the Canadian and US migratory laws. On the one 
hand, since the first half of the 1960s Canadian emigration policy is based on a point system 
that emphasizes formal education and skills. On the other hand, during the same years the US 
migratory policy system started to emphasize family reunification. There is some evidence 
suggesting that Mexican migrants tended to migrate more to the US than to Canada due to a 
lack of credentials (Borjas 1993).24  
                                                 
24 The family reunification emphasis of the US migratory system started in 1965, while the major policy changes 
to the Canadian system and its emphasis on skill started in 1962 (Borjas 1993). 
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Besides these migratory laws, relatively lower levels of social capital in the form of 
preexisting social networks and greater geographic distance also act as powerful deterrents in 
the context of the Mexico-Canada flow (Antecol et al. 2003). In fact, taking Latin America as 
a whole, the literature shows that previous to the 1970s, migration of Latin Americans to 
Canada was negligible due to lack of important economic and political connections and 
geographic distance (Bernhard, Landolt and Goldring 2009). Existing data for the period 1981-
2000 do show that there was no Latin American country among the top 10 source countries 
that comprise Canada’s immigrant population (Hou 2007).  
The last migration flow that comprises the North American migratory subsystem is 
the North-North migration flow at the US-Canadian border. The literature explicitly suggests 
that information on this flow is relatively scant (Konrad and Nicol 2011; Ramirez 2001). Based 
on my estimates, between 1960 and 2000, over 160,000 Canadians migrated to the US per 
decade, while close to 90,000 US migrants went to Canada. It should be noted that the US-
Canadian border represents an important and active boundary since most of the Canadian 
population lives within 100 miles of the border (Ramirez 2001). Not surprisingly, Anglo-
Canadians have historically been better able to incorporate into American society than French-
Canadians, although there is evidence of the role of French-Canadians as part of the 
development of the industrial sector in New England (Ramirez 2001). 
An interesting migration phenomenon that brings together Canada and the US – and 
more recently Mexico – is seasonal (winter) migration (Marshall and Longino 1988; McHigh 
and Mings 1994), also known as snowbird migration (Coates, Morrison and Healy 2002). This 
is a temporary migration stream originated in Canada, and in the north of the US to a lesser 
extent, directed towards the US Sun Belt –and more recently to Mexico. In the case of 
Canadians flowing to the US, Coates et al. (2002) report that by the end of the 1990s this flow 
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was comprised of about 300,000 Canadian migrants that stayed in the US Sun Belt somewhere 
between 21 and 90 days during winter. Like the lifestyle migrants mentioned earlier, snowbird 
migrants tend to be relatively old and politically active (Coates, Healy and Morrison 2002; 
Marshall and Longino 1988; McHigh and Mings 1994). Snowbird migration is, therefore, a 
distinctive feature of the North American migration subsystem that binds together, for a 
relatively short period of time during a given year, the North American triad. 
The analysis of migration dynamics in the North American migratory subsystem has 
provided three particular insights on migration dynamics in the Americas: (1) the importance 
of early institutional North-South temporary work agreements to propel migration flows later 
in time (e.g. the bracero and SWAP programs); (2) the increasing numbers of both temporary 
(i.e. snowbird migrants) and permanent (i.e. migrants of privilege) lifestyle migrants in North-
North and North-South flows and; (3) the significance of migratory laws in order to partially 
understand the strength and demographic composition of South-North flows (i.e. the effects 
of the skill-based point system in Canada vs. the reunification-based system in the US). 
The South American Migratory Subsystem 
Previous research has shown that countries in South America comprise a distinctive 
migratory subsystem (Pellegrino 1995; Parrado and Cerrutti 2015). Within this large 
subsystem, three main types of flows can be identified: those between Andean countries, those 
between Andean Countries and countries in the Southern Cone, and those between countries 
in the Southern Cone. I start by analyzing key Andean flows. 
The Andean region is comprised of five countries: Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
and Venezuela. From Figure 3.2 it is clear that Venezuela was, by far, the main destination 
country in the Andean region. This is clearly supported by the literature (Villa and Martínez 
2000; Cerruti and Parrado 2015; OIM 2012; Rochcau 1983). Figure 3.2 also shows that the 
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largest flow in the Andean region is that of Colombians going to Venezuela. Based on my 
estimates, between 1960 and 2000, more than 90 percent of the 705,000 Colombians that 
migrated to another country in Latin America went to Venezuela. A similar estimate is reported 
elsewhere (Martínez and Stang 2006). The peak of this flow was in the 1970s, with close to 
300,000 Colombians migrating to Venezuelan soil. Colombians in Venezuela tended to work 
in the construction and service industries (e.g. restaurants, hotels) and as cotton harvesters at 
the borders of the two countries (Escobar 1991).  
A significant number of Colombians in Venezuela, especially those migrating in the 
1970s, also held managerial positions (OIM 2012; Pellegrino 1995). The large flow of 
Colombians to Venezuela in the 1970s was not unique, however. My estimates show that, with 
no exception, all countries in the Andean region sent more migrants to Venezuela in the 1970s 
than in any other decade. This is also supported by the literature (Pellegrino 1995, 2003; Cerruti 
and Parrado 2015; OIM 2012). These in-flows were not solely composed of economic 
migrants. A significant number of political migrants from countries like Colombia, Uruguay, 
Chile or Argentina also flowed to Venezuela in the 1970s (Cerrutti and Parrado 2015; Silva 
and Massey 2015). 
The migration of Colombians to Ecuador is also significant and constant in the 
Andean region. This flow is in fact the second largest in the Andes (OIM 2012; Escobar 1991; 
Cerrutti and Parrado 2015; Martinez and Stang 2006). The literature reports that during the 
1960s, migration of Colombians to Ecuador was especially active at the Pacific border between 
these two countries (Escobar 1991; Mejía 2012). Most of these border migrants worked in the 
logging and rubber extraction industries (Eguiguren 2017). External economic factors like the 
very low oil prices reduced this flow in the 1980s (Mejía 2012; Pellegrino 1992). These 
fluctuations are captured in my data. My estimates show that the peak of the flow of 
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Colombians to Ecuador was in the 1970s (close to 16,000 migrants), while the lowest point of 
the flow was in the 1980s (close to 7,000 migrants). As mentioned in the Theory section in the 
context of my discussion of mixed migratory chains, similar fluctuations due to the crisis in 
oil prices are also observed in the flow of Colombians to Venezuela. During the 1990s, new 
push factors were positively affecting the emigration of Colombians to neighboring Andean 
countries. The increasing brutality of the Colombian internal conflict was prominent in that 
regard (Silva and Massey 2015; Mejía 2012).  
In the case of Peru as an emigration country, previous to the 1980s migration to 
Argentina was relatively small, mostly composed of male university students (Pacecca 2000b; 
Hiskey and Orces 2010). This flow significantly changed during the 1980s and 1990s when 
Argentina became the largest destination country for Peruvians in the Americas. During the 
1990s the Argentinian peso was pegged to the US dollar in an attempt to reduce hyperinflation. 
This fixed exchange rate incentivized labor migration to Argentina because it meant that 
migrants would be effectively paid in dollars (Cerrutti 2005). In that context, many Peruvian, 
Bolivian, and Paraguayan migrants – most of them women – migrated to Argentina, especially 
to cities like Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and Rosario (Cerrutti 2005; Bastia 2005, 2007; Sassone 
1989). These flows exemplify both the emergence of care chains within the global South and 
of gendered migration flows in the region (Bastia 2009; Cerrutti and Parrado 2015, Cerrutti 
2005). Fujimori’s self-coup in 1992 also impacted emigration of Peruvians (Altamirano 1992). 
In particular, there is indeed evidence that Fujimori’s regime made Peruvian women more 
likely to migrate than men (Hiskey and Orces 2010). The infamous forced sterilization of more 
than 270,000 indigenous Peruvian women by Fujimori’s regime in the 1990s symbolizes the 
struggles of Peruvian women in these years (Ballón 2014). 
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In the case of Bolivian emigrants, the literature reports that Argentina and Brazil were 
major destinations (Ledo 2010). This is supported by my estimates since Argentina and Brazil 
emerge, respectively, as the first and third most common destination countries for Bolivians 
in each of the decades under analysis. The second most common destination of Bolivians was 
the US. On average, based on my estimates, close to 50,000 Bolivians flowed to Argentina per 
decade between 1960 and 2000. The literature reports that during the 1980s and onwards 
Bolivians became the largest foreign-born group in Argentina (OIM 2012). Bolivians in 
Argentina are reported to predominantly work as agricultural and construction workers, 
miners, domestic workers, and in the garment industry (Bastia 2007; Courtis and Pacecca 
2010). Although Bolivian migration to Argentina is essentially economic and circulatory 
(Bastia 2007; Escobar 1991), political turmoil around the coup of Banzer in 1971 also 
incentivized emigration to Argentina (Cerruti and Parrado 2015). The flow of Peruvians and 
Bolivians to Argentina represent the major migratory movements from the Andean region to 
the Southern Cone.  
As shown in Figure 3.2, the most prominent flows within Southern Cone proper are 
comprised of both Uruguayans and Paraguayans going to Argentina. This is supported by the 
literature (Franco and Di Filippo 1999; Sporlein 2015; Gómez and Bologna 2013). Based on 
my estimates, on average, about 68,000 Paraguayans flowed to Argentina per decade between 
1960 and 2000. The peak of this flow was in the 1990s, when more than 89,000 Paraguayans 
migrated to Argentina. In general, years of education, lack of employment, and social ties to 
siblings or a wife with migration experience, have been shown to increase Paraguayan’s 
probability to migrate to Argentina (Cerrutti and Parrado 2003). The sustained migration of 
Paraguayans to Argentina is also associated with Stroessner’s 35-year-long (1954-1989) 
dictatorship (Cerrutti and Parrado 2015). Concomitantly, macroeconomic factors like 
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increased inflation and the deterioration of employment opportunities in Argentina, especially 
during the 1980s, predicted Paraguayans return migration from Argentina (Parrado and 
Cerrutti 2003). The construction of hydroelectric power plants in Paraguay during the 1970s 
and 1980s also incentivized return migration from Argentina (Villa and Martínez 2000). My 
estimates do show that the 1980s is the decade with the lowest number of Paraguayans (close 
to 24,000) flowing to Argentina. 
Given that Paraguayan, Peruvian, and Bolivian flows that took place during the late 
1980s and 1990s were mainly directed to large cities like in Argentina this created “alarmist 
attitudes” with regards to Latin American migrants in Argentina (Sassone 1989). In that 
context, in 1987 Argentinean President Alfonsín sanctioned a decree in which (indirect) 
discrimination was instituted against migrants from countries like Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay 
(Bastia and vom Hau 2014). This represented a significant regulatory change since in previous 
decades flows to Argentina from neighboring countries were highly unregulated (Parrado and 
Cerrutti 2003).  
The flow of Paraguayans to Brazil represents another prominent migratory corridor in 
the Southern Cone (OIM 2012; Cerruti and Parrado 2015). These migrants tend to be 
agricultural workers settled in rural areas, especially in the Brazilian states of Paraná and Mato 
Grosso (Souchaud 2010; Patarra and Baeninger 2004). Interestingly, the migration between 
Brazil and Paraguay is highly bidirectional. Rochcau (1983) notes that Paraguayans flowing to 
Brazil in search of jobs, and that Brazilians emigrating to Paraguay in search of land, was an 
exchange initially stimulated by the construction of the Friendship Bridge in 1965 over the 
Paraná River. Since then Brazilian peasants have had an important presence in eastern 
Paraguay (Pellegrino 2003; Póvoa and Sprandel 2010). Brazilians are indeed the largest foreign-
born population in Paraguay, and their economic activities have diversified over time to 
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encompass construction work, the service industry, and commerce (Souchaud 2010). Based 
on my estimates, Paraguay was the top destination in Latin America for Brazilian migrants in 
all decades under analysis, except in the 1990s. Similarly, Brazil was always the second most 
popular destination in Latin America for Paraguayans. These estimates conform to evidence 
reported in the literature (Loreley 2005). Latin American migration was never the main source 
of immigrants in Brazil, however (Klein 1995). This is the result of efforts from the Brazilian 
state to attract qualified migrants from other latitudes (Pellegrino 1992) and of the strength of 
urban-rural flows within Brazil that made this country less dependent on foreign labor 
(Pellegrino 2003). 
Finally, Chile is an interesting because it had a very stark transition in its migratory 
profile going from being a net emigration country between the 1960s and 1980s (Bernhard et 
al. 2009) to becoming a net immigration country in the 1990s (Martínez and Stang 2006; 
Stefoni 2010). My data do reflect these changes. Based on my estimates, more than 41,000 
Chileans emigrated to other countries in the Americas in the 1990s, while more than 71,500 
immigrated to Chile from the Americas. In contrast, in the 1980s, close to 83,000 Chileans 
emigrated to other countries in the Americas, while close to 31,000 people from the Americas 
immigrated to Chile. The same net emigration pattern is present in my estimates for the 1970s 
and 1960s. During the years of net emigration, Chile had very important flows directed 
towards Argentina – most of these migrants were men (Villa and Martínez 2000) –, and to a 
lesser extent to Brazil and Venezuela. Most of these flows were incentivized by Pinochet’s 
dictatorship (1973-1991) (Cerrutti and Parrado 2015; OIM 2012). During the 1990s, Chile’s 
return to democracy and its remarkable macroeconomic performance, were associated with 
return migration of Chileans, as well as with increased migration flows from neighboring 
countries like Peru (Villa and Martínez 2000; Pellegrini 2003; OIM 2012; Franco and Di 
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Filippo 1999). The migration of Peruvians to Chile during the 1990s was mainly directed 
towards Santiago and was also mainly composed of women (Stefoni 2010).  
To summarize, the analysis of migration dynamics in the South American migratory 
subsystem has provided three particular insights on migration dynamics in the Americas: (1) 
the importance of external shocks like abrupt changes in oil prices to understand migration 
flows in the Andean region and South America (e.g. flows to Venezuela in the 1970s); (2) the 
relevance of care work to understand South-South migration dynamics in general, and the 
feminization of migration flows to large cities in the Southern Cone in particular (e.g. 
Peruvians going to Argentina); (3) the critical importance of transitions in and out democracy 
to understand emigration on the one hand, and return migration on the other (e.g. Chileans 
going to, and coming from, Argentina). 
Once the most prominent migratory corridors in the Americas have been depicted and 
described, the final part of this Chapter is devoted to explain the emergence and evolution of 
the migratory system that emerges out of these very same flows. In order to do so, I will be 
relaying on techniques that allow me to capture key dynamics of migratory chains by focusing 
on their subjacent network structure.  
Explaining the Structure of International Migration Flows in the Americas, 1960-2000 
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics of the four networks of decades-long 
migration flows under analysis. The networks are relatively dense with an average density of 
0.449, with no observed isolates. Mean in-degree is close to 14 incoming ties per country, on 
average. It should be noted, however, that the standard deviation of the in-degree distributions 
of these networks is relatively large. This is associated with the existence of long tails, which 
signal the existence of popular nodes or hubs, like the US, that tend to get a much larger 
number of in-flows than the average country. To see a graphic representation of the in-degree 
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distribution of each network, see Appendix A.3.6. The dyad census in Table 3.3 shows that 
the number of mutual dyads ([i→j]; [j→i]) is always smaller than both the number of null dyads 
([i no tie j]; [j no tie i]) and of asymmetric dyads ([i→j]; [j no tie i]).  
In terms of the triadic structure of these networks, which is the backbone of migratory 
chain, Table 3.3 shows that in the observed networks there are always a very small number of 
cyclic triangles ([k→j]; [j→i]; [i→k], graphically ) when compared to the number of transitive 
triangles ([j→k]; [i→j]; [i→k], graphically ). For instance, in the 1980s there were only 7 
cyclic triads while there were 345 transitive triads. The ratio of triangles to triads is also very 
different. On the one hand, in the case of cyclic triads, the ratio of cyclic triangles ( ) to the 
number of 021C triads ( ) is 0.051. On the other hand, in the case of transitive triads, the 
ratio of closed triangles ( ) to the number of 021U triads ( ) is 0.62. The difference 
between these two ratios is very large since the ratio of transitive triangles to 021U triads is 
more than 12 times that of cyclic triangles to 021C triads. This conforms to my hypotheses 
since the data do suggest the existence of a positive tendency towards transitive closure and a 
negative tendency towards cyclic closure in the context of the migratory chains observed in 
the Americas.  
Note that it is entirely possible that the counts of triads and triangles reported above 
are the product of chance, conditional on other structural features of the networks. Put 
differently, these observed counts might be typical of networks that happen to share similar 
structural features (e.g. number of ties, number of mutual dyads etc.) to the ones observed in 
the empirical networks.  
As a first step to rule out that possibility, Table 3.3 reports counts of transitive and 
cyclic triangles, as well as of the relevant triads (i.e. 021C and 021U), for random simulated 
networks that are structurally similar to my observed networks. More specifically, for each of 
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the four observed networks, I simulated 500 random networks that have the same number of 
nodes, and ties, and also have exactly the same proportion of null, symmetric, and asymmetric 
dyads as the empirical networks. Results show that in 13 out of 16 cases, the mean number of 
simulated configurations (e.g. the mean number of simulated cyclic triangles in the 1980s equals 
84.5) is more than three standard deviations apart from the empirical count of the same 
configuration (e.g. the observed number of cyclic triangles in the 1980s is 7). This represents 
further evidence in favor of my hypotheses suggesting that there is indeed a systematic – and 
highly hierarchical – process shaping closure in the migratory chains observed in the Americas.  
Here I provide a final piece of descriptive evidence in favor of my hypothesis. As 
mentioned in the theory section, exchanges – including migratory exchanges – between 
countries in the Americas can be expected to be highly hierarchical and unequal. Furthermore, 
from an analytic point, I suggested the existence of three stratum in which the countries in the 
system of international migration flows can be located. Countries in the upper strata are top 
players at the system-level, in the case at hand, the US and Canada. These are the countries 
that have the most resources and stability, thus making them highly desirable destinations. In 
that context, Table 3.4 shows how many times the US and Canada are part of migratory chains 
with horizontal-like exchange patterns, that is, the number of times these two countries are in 
the cyclic triangles observed in the data. The answer is clear: the US and Canada are nowhere 
to be found in this kind of equal exchange situations. However, these two countries are part 
of more than 26 percent of all transitive triangles, that is, of the migratory chains that are 
hierarchically structured. The descriptive evidence does suggest, once more, the existence of 
a highly hierarchical system where a clear pecking order between countries exists. 
Table 3.5 displays results of TERG models estimating the emergence and evolution of 
migration flows in the Americas between 1960 and 2000. These models go beyond the 
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descriptive results in Table 3.3 by means of including other endogenous dependencies (e.g. in-
degree popularity), as well as exogenous factors (e.g. level of political conflict) and the 
configuration of the network at previous time points (e.g. dyadic stability). The evidence from 
the TERG model strongly conforms to my hypotheses: local patterns of relational deference 
at the level of triads play a key role in the generative process behind the evolution of migration 
flows in the Americas; thus evidencing the hierarchical nature of the Americas migratory 
system. These effects are not a mere nuance; they are empirically robust and also make sense 
theoretically once migratory chains are laid out in the context of such a highly stratified system. 
The results in Table 3.5 report that the coefficient for cyclic triangles is of -0.154, 
which means that an additional tie i→k that closes a triad of the form [k→j];[j→i] (graphically, 
) decreases the odds of the existence of a flow from i to k by [100 * (exp(0.154) – 1)] ≈ 17 % 
on average, conditional on the rest of the network. On the other hand, the coefficient for 
transitive triangles is of 0.140, which means that an additional tie i→k that closes a triad of the 
form [i→j]; [j→k] (graphically, ) increases the odds of the existence of a flow from i to k by 
≈ 15 % on average, conditional on the rest of the network. The results hold after incorporating 
exogenous covariates previously used in the literature like income, political violence, language 
and geographic distance (Fagiolo and Mastrorillo 2007; Özden et al. 2011). More importantly, 
these results also hold above and beyond both contemporaneous dependence processes like 
mutuality (e.g. the tendency of flows j→i and i→j to co-occur) and inter-temporal dependence 
processes like dyadic stability (e.g. the tendency of a flow from j→i to remain in time). All of 
this supports the hypotheses developed in the Theory section. 
In terms of the goodness-of-fit of the model, Figure 3.3 show that the estimated model 
reported in Table 3.5 fits the data very well. Except for the plot in the bottom right corner, 
the different plots in Figure 3.3 shows box plots representing the distribution of six network 
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statistics computed on 500 simulated networks per decade. These 500 networks per decade 
are all simulated under the generative model in Table 3.5 and are compared to the empirical 
distribution of the same six statistics, as represented by the solid lines. All these plots show 
evidence of very good fit. The bottom right plot in Figure 3.3 shows ROC curves estimated 
for each one of the fitted networks in order to further assess the accuracy of the TERG model. 
All curves have a score > 0.8, which is conventionally considered as good fit. It should be 
noted that the network corresponding to the 1960s is excluded from all plots in Figure 3.3 
since the first network in the series of observed networks (i.e. the 1960s) is actually not 
modeled, but taken as the initial source of information to fit subsequent networks (Liefeld, 
Cranmer and Desmarais 2016) Finally, Appendix A.3.8 shows that model in Table 3.5 is not 
degenerate.  
Importantly, Table 3.6 shows how the two key coefficients under analysis (i.e. 
transitive triangles and cyclic triangles) vary based on different threshold values. The 
coefficients in Table 3.6 are estimated after controlling for all relevant covariates included in 
Table 3.5. For ease of expositions, however, I only present the coefficients relevant for my 
hypotheses. The full TERG models based on the different thresholding rules can be found in 
Appendix A.3.7.  
Table 3.6, therefore, provides further support for my hypotheses since it is clear that 
by including fewer flows (e.g. top 10 destination countries vs. top 15 destination countries), 
that is, by analyzing only the largest flows in the system, the strength of transitivity and 
(anti)cyclicality is amplified. On the other hand, by including more flows (e.g. top 20 
destinations vs. top 15 destination countries), the strength of transitivity and (anti)cyclicality is 
reduced. In a word, the results show that as one focuses on the most prominent migratory 
corridors in the Americas, the hierarchical nature of the system is more palpable. Qualitatively 
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similar results are found using a completely different thresholding rule, based on actual flow 
size, and a completely different inferential technique, the Stochastic Actor-oriented Model (see 
Appendix A.3.9 for these results and their rationale).  
Conclusions 
Throughout this Chapter I have taken several critical steps to push forward the field 
of international migration. First, I have estimated migration flows in the Americas during the 
distinctive period between 1690 and 2000. By doing so, I have provided an unprecedented 
picture of decades-long migration flows in the Americas. Relatedly, by capitalizing on the 
breadth and scope of my data, I have described in detail the main migratory corridors in the 
Americas, thus providing a unified description of the literature on migration flows in the 
Americas, a literature that is highly scattered due to the its emphasis on bilateral case studies. 
Second, by capitalizing on the relational nature of my data, I have provided a network-based 
theory of migratory chains based on the existence of three analytically different stratum: an 
upper strata (US and Canada); a middle strata (Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Argentina); and a 
lower strata (all other countries). Moreover, by analyzing the history of flows with the aid of 
both circos plots and network-based descriptive statistics, I have shown that the concept of 
migratory chain allows for a description of the intricate and highly stratified system of 
migration flows in the Americas. Third, I have tested hypotheses in order to show that the 
stratified/hierarchical nature of system can be traced down to key processes taking place at 
the local level, namely, to the transitivity and (anti)cyclicity of the migratory chains. Finally, I 
have also shown that these local tendencies are very stable blueprints of the system, thus 
making them necessary to explain the emergence and evolution of the overall system over 
time.  
 103 
 
 Future work should address important questions that remain answered. First, several 
questions related to closure of migratory chains need deeper theorization and analysis. For 
instance, are top-down migratory chains more likely to be exhibit stronger tendencies towards 
transitivity and (anti)cyclicity when compared to mixed migratory chains and/or bottom-up 
migratory chains. Second, are the results provided in this Chapter robust to different time 
periods, different geographies, or to a gender-based analysis? Testing the theory put forward 
in this Chapter in a different continental system (e.g. Asia or Africa), at a global scale, or by 
analyzing gender-disaggregated flows, would be critical in this regard. Third, from a 
methodological point of view, can we assess what are the advantages of using a network-based 
approach as a predictive tool to model flows-as-networks when compared to more traditional 
approaches to model aggregate-level migration flows? An answer to this question would 
generate important inputs for both academic and policy-oriented audiences interested in the 
difficult task of forecasting migration flows. Finally, what are the different times frames in 
which the processes described in this Chapter take place? Producing fine-grained aggregate-
level data on migratory flows would be a necessary step in this regard. The migration stock 
database recently produced by the UN, based on 5-year intervals between 2000 and 2015, is 
very promising in this regard. A detailed explanation of the timing (e.g. long term vs. short 
term) of the processes described in this Chapter can be helpful to star answering questions 
about causality in the context of international migration flows. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation is devoted to the study of network dynamics that are the direct or 
indirect result of behaviors observed at the limen of prominent symbolic boundaries. In 
Chapter 1, I analyze the diffusion of innovations in artificial societies with tunable levels of 
(cultural) segregation. In Chapter 2, I focus on the diffusion of a health-related innovation 
using empirical data from an American high school. In Chapter 3, I study the local network 
configuration of migratory chains; which, in turn, (re)produce the highly stratified system of 
migration flows in place in the Americas. Throughout the dissertation, I consistently use 
systems science methods like agent-based models, Stochastic Actor-oriented Models 
(SAOMs) and Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models (TERGMs). 
One of the key arguments in this dissertation has to do with the idea of cultural 
brokerage. When social actors, either individual or collective, span cultural holes, that means 
that they are making segregated networks more compact by means of bridging previously 
disconnected social actors and the cultural worlds to which they belong. A key point in this 
dissertation is that cultural brokers often are at an advantageous position from a structural 
point of view (e.g. by means of influencing diffusion dynamics), but could also be at a 
disadvantage from a social (e.g. psychological, cultural) perspective. Indeed, being in-
between, rather than simply in, can bring pain, alienation, and distress. That is a major 
paradox: on the one hand, cultural brokers, and their cross-cultural ties and “translation” 
abilities, are much needed to make (culturally) segregated networks more compact. On the 
other hand, when these brokers do traverse cultural boundaries, especially bright symbolic 
boundaries, they put themselves at great risk.  
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In fact, Chapter 1 and 2 document the importance of cultural brokers to the 
widespread diffusion of innovations. At the same time, in those two Chapters I also  
document how an array of scattered and heterogeneous literatures on adolescent 
socialization, families, race & ethnicity, migration, and friendship formation systematically 
point to the burdens of cultural brokerage and liminality more generally.  
It is imperative that future work carefully addresses the above mentioned paradox. In 
particular, a systematic understanding of the determinants of cultural brokerage, and the 
burdens it carries, will be critical to nurture and encourage the bridging of cultural holes in 
culturally (e.g. racially) segregated societies. Only after understanding the causes and 
consequences of cultural brokerage on the lives of cultural brokers themselves will we be 
able to fully support the bridging of cultural holes. In this dissertation I aimed to put 
computational social science and systems science methods in conversation with these 
interesting questions. 
Chapter 3 is in line with that very same approach. International migrants’ movements 
throughout the Americas were at the center of the analysis conducted in that last Chapter. In 
particular, using network-analytic techniques, I studied how aggregate-level data on 
migration dynamics are useful to describe the system of international migration flows in the 
Americas during the second half of the 20th century. Results show how triads are key to 
understand the temporal (re)production of migratory chains that traverse the three different 
strata that characterize this system.  
In that context, it is critical not to lose sight of one key fact: international migrants 
are vectors of cultural brokerage who typically are, at the same time, at a great disadvantage 
precisely because of their (cultural) liminality. That is, international migrants embody very 
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well the paradox behind cultural brokerage mentioned in the paragraphs above. In this 
regard, I truly believe that the literatures and theories on the causes and consequences of 
migration reviewed and tested in Chapter 3 are a great starting point to understand the 
causes and consequences of cultural brokerage more broadly. In that sense, I also believe 
that my attempt to fully incorporate migration literatures and findings in the critical theory 
of liminality put forward in Chapters 1 and 2 is a first try at achieving a theoretical synthesis 
of liminality as a key mechanism for the bridging of cultural holes. 
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TABLES 
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Table 1.1 Segregation along the Primary Boundary: Modularity 
 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.055 -0.080 -0.120 -0.163 -0.212 -0.256 -0.300 -0.349 -0.396 -0.449 -0.500 
0.1 -0.042 -0.063 -0.097 -0.134 -0.169 -0.207 -0.243 -0.276 -0.319 -0.358 -0.400 
0.2 -0.032 -0.048 -0.073 -0.101 -0.127 -0.154 -0.183 -0.208 -0.236 -0.27 -0.302 
0.3 -0.026 -0.032 -0.05 -0.065 -0.084 -0.102 -0.123 -0.138 -0.16 -0.183 -0.202 
0.4 -0.013 -0.018 -0.025 -0.034 -0.045 -0.052 -0.064 -0.067 -0.076 -0.093 -0.100 
0.5 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 
0.6 0.010 0.014 0.022 0.032 0.045 0.050 0.060 0.073 0.079 0.090 0.099 
0.7 0.019 0.033 0.042 0.062 0.083 0.104 0.120 0.136 0.157 0.176 0.200 
0.8 0.026 0.046 0.069 0.094 0.126 0.151 0.180 0.207 0.238 0.266 0.296 
0.9 0.039 0.058 0.092 0.131 0.162 0.200 0.241 0.276 0.315 0.356 0.398 
1 0.050 0.076 0.120 0.162 0.208 0.255 0.300 0.346 0.398 0.447 0.499 
           Secondary free parameters: Z = 5, N = 300; B = 9; G = 2. Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
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Table 1.2 Segregation along the Primary Boundary: Ln(Gross Segregation Index)  
 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.219 -0.320 -0.489 -0.678 -0.915 -1.142 -1.401 -1.752 -2.190 -2.982 ∞ 
0.1 -0.164 -0.251 -0.392 -0.551 -0.710 -0.890 -1.071 -1.258 -1.529 -1.825 -2.223 
0.2 -0.122 -0.187 -0.290 -0.408 -0.519 -0.640 -0.772 -0.892 -1.034 -1.219 -1.415 
0.3 -0.097 -0.121 -0.194 -0.257 -0.337 -0.415 -0.503 -0.571 -0.668 -0.772 -0.865 
0.4 -0.045 -0.067 -0.096 -0.132 -0.174 -0.203 -0.256 -0.268 -0.304 -0.377 -0.404 
0.5 0.012 0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.015 -0.011 0.004 0.003 -0.006 0.017 -0.003 
0.6 0.048 0.065 0.099 0.141 0.192 0.212 0.255 0.308 0.332 0.380 0.417 
0.7 0.084 0.141 0.181 0.261 0.348 0.439 0.509 0.575 0.669 0.756 0.870 
0.8 0.116 0.195 0.290 0.397 0.533 0.643 0.778 0.908 1.061 1.215 1.392 
0.9 0.166 0.245 0.387 0.555 0.694 0.871 1.080 1.276 1.521 1.822 2.224 
1 0.212 0.320 0.506 0.693 0.910 1.156 1.422 1.744 2.232 2.963 ∞ 
              Secondary free parameters: Z = 5, N = 300; B = 9; G = 2. Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
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Table 2.1. SAOM Estimates Reported by Shoham et al. 2012 and Zhang et al. 2015a 
Testing Friendship Nominations and BMI Coevolution in Jefferson High 
 
Friendship Nomination (Network) 
Function 
b     95% C. I. 
 Basic rate parameter network change 12.87  
   Out-degree (density) -3.56 (-3.64   ,   -3.48) 
   Reciprocity 2.26 (2.13    ,    2.39) 
   Number of transitive triplets 0.48 (0.43    ,    0.53) 
   Same sex 0.18 (0.10    ,    0.26) 
   Same grade 0.49 (0.41    ,    0.57) 
   Similarity on age 0.91 (0.62    ,    1.20) 
   Similarity on income 0.06 (-0.23   ,    0.35)  
   BMI ego  -0.007 (-0.017 ,  0.003) 
   BMI alter  0.014 (0.003  ,    0.03) 
   Similarity on BMI 0.54 (0.014  ,    0.95) 
BMI (Behavior) Function  
 Basic rate parameter behavior change 4.17  
   BMI linear shape 0.16 (0.11    ,    0.22) 
   BMI quadratic shape 0.015 (0.004  ,   0.025) 
   BMI average similarity 14.1 (7.76    ,   20.44) 
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Table 3.1 Transitive Triadic Closure 
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Table 3.2 Cyclic Triadic Closure  
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Table 3.3 Network Descriptive Statistics, Migration Flows in the Americas 1960 – 
2000 
 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Density 0.449 0.443 0.446 0.458 
Centralization 0.313 0.319 0.316 0.303 
Mean in-degree (sd) 13.91 (8.76) 13.72 (9.23) 13.81 (9.16) 14.19 (7.97) 
Number of  nodes 32 32 32 32 
Number of ties 445 439 442 454 
Isolates 0 0 0 0 
 
Dyad Census     
   Number of Mutual Dyads 122 126 118 133 
   Number of Asymmetric Dyads 201 187 206 188 
   Number of Null Dyads 173 183 172 175 
 
 
Observed Network 
   Number of Transitive Triangles  295 236 345 261 
   Number of 021U Triads 464 520 486 376 
   Number of Cyclic Triangles 21 8 7 15 
   Number of 021C Triads 285 187 242 244 
 
Simulated Networks*     
   Mean Number of Transitive Triang. 
    (sd)  
239.15 
(43.67) 
205.99 
(36.98)      
253.81 
(42.28) 
204.58 
(37.00) 
   Mean Number of 021U Triads  
    (sd) 
209.14 
(23.25) 
198.21 
(22.47) 
217.33 
(24.18) 
189.86 
(21.54) 
   Mean Number of Cyclic Triangles  
    (sd) 
79.57   
(15.51) 
67.77   
(13.78) 
84.46   
(15.97) 
67.58   
(14.17) 
   Mean Number of 021C Triads  
    (sd) 
415.14 
(42.16) 
398.72 
(42.17) 
434.34 
(40.42) 
378.18 
(39.81) 
*Based on 500 dyad census-conditioned random graphs 
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Table 3.4 Upper Strata Nodes (i.e. US and Canada) and Triangle Counts 
 
Cyclic triangles with at least one upper strata node          60s        70s        80s       90s 
   Count  0 0 0 0 
   (% of all observed cyclic triangles) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Transitive triangles with at least one upper strata node      
   Count  82 56 80 79 
   (% of all observed transitive triangles) (28) (24) (23) (30) 
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Table 3.5 TERGM to Investigate International Migration Flows in the Americas, 
1960-2000  
 
   Estimates  Lower Bound CI Upper Bound CI 
Intercept/edges 2.583 ** 2.456 3.232 
Endogenous dependencies     
  Transitive triangles 0.140 ** 0.093 0.192 
  Cyclic triangles -0.154 ** -0.215 -0.083 
Endogenous controls     
  Mutuality 0.409 ** 0.204 0.597 
  Reciprocation 0.245  -0.024 0.544 
  Dyadic stability 0.478 ** 0.280 0.844 
  In-degree popularity 0.173 + 0.057 0.283 
  Out-degree popularity -1.293 ** -1.622 -1.253 
  Out-degree absolute diff -0.649 + -1.409 -0.106 
Exogenous controls     
  Same region 1.193 ** 1.033 1.275 
  Same language 0.423 ** 0.173 0.746 
  Income * in-degree 0.001 ** 0.001 0.003 
  Income * out-degree 0.001 + 0.001 0.002 
  Conflict * in-degree -0.002  -0.005 0.004 
  Conflict * out-degree 0.002  -0.003 0.007 
P-value thresholds (two-sided): + < 0.1, * < 0.05, ** < 0.001  
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Table 3.6. TERGMs to Investigate International Migration Flows in the Americas by 
Thresholding Rule Value, 1960-2000 
 
 
  
Estimates  
Lower 
Bound CI 
Upper 
Bound CI 
Thresholding 
rule 
Endogenous dependencies      
      
  Transitive triangles 0.222 ** 0.153 0.316 Top 10 
  Cyclic triangles -0.245 ** -0.433 -0.149 destinations 
     
  Transitive triangles 0.140 ** 0.093 0.192 Top 15 
  Cyclic triangles -0.154 ** -0.215 -0.083 destinations 
      
  Transitive triangles 0.088 ** 0.064 0.126 Top 20 
  Cyclic triangles -0.107 ** -0.140 -0.073 destinations 
Note: to see all coefficients see Table 3.5 (top 15), and the Appendix, Tables A.3.7 (top 10 & (top 20).                                                                                                                                             
P-value thresholds (two sided): + < 0.1, * < 0.05, ** < 0.001  
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FIGURES 
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Figure 1.1 Intercultural Capacity for Brokerage in a Hypothetical Undirected 
Network 
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Figure 1.2 Representative Sociograms Based on Relevant Levels of Consolidation (C) 
and Homophily Bias (H) with G = 2 
 
No Segregation: Random Graph 
C = 0, H = 0.5 
Mid-Level Segregation 
C = 0.5, H = 1 
Full Segregation 
C = 1, H = 1 
   
Ln (GSI)=0.026 
Modularity = 0.005 
Ln (GSI)=1.124 
Modularity = 0.250 
Ln (GSI)=infinity 
Modularity = 0.5 
Secondary free parameters: Z = 5, N = 300; B = 9. 
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Figure 1.3 Representative Sociograms Based on Relevant Levels of Consolidation (C) 
and Homophily Bias (H) with G = 3 & G = 4 
 
No Segregation: Random 
Graph 
C = 0, H = 0.33, G = 3 
Mid-Level Segregation 
C = 0.5, H = 1, G=3 
Full Segregation 
C = 1, H = 1; G=3 
   
Ln (GSI)=0 
Modularity = -0.002 
Ln (GSI)=1.577 
Modularity = 0.366 
Ln (GSI)=infinite 
Modularity = 0.666 
   
No Segregation: Random 
Graph 
C = 0, H = 0.25,G=4 
Mid-Level Segregation 
C = 0.5, H = 1, G=4 
Full Segregation 
C = 1, H = 1; G=4 
   
Ln (GSI)=-0.003 
Modularity = -0.003 
Ln (GSI)=1.775 
Modularity = 0.400 
Ln (GSI)=infinite 
Modularity = 0.75 
Secondary free parameters: Z = 5, N = 300; B = 9. 
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Figure 1.4 Overall Adoption. Baseline Model (N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Tmean=0.5; Tsd=0.05) 
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Figure 1.5 In-Group Adoption. Baseline Model (N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Tmean=0.5; Tsd=0.05) 
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Figure 1.6 Out-Group Adoption. Baseline Model (N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Tmean=0.5; Tsd=0.05) 
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Figure 1.7 Effectiveness of Cultural Brokerage vs. Other Strategies (Random, Popularity, Structural Brokerage – i.e. Betweenness –) 
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Baseline Model  
(N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Tmean=0.5; Tsd=0.05) 
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Figure 1.8 Effectiveness of Null Brokerage vs. Other Strategies (Random, Popularity, Structural Brokerage – i.e. Betweenness –) 
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Baseline Model  
(N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Tmean=0.5; Tsd=0.05) 
(Null Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Figure 1.9 Robustness Check for Tmean: Cultural vs. Structural Brokerage (N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Tsd=0.05) 
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Figure 2.1 BMI in the Observed (Solid Line) and Simulated (Box Plots) Jefferson 
High in Wave 2 
 
 
      Box plots are based on 100 simulations. 
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Figure 2.2 Overall Overweight Change (OWoverall) in Jefferson High by Effectiveness 
and Seed Innovator Type 
 
                                                                 
Box plots are based on 250 simulations 
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Figure 2.3 Out-group Overweight Change (OWout) Across the Gender Boundary in 
Jefferson High by Effectiveness (E) and Seed Innovator Type (S)  
 
                                                                        
Box plots are based on 250 simulations 
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Figure 2.4. Out-group Overweight Change (OWout) Across Several Boundaries in 
Jefferson High by Effectiveness (E) and Seed Innovator Type (S) 
 
                                              
Box plots are based on 250 simulations 
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Figure 2.5. In-group Overweight Change (OWin) Across Several Boundaries in 
Jefferson High by Effectiveness (E) and Seed Innovator Type (S) 
 
 
Box plots are based on 250 simulations 
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Figure 3.1 Migration Flows in Central America and the Caribbean by Decade, 1960-
2000 
 
 
 
Note. Countries can be identified as follows: Belize (BZ); Costa Rica (CR); El Salvador (SV); Guatemala (GT); Honduras 
(HN); Nicaragua (NI); Panama (PA); Antigua and Barbuda (AG); Aruba (AW); the Bahamas (BS); Barbados (BB); Cuba 
(CU); Dominican Republic (DO); French Guiana (GF); Grenada (WG); Guadalupe (GP); Guyana (GY); Haiti (HT); 
Jamaica (JA); Martinique (MQ); Puerto Rico (PR); St. Lucia (WL); St. Vincent and the Grenadines (WV); Suriname (SR); 
Trinidad and Tobago (TT). 
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Figure 3.2 Migration Flows in South America by Decade, 1960-2000 
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Figure 3.3 TERGM: Goodness-of-fit Assessment 
 
  
  
Except for the plot in the lower right corner, solid lines represents median of the observed networks. Box plots represents 95% confidence intervals based on 500 simulated 
networks.
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APPENDIX 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS, REPLICATION MATERIALS, AND DATA SOURCES                                                                                      
A.1.1. Pseudo-code of the Computational Model 
FIRST PROCEDURE  (Populate Model, Initialize Parameters) 
• Select and create a number of agents (N)  
• where N є [100,∞) and {N : N є ( +)} 
• Select a level of Consolidation (C) 
• where C є [0,1] and {C : C є (R+ U [0])} 
• Select a level of Homophily Bias (H) 
• where H є [0,1] and {H : H є (R+ U [0])} 
• Select a number of Groups or Communities (G) 
• where 2 ≤ G ≤ x with {x : x є [3,∞) and x є +} and {G : G є +} 
• Select a number of secondary boundaries (B) 
• where 2 ≤ B ≤ n with {n : n є [3,∞) and n є +} and {B : B є +}. 
• Select a margin of error for (F) 
• where F є [0.01,0.05] and {F : F є (R+ U [0])}  
• Select a mean degree (Z) 
• where Z є [4,10] and {Z : Z є ( +)} 
• Select a number of iterations (Q) 
• where Q є [100,∞) and {Q : Q є ( +)} 
• Select the population mean for the adoption thresholds (Tmean) 
• where 0 ≤ Tmean ≤ 1 where { Tmean : Tmean є (R+ U [0])} 
• Select the population standard deviation for the adoption thresholds (Tsd) 
• where 0 ≤ Tsd ≤ 1 where { Tsd : Tsd є (R+ U [0])} 
 
SECOND PROCEDURE (Consolidation) 
• For agent i to agent N:  
• Randomly assign agent i to one, and only one, of the possible values of G (i.e. group 
membership). 
▪ Call this distribution of agents within groups the primary boundary (PB) 
• Create B copies of PB 
• Induce a C level of correlation between each B and PB by partially reshuffling the secondary 
boundaries 
▪ Stop if the average pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficient between all the boundaries 
is equal to C +/- F 
 
THIRD PROCEDURE (Homophily Bias) 
• While Z has not been reached:  
• Ask a randomly selected agent i to: 
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▪ Select a social boundary at random (any of the secondary boundaries or the PB can be 
selected). Call the selected boundary b 
▪ Draw a random number r from the unit interval (r є [0,1] and {r : r є (R+ U [0])} 
▪ If-else r ≤ H 
o Create an undirected tie with a random alter j that has the same value (i.e. group 
membership) in b   
o Create an undirected tie with a random an alter j that has a different value (i.e. 
group membership) in b   
 
FOURTH PROCEDURE (Diffusion) 
• For agent i to agent N:  
• Compute agent’s i degree (Di) intercultural capacity for brokerage (IBi), and betweenness 
centrality (BEi) 
• Create a variable Ai to indicate if the agent has adopted the innovation. Initially, no agent is 
an adopter (i.e. Ai = 0) 
• Calculate cultural similarity to all other agents in the society using the simple matching 
coefficient (SMC), see equation 3 in Chapter 1. 
• Generate a random number (Ti), where Ti ~ N (Tmean, Tsd) 
• Rank-order agents based on Di, IBi, and BEi. There is one unique ranking per measure. 
• Select one of four rules to pick the seed agent: IB, degree, betweenness. or random 
• Based on the previous step, select the agent with highest Di or IBi or BEi or select an agent at 
random. Call the selected agent seed. 
• Ask agent seed and all her immediate neighbors to become adopters (i.e. Ai = 1). Call this set 
the seed neighborhood (s) 
• Repeat Q times:  
• Ask a randomly selected non-adopter (i.e. Ai = 0) agent i to: 
▪ Randomly select one of her neighbors j 
▪ Adopt the innovation (i.e. Ai = 1) if j has already adopted the innovation (i.e. Aj = 1) 
and the similarity to agent j (i.e. SMCij) is ≥ Ti  
 
FIFTH PROCEDURE (Compute Dependent Variables) 
 
• Compute the following quantities:  
• Aoverall = ∑ 𝐴𝑖 
𝑁𝑛𝑠
𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑠
                                                                                   
• Ain = ∑  𝐴𝑖 𝐺𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑
𝑁𝑛𝑠
𝑖
∑ 𝐺𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑
𝑁𝑛𝑠  
𝑖
                                                                                      
• Aout = ∑ 𝐴𝑖 ǀ𝐺𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 − 1) ǀ
𝑁𝑛𝑠
𝑖
∑ ǀ𝐺𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 − 1) ǀ
𝑁𝑛𝑠
𝑖
                                                                               
 
Where Nns is the set of all agents that are not part of the seed neighborhood, and Gi,seed = 1 if the 
ith agent has the same group membership in the primary boundary that the seed agent, and 0 
otherwise. 
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APPENDIX A.1.2                                                                                                                               
Segregation along the Primary Boundary with G = 5 
 
Modularity 
 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.024 -0.036 -0.050 -0.068 -0.086 -0.102 -0.120 -0.140 -0.159 -0.179 -0.200 
0.1 -0.015 -0.020 -0.027 -0.034 -0.043 -0.052 -0.059 -0.070 -0.080 -0.090 -0.099 
0.2 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.3 0.009 0.015 0.022 0.029 0.037 0.047 0.058 0.066 0.077 0.086 0.098 
0.4 0.019 0.033 0.048 0.061 0.082 0.097 0.114 0.136 0.153 0.175 0.198 
0.5 0.030 0.046 0.071 0.096 0.123 0.148 0.175 0.205 0.232 0.263 0.294 
0.6 0.041 0.063 0.096 0.127 0.165 0.199 0.236 0.273 0.314 0.351 0.395 
0.7 0.052 0.081 0.121 0.162 0.204 0.248 0.295 0.340 0.388 0.438 0.493 
0.8 0.061 0.099 0.143 0.192 0.246 0.299 0.355 0.406 0.470 0.529 0.594 
0.9 0.073 0.114 0.167 0.225 0.287 0.350 0.411 0.481 0.546 0.617 0.696 
1 0.084 0.134 0.194 0.260 0.329 0.403 0.473 0.546 0.628 0.710 0.799 
   Secondary free parameters: Z = 5; N = 300; B = 9; G = 5. Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
 
 
Ln(Gross Segregation Index) 
 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.145 -0.234 -0.337 -0.487 -0.656 -0.832 -1.061 -1.359 -1.774 -2.462 ∞ 
0.1 -0.077 -0.116 -0.162 -0.212 -0.281 -0.353 -0.409 -0.505 -0.600 -0.697 -0.797 
0.2 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.013 0.001 -0.003 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.016 0.017 
0.3 0.073 0.112 0.153 0.194 0.241 0.293 0.356 0.395 0.451 0.499 0.558 
0.4 0.134 0.216 0.303 0.372 0.478 0.555 0.637 0.740 0.817 0.912 1.012 
0.5 0.200 0.290 0.424 0.550 0.676 0.792 0.915 1.042 1.157 1.284 1.415 
0.6 0.263 0.379 0.550 0.699 0.867 1.019 1.172 1.327 1.495 1.650 1.834 
0.7 0.325 0.472 0.670 0.856 1.040 1.225 1.419 1.605 1.805 2.020 2.277 
0.8 0.369 0.562 0.770 0.988 1.215 1.436 1.665 1.882 2.166 2.458 2.825 
0.9 0.432 0.637 0.879 1.129 1.387 1.647 1.905 2.220 2.549 2.980 3.643 
1 0.488 0.727 0.996 1.275 1.559 1.868 2.183 2.546 3.058 3.818 ∞ 
        Secondary free parameters: Z = 5; N = 300; B = 9; G = 5. Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
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Sociograms 
 
No Segregation: Random  
C = 0, H = 0.5 
 Mid-Level Segregation 
C = 0.5, H = 1 
Full Segregation 
C = 1, H = 1 
 
 
  
Modularity = 0 
Ln (GSI)=0.019 
 Modularity = 0.422 
Ln (GSI)=1.948 
Modularity = 1 
Ln (GSI)=infinite 
Secondary free parameters: Z = 5, N = 300; B = 9 
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APPENDIX A.1.3                                                                                                                              
Segregation along the Primary Boundary with G = 10 
 
Modularity 
 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.014 -0.020 -0.026 -0.035 -0.044 -0.052 -0.061 -0.069 -0.079 -0.089 -0.100 
0.1 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
0.2 0.009 0.012 0.019 0.031 0.038 0.050 0.055 0.068 0.078 0.087 0.099 
0.3 0.018 0.028 0.047 0.062 0.083 0.096 0.113 0.133 0.152 0.174 0.195 
0.4 0.029 0.049 0.071 0.097 0.120 0.143 0.173 0.203 0.231 0.258 0.290 
0.5 0.041 0.064 0.095 0.127 0.158 0.192 0.231 0.265 0.309 0.345 0.386 
0.6 0.053 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.203 0.246 0.292 0.337 0.382 0.434 0.488 
0.7 0.062 0.096 0.142 0.192 0.246 0.295 0.349 0.404 0.463 0.519 0.587 
0.8 0.074 0.114 0.167 0.222 0.281 0.342 0.407 0.471 0.539 0.609 0.693 
0.9 0.084 0.133 0.194 0.258 0.323 0.392 0.466 0.540 0.619 0.697 0.792 
1 0.097 0.148 0.215 0.291 0.365 0.443 0.522 0.611 0.696 0.792 0.899 
       Secondary free parameters: Z = 5; N = 300; B = 9. Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
 
 
Ln(Gross Segregation Index) 
 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.141 -0.213 -0.299 -0.444 -0.600 -0.762 -0.987 -1.217 -1.641 -2.325 ∞ 
0.1 0.009 -0.006 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.015 0.021 0.022 0.020 
0.2 0.129 0.167 0.236 0.348 0.410 0.509 0.544 0.648 0.719 0.779 0.862 
0.3 0.223 0.319 0.486 0.601 0.753 0.840 0.949 1.067 1.176 1.295 1.404 
0.4 0.327 0.499 0.671 0.847 0.991 1.127 1.287 1.440 1.576 1.701 1.843 
0.5 0.436 0.614 0.836 1.032 1.211 1.385 1.574 1.734 1.929 2.083 2.256 
0.6 0.534 0.732 0.988 1.218 1.442 1.648 1.851 2.049 2.239 2.458 2.689 
0.7 0.603 0.841 1.121 1.386 1.645 1.867 2.100 2.332 2.584 2.826 3.144 
0.8 0.689 0.952 1.258 1.531 1.803 2.072 2.343 2.618 2.915 3.251 3.728 
0.9 0.760 1.067 1.396 1.700 1.990 2.282 2.597 2.924 3.305 3.752 4.518 
1 0.849 1.154 1.500 1.850 2.168 2.497 2.840 3.264 3.747 4.528 ∞ 
        Secondary free parameters: Z = 5; N = 300; B = 9. Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
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Sociograms 
 
No Segregation: 
Random  
C = 0, H = 0.5 
Mid-Level Segregation 
C = 0.5, H = 1 
Full Segregation 
C = 1, H = 1 
 
  
Modularity = -0.014 
Ln (GSI)=0.124 
Modularity = 0.452 
Ln (GSI)=2.535 
Modularity = 1 
Ln (GSI)=infinite 
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APPENDIX A.1.4                                                                                                                              
Segregation along the Primary Boundary with Z = 10 
 
Modularity 
 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.053 -0.080 -0.121 -0.164 -0.209 -0.255 -0.300 -0.345 -0.397 -0.448 -0.500 
0.1 -0.043 -0.063 -0.096 -0.133 -0.168 -0.204 -0.240 -0.279 -0.314 -0.354 -0.398 
0.2 -0.032 -0.048 -0.072 -0.100 -0.128 -0.150 -0.179 -0.206 -0.234 -0.266 -0.297 
0.3 -0.025 -0.034 -0.049 -0.068 -0.083 -0.102 -0.117 -0.138 -0.156 -0.177 -0.197 
0.4 -0.011 -0.018 -0.022 -0.034 -0.044 -0.054 -0.059 -0.071 -0.080 -0.088 -0.098 
0.5 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
0.6 0.009 0.013 0.023 0.033 0.039 0.048 0.059 0.068 0.077 0.088 0.098 
0.7 0.019 0.029 0.046 0.063 0.083 0.100 0.119 0.138 0.157 0.176 0.193 
0.8 0.029 0.044 0.068 0.097 0.124 0.151 0.180 0.205 0.234 0.263 0.296 
0.9 0.041 0.060 0.095 0.128 0.164 0.203 0.242 0.274 0.313 0.356 0.397 
1 0.054 0.075 0.116 0.163 0.205 0.254 0.298 0.347 0.393 0.446 0.500 
        Secondary free parameters: N = 300; B = 9; G=2 Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
  
Ln(Gross Segregation Index) 
 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.213 -0.326 -0.502 -0.695 -0.914 -1.155 -1.424 -1.744 -2.222 -2.974 ∞ 
0.1 -0.171 -0.254 -0.396 -0.558 -0.718 -0.889 -1.072 -1.292 -1.517 -1.808 -2.224 
0.2 -0.127 -0.191 -0.292 -0.411 -0.535 -0.634 -0.765 -0.900 -1.040 -1.218 -1.402 
0.3 -0.095 -0.134 -0.196 -0.276 -0.337 -0.422 -0.486 -0.579 -0.662 -0.757 -0.852 
0.4 -0.036 -0.068 -0.084 -0.134 -0.176 -0.215 -0.238 -0.289 -0.325 -0.359 -0.404 
0.5 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.008 
0.6 0.045 0.060 0.103 0.144 0.170 0.209 0.254 0.291 0.331 0.375 0.421 
0.7 0.087 0.130 0.199 0.271 0.353 0.426 0.509 0.593 0.682 0.768 0.852 
0.8 0.130 0.192 0.293 0.413 0.530 0.652 0.785 0.911 1.057 1.218 1.411 
0.9 0.177 0.257 0.406 0.547 0.711 0.896 1.100 1.277 1.521 1.840 2.234 
1 0.231 0.322 0.499 0.706 0.908 1.164 1.426 1.773 2.193 2.958 ∞ 
        Secondary free parameters: N = 300; B = 9; G=2. Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
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APPENDIX A.1.5                                                                                                                              
Segregation along the Primary Boundary for B = 4 
 
Modularity 
 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.103 -0.113 -0.152 -0.192 -0.234 -0.278 -0.321 -0.365 -0.406 -0.454 -0.500 
0.1 -0.082 -0.091 -0.122 -0.152 -0.187 -0.222 -0.257 -0.291 -0.326 -0.361 -0.399 
0.2 -0.064 -0.070 -0.090 -0.116 -0.141 -0.167 -0.192 -0.218 -0.243 -0.269 -0.298 
0.3 -0.043 -0.045 -0.062 -0.078 -0.094 -0.111 -0.127 -0.145 -0.163 -0.180 -0.199 
0.4 -0.024 -0.024 -0.031 -0.038 -0.048 -0.054 -0.064 -0.073 -0.083 -0.092 -0.099 
0.5 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
0.6 0.022 0.019 0.029 0.038 0.044 0.053 0.061 0.072 0.081 0.091 0.099 
0.7 0.041 0.044 0.057 0.072 0.092 0.109 0.125 0.145 0.160 0.177 0.198 
0.8 0.060 0.066 0.087 0.114 0.138 0.165 0.193 0.214 0.243 0.270 0.297 
0.9 0.079 0.087 0.116 0.150 0.185 0.221 0.256 0.289 0.323 0.361 0.399 
1 0.099 0.114 0.146 0.192 0.233 0.274 0.319 0.361 0.406 0.451 0.499 
        Secondary free parameters: Z = 5, N = 300; G=2 Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
 
Ln(Gross Segregation Index) 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.419 -0.463 -0.630 -0.816 -1.026 -1.271 -1.538 -1.881 -2.297 -3.088 ∞ 
0.1 -0.330 -0.367 -0.498 -0.633 -0.794 -0.965 -1.146 -1.343 -1.575 -1.846 -2.208 
0.2 -0.253 -0.281 -0.362 -0.473 -0.582 -0.702 -0.817 -0.944 -1.070 -1.216 -1.390 
0.3 -0.169 -0.177 -0.247 -0.313 -0.378 -0.453 -0.519 -0.600 -0.679 -0.760 -0.850 
0.4 -0.090 -0.090 -0.118 -0.147 -0.190 -0.211 -0.255 -0.291 -0.333 -0.369 -0.400 
0.5 -0.007 0.003 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.014 -0.007 0.006 0.012 0.008 0.009 
0.6 0.098 0.088 0.126 0.162 0.188 0.223 0.259 0.305 0.340 0.381 0.415 
0.7 0.177 0.190 0.240 0.304 0.388 0.460 0.526 0.615 0.682 0.763 0.861 
0.8 0.254 0.278 0.367 0.479 0.587 0.708 0.836 0.942 1.088 1.238 1.403 
0.9 0.335 0.368 0.491 0.636 0.802 0.974 1.158 1.353 1.578 1.864 2.227 
1 0.416 0.481 0.621 0.832 1.036 1.261 1.547 1.869 2.319 3.047 ∞ 
        Secondary free parameters: Z = 5, N = 300; G=2. Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
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APPENDIX A.1.6                                                                                                                              
Segregation along the Primary Boundary with N = 500 
 
Modularity 
 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.053 -0.077 -0.120 -0.165 -0.212 -0.257 -0.304 -0.350 -0.398 -0.447 -0.500 
0.1 -0.045 -0.062 -0.098 -0.135 -0.170 -0.207 -0.244 -0.279 -0.320 -0.356 -0.399 
0.2 -0.033 -0.048 -0.073 -0.098 -0.128 -0.155 -0.184 -0.211 -0.239 -0.270 -0.299 
0.3 -0.020 -0.031 -0.051 -0.067 -0.086 -0.107 -0.121 -0.139 -0.161 -0.180 -0.198 
0.4 -0.014 -0.016 -0.027 -0.035 -0.045 -0.051 -0.063 -0.071 -0.079 -0.088 -0.102 
0.5 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
0.6 0.009 0.014 0.024 0.034 0.042 0.053 0.060 0.068 0.080 0.089 0.100 
0.7 0.018 0.030 0.049 0.065 0.086 0.104 0.121 0.140 0.158 0.181 0.199 
0.8 0.032 0.045 0.072 0.100 0.127 0.155 0.180 0.209 0.238 0.268 0.299 
0.9 0.040 0.060 0.096 0.133 0.169 0.206 0.245 0.278 0.313 0.358 0.399 
1 0.053 0.077 0.119 0.166 0.209 0.258 0.303 0.348 0.398 0.448 0.500 
        Secondary free parameters: Z = 5; G=2; B=9. Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
 
Ln(Gross Segregation Index) 
 
  CONSOLIDATION (C) 
  0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
H 
O 
M 
O 
P 
H 
I 
L 
Y 
 
(H) 
0 -0.211 -0.309 -0.492 -0.689 -0.912 -1.146 -1.423 -1.748 -2.201 -2.927 ∞ 
0.1 -0.177 -0.248 -0.396 -0.555 -0.711 -0.883 -1.073 -1.270 -1.525 -1.799 -2.206 
0.2 -0.130 -0.190 -0.291 -0.396 -0.523 -0.644 -0.775 -0.906 -1.046 -1.218 -1.391 
0.3 -0.075 -0.122 -0.203 -0.267 -0.345 -0.437 -0.496 -0.572 -0.670 -0.756 -0.843 
0.4 -0.050 -0.060 -0.104 -0.139 -0.178 -0.204 -0.253 -0.284 -0.318 -0.353 -0.415 
0.5 -0.008 -0.002 -0.011 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
0.6 0.040 0.060 0.101 0.141 0.176 0.220 0.247 0.282 0.333 0.371 0.415 
0.7 0.076 0.128 0.202 0.270 0.355 0.430 0.506 0.588 0.665 0.774 0.857 
0.8 0.136 0.187 0.297 0.413 0.529 0.651 0.769 0.905 1.054 1.216 1.397 
0.9 0.167 0.250 0.396 0.556 0.714 0.889 1.087 1.272 1.492 1.820 2.214 
1 0.219 0.317 0.496 0.701 0.905 1.160 1.424 1.747 2.208 2.946 ∞ 
        Secondary free parameters: Z = 5; G=2; B=9. Cell values averaged over 100 independent realizations. 
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APPENDIX A.1.7                                                                                                                                                                              
Effectiveness of Cultural Brokerage: Baseline Model with Changes in Key Free Parameters 
 
Baseline Model with Threshold Mean (Tmean) = 0.4 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
 
 
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Q=10000; M=0; Tsd=0.05 
(Culturage Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Threshold Mean (Tmean) = 0.6 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
  
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Q=10000; M=0; Tsd=0.05 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Threshold Mean (Tmean) = 0.7 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
  
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Q=10000; M=0; Tsd=0.05 
 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Threshold Standard Deviation (Tsd) = 0.01 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
  
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Q=10000; M=0; Tmean=0.5 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Threshold Standard Deviation (Tsd) = 0.1 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
 
 
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Q=10000; M=0; Tmean=0.5 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Threshold Standard Deviation (Tsd) = 0.15 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
  
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Q=10000; M=0; Tmean=0.5 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Number of Groups (G) = 3 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
 
 
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; B=9; Q=10000; M=0; Tmean=0.5; Tmean=0.05 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Number of Groups (G) = 10 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
 
 
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; B=9; Q=10000; M=0; Tmean=0.5; Tmean=0.05 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Number of Secondary Boundaries (B) = 4 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
 
 
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; Q=10000; M=0; Tmean=0.5; Tmean=0.05 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Number of Secondary Boundaries (B) = 14 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
  
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; Q=10000; M=0; Tmean=0.5; Tmean=0.05 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Number of Iterations (Q) = 50000 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
 
 
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; M=0; Tmean=0.5; Tmean=0.05 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Behavioral Noise (Q) = 0.01 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
 
 
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; M = 10000; Tmean=0.5; Tmean=0.05 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Behavioral Noise (Q) = 0.025 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
  
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; M = 10000; Tmean=0.5; Tmean=0.05 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Behavioral Noise (Q) = 0.05 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
  
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; M = 10000; Tmean=0.5; Tmean=0.05 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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Baseline Model with Behavioral Noise (Q) = 0.1 
 
 H     O     M      O      P      H      I       L      Y 
 
 
C 
O 
N 
S 
O 
L 
I 
D 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
  
(Cultural Brokerage) – (Random) (Cultural Brokerage) – (Popularity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Model: 
N=300; Z=5; G=5; B=9; Tmean=0.5; Tmean=0.05 
 (Cultural Brokerage) – (Structural Brokerage)  
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APPENDIX A.2.1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Descriptive Statistics Jefferson High 
 
Variable Name Mean or Percent    SD Range 
   Age 15.03 1.10 12  – 19 
   Income 49.38 25.94 3 – 200 
   BMI 22.91 4.37 13.8  – 44.3 
   Grade 10.04 0.97 7 – 12 
   Men 47.19%  0 – 1 
   Latino 0.81%  0 – 1 
   White 94.69%  0 – 1 
   Black 0%  0 – 1 
   Asian  0.32%  0 – 1 
   Native 0.32%  0 – 1 
   Multiracial 4.51%  0 – 1 
   Average # in-ties 3.10 0.07 0 – 17 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 160 
 
APPENDIX A.2.2                                                                                                                  
Replication of SAOM Estimates Reported by Shoham et al. 2012 and Zhang et al. 
2015a Testing Friendship Nominations and BMI Coevolution in Jefferson High 
 
Friendship Nomination (Network) Function b S.E. 
 Basic rate parameter network change 12.75  
   Out-degree (density) -3.56*** (0.04) 
   Reciprocity 2.25*** (0.07) 
   Number of transitive triplets 0.49*** (0.03) 
   Same sex 0.19*** (0.04) 
   Same grade 0.46*** (0.04) 
   Similarity on age 1.22*** (0.19) 
   Similarity on income 0.08 (0.15)  
   BMI ego  -0.05** (0.02) 
   BMI alter  0.03 (0.02) 
   Similarity on BMI 0.41* (0.22) 
BMI (Behavior) Function  
 Basic rate parameter behavior change 0.95  
   BMI linear shape 1.39* (0.72) 
   BMI quadratic shape 0.28 (0.24) 
   BMI average similarity 22.14 (14.88) 
*p. < 0.1; **p. <0.05; ** p. <0.001 
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APPENDIX A.3.1                                                                                                                                         
List of Countries Included in the Estimation of Migration Flows (N = 192) 
 
Country Name Region 
Afghanistan South Asia 
Albania Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Algeria Rest of Middle East and North Africa 
Angola Africa 
Antigua and Barbuda Latin America and the Caribbean 
Argentina Latin America and the Caribbean 
Armenia Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Aruba Latin America and the Caribbean 
Australia Australia and New Zealand 
Austria Western Europe 
Azerbaijan Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Bahamas, The Latin America and the Caribbean 
Bahrain High Income Middle East and N. Africa 
Bangladesh South Asia 
Barbados Latin America and the Caribbean 
Belarus Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Belgium Western Europe 
Belize Latin America and the Caribbean 
Benin Africa 
Bhutan South Asia 
Bolivia Latin America and the Caribbean 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Botswana Africa 
Brazil Latin America and the Caribbean 
Brunei Darussalam East Asia and the Pacific 
Bulgaria Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Burkina Faso Africa 
Burundi Africa 
Cambodia East Asia and the Pacific 
Cameroon Africa 
Canada Canada 
Cape Verde Africa 
Central African Republic Africa 
Chad Africa 
Chile Latin America and the Caribbean 
China East Asia and the Pacific 
Colombia Latin America and the Caribbean 
Comoros Africa 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Africa 
Congo, Rep. Africa 
Costa Rica Latin America and the Caribbean 
Cote d'Ivoire Africa 
Croatia Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
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Cuba Latin America and the Caribbean 
Cyprus Western Europe 
Czech Republic Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Denmark Western Europe 
Djibouti Africa 
Dominican Republic Latin America and the Caribbean 
Ecuador Latin America and the Caribbean 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Rest of Middle East and North Africa 
El Salvador Latin America and the Caribbean 
Equatorial Guinea Africa 
Eritrea Africa 
Estonia Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Ethiopia Africa 
Fiji East Asia and the Pacific 
Finland Western Europe 
France Western Europe 
French Guiana Latin America and the Caribbean 
French Polynesia East Asia and the Pacific 
Gabon Africa 
Gambia, The Africa 
Georgia Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Germany Western Europe 
Ghana Africa 
Greece Western Europe 
Grenada Latin America and the Caribbean 
Guadeloupe Latin America and the Caribbean 
Guatemala Latin America and the Caribbean 
Guinea Africa 
Guinea-Bissau Africa 
Guyana Latin America and the Caribbean 
Haiti Latin America and the Caribbean 
Honduras Latin America and the Caribbean 
Hong Kong SAR, China East Asia and the Pacific 
Hungary Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Iceland Western Europe 
India South Asia 
Indonesia East Asia and the Pacific 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Rest of Middle East and North Africa 
Iraq Rest of Middle East and North Africa 
Ireland Western Europe 
Israel High Income Middle East and N. Africa 
Italy Western Europe 
Jamaica Latin America and the Caribbean 
Japan Japan 
Jordan Rest of Middle East and North Africa 
Kazakhstan Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Kenya Africa 
Kiribati East Asia and the Pacific 
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Korea, Dem. Rep. East Asia and the Pacific 
Korea, Rep. East Asia and the Pacific 
Kuwait High Income Middle East and N. Africa 
Kyrgyz Republic Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Lao PDR East Asia and the Pacific 
Latvia Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Lebanon Rest of Middle East and North Africa 
Lesotho Africa 
Liberia Africa 
Libya Rest of Middle East and North Africa 
Lithuania Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Luxembourg Western Europe 
Macao SAR, China East Asia and the Pacific 
Macedonia, FYR Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Madagascar Africa 
Malawi Africa 
Malaysia East Asia and the Pacific 
Maldives South Asia 
Mali Africa 
Malta Western Europe 
Martinique Latin America and the Caribbean 
Mauritania Africa 
Mauritius Africa 
Mexico Latin America and the Caribbean 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. East Asia and the Pacific 
Moldova Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Mongolia East Asia and the Pacific 
Morocco Rest of Middle East and N. Africa 
Mozambique Africa 
Myanmar East Asia and the Pacific 
Namibia Africa 
Nepal South Asia 
Netherlands Western Europe 
New Caledonia East Asia and the Pacific 
New Zealand Australia and New Zealand 
Nicaragua Latin America and the Caribbean 
Niger Africa 
Nigeria Africa 
Norway Western Europe 
Oman High Income Middle East and N. Africa 
Pakistan South Asia 
Panama Latin America and the Caribbean 
Papua New Guinea East Asia and the Pacific 
Paraguay Latin America and the Caribbean 
Peru Latin America and the Caribbean 
Philippines East Asia and the Pacific 
Poland Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Portugal Western Europe 
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Puerto Rico Latin America and the Caribbean 
Qatar High Income Middle East and N. Africa 
Reunion Africa 
Romania Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Russian Federation Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Rwanda Africa 
Samoa East Asia and the Pacific 
Sao Tome and Principe Africa 
Saudi Arabia High Income Middle East and N. Africa 
Senegal Africa 
Serbia and Montenegro Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Sierra Leone Africa 
Singapore East Asia and the Pacific 
Slovak Republic Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Slovenia Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Solomon Islands East Asia and the Pacific 
Somalia Africa 
South Africa Africa 
Spain Western Europe 
Sri Lanka South Asia 
St. Lucia Latin America and the Caribbean 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Latin America and the Caribbean 
Sudan Africa 
Suriname Latin America and the Caribbean 
Swaziland Africa 
Sweden Western Europe 
Switzerland Western Europe 
Syrian Arab Republic Rest of Middle East and North Africa 
Taiwan, China East Asia and the Pacific 
Tajikistan Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Tanzania Africa 
Thailand East Asia and the Pacific 
Timor-Leste East Asia and the Pacific 
Togo Africa 
Tonga East Asia and the Pacific 
Trinidad and Tobago Latin America and the Caribbean 
Tunisia Rest of Middle East and North Africa 
Turkey Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Turkmenistan Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Uganda Africa 
Ukraine Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
United Arab Emirates High Income Middle East and N. Africa 
United Kingdom Western Europe 
United States United States 
Uruguay Latin America and the Caribbean 
Uzbekistan Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Vanuatu East Asia and the Pacific 
Venezuela, RB Latin America and the Caribbean 
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Vietnam East Asia and the Pacific 
West Bank and Gaza Rest of Middle East and North Africa 
Yemen, Rep. Rest of Middle East and North Africa 
Zambia Africa 
Zimbabwe Africa 
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APPENDIX A.3.2                                                                                                                                          
Data Sources and Code 
 
• Original bilateral migrant stock data produced by the World Bank can be downloaded 
from https://bit.ly/2tXTcI9  
• Original data on total population per country produced by the UN Population Division 
can be downloaded from https://bit.ly/2cnUFD4  
• Original data on number of deaths per country produced by the UN Population Division 
can be downloaded from https://bit.ly/2tNtkj7  
• Original data on number of births per country produced by the UN Population Division 
can be downloaded from https://bit.ly/2tZp7I9  
• Taiwan’s total population, number of births, and number of deaths data can be 
downloaded from https://bit.ly/2KDX0bP  
• Original Adjusted Income per Capita Index is developed by Padros de la Escosura (2015). 
The raw data can be downloaded from https://bit.ly/2KuEJyo .Since the original data 
ranges from 0 to 1 with a three-decimal point format, each original value was multiplied 
by 100. 
• Original Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) 1946-2015 data set developed by the 
Center for Systematic Piece codebook and data can be accessed https://bit.ly/1RD6fl7  
This data set lists annual time-series data on political violence. I manually added 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. 
Lucia which were not in the original data set but did not have any major political 
conflicts between 1946-2015. I also completed the entries for Jamaica (1946 to 1961 
were absent), Guyana (1946 to 1965 were absent), Suriname (1946 to 1974 were absent) 
and Trinidad (1946 to 1961 were absent). None of these four countries had major 
episodes of political violence during those years. Importantly, the MEPV does not 
include in the count of major episodes of political violence any conflict related to 
independence (see codebook).  
• Geographic distance between countries in the world can be downloaded from 
https://bit.ly/2KEXfAd  
o The original data file can be downloaded after clicking on the hyperlink 
“dist_cepii.dta” on page 2. The original file is a STATA data file (dist_cepii.dta). 
Therefore, the data set was opened in STATA 13 and save as a .csv file. 
The UN data (i.e. population, births, deaths) originally are in thousands, so before saving 
these three data sheets in .csv format, all cell containing data were multiplied by 1000. This is 
important because if the data sheets are directly saved in .csv format, the decimal points are 
lost.  
 
Code 
All the relevant code to estimate migration flows and fit TERG models, as well as the raw 
input data files used in Chapter 3, can be downloaded as R objects from www.diegoleal.info 
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APPENDIX A.3.3                                                                                                                               
Countries in the Americas Included in the Analysis (N = 38) 
 
Country Subregion 
Antigua and Barbuda Caribbean 
Argentina Southern Cone 
Aruba Caribbean 
Bahamas, The Caribbean 
Barbados Caribbean 
Belize Central America 
Bolivia Andes 
Brazil Southern Cone 
Canada North America 
Chile Southern Cone 
Colombia Andes 
Costa Rica Central America 
Cuba Caribbean 
Dominican Republic Caribbean 
Ecuador Andes 
El Salvador Central America 
French Guiana Caribbean 
Grenada Caribbean 
Guadeloupe Caribbean 
Guatemala Central America 
Guyana Caribbean 
Haiti Caribbean 
Honduras Central America 
Jamaica Caribbean 
Martinique Caribbean 
Mexico North America 
Nicaragua Central America 
Panama Central America 
Paraguay Southern Cone 
Peru Andes 
Puerto Rico Caribbean 
St Lucia Caribbean 
St Vincent and the Grenadines Caribbean 
Suriname Caribbean 
Trinidad and Tobago Caribbean 
United States North America 
Uruguay Southern Cone 
Venezuela, RB Andes 
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APPENDIX A.3.4                                                                                                                                
Circos Plots Specifications 
 
 
 
Input data files can be obtained by running the relevant code (see Appendix A.3.1).  
Once data files are obtained, make sure you delete all the quotation marks “” around the 
column and row names of the flow matrices, and writing “DAT” in cell [1,1] of all flow 
matrices, the circos plots used in the paper can be reproduced using a web application 
(http://mkweb.bcgsc.ca/tableviewer/) with settings detailed in the table above.  
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APPENDIX A.3.5                                                                                                                                        
Sociograms of the Migration Flows in the Americas by Thresholding Rule 
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APPENDIX A.3.6                                                                                                                                         
In-degree Distributions with Thresholding = 15, Migration Flows in the Americas, 
1960 – 2000 
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APPENDIX A.3.7                                                                                                                                         
TERGM to Investigate International Migration Flows in the Americas, 1960-2000. 
Robustness checks  
 
Thresholding = Top 10 Destination Countries 
 
 Estimates 
Lower Bound 
CI Upper Bound CI 
Intercept/edges 15.369 *** 11.627 26.253 
Endogenous 
dependencies     
  Transitive triads 0.222 *** 0.153 0.316 
  Cyclic triads -0.245 *** -0.433 -0.149 
Endogenous controls     
  In-degree popularity         0.179 *** 0.062 0.334 
  Out-degree popularity -4.293 *** -6.631           -3.721 
  Mutuality 0.635 *** 0.233 1.398 
  Delayed reciprocity 0.376 *** 0.156 0.931 
  Dyadic stability 0.612 *** 0.408 0.978 
  Outdegree absolute diff -4.343 *** -8.060 -3.206 
Exogenous controls     
  Same region 0.656 *** 0.807 1.044 
  Same language 0.605 *** 0.357 1.234 
  Income * indegree 0.001  -0.001 0.002 
  Income * outdegree 0.001 *** 0.001 0.002 
  Conflict * indegree 0.001  0.005 0.014 
  Conflict * outdegree 0.007 *** 0.005 0.017 
P-value thresholds (two sided): + < 0.1, * < 0.05, ** < 0.001 
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Thresholding = Top 20 Destination Countries 
 
 Estimates 
Lower Bound 
CI Upper Bound CI 
Intercept/edges -1.965  -4.248 1.491 
Endogenous 
dependencies     
  Transitive triads 0.082 *** 0.064 0.126 
  Cyclic triads -0.107 *** -0.140 -0.073 
Endogenous controls     
  In-degree popularity         0.301 * 0.190 0.411 
  Out-degree popularity -0.380 *** -1.606           -0.041 
  Mutuality 0.559 *** 0.400 0.732 
  Delayed reciprocity 0.251 *** 0.156 0.503 
  Dyadic stability 0.414 *** 0.265 0.647 
  Outdegree absolute diff 0.359 *** -0.664 -0.127 
Exogenous controls     
  Same region 1.004 *** 0.649 1.134 
  Same language 0.593 *** 0.332 0.719 
  Income * indegree 0.001 * 0.001 0.001 
  Income * outdegree 0.001  -0.001 0.001 
  Conflict * indegree -0.005 *** -0.019 -0.003 
  Conflict * outdegree 0.005  -0.006 0.015 
P-value thresholds (two sided): + < 0.1, * < 0.05, ** < 0.001 
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APPENDIX A.3.8                                                                                                                              
Degeneracy Check for TERGM in Table 3.5 (large P-values are desirable)            
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APPENDIX A.3.9                                                                                                                            
Robustness Check: Stochastic Actor-oriented Models 
 
In order to test if the inferential results regarding the two hypotheses of this study were 
robust, I conducted analyses based on a different thresholding rule (based on actual flow size 
instead of top destinations of each country), and a differential inferential technique 
(stochastic actor-oriented models – SAOM – instead of TERG models). As shown below, 
results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in the Chapter 3. For a detailed 
explanation of the stochastic actor oriented model see Snijders et al. (2010).  
 
SAOM to Investigate International Migration Flows in the Americas (1960-2000). 
Thresholding = Keep All Flows of Size > 10 
 
 Estimates S.E. 
Intercept/edges -2.042 ** 0.414 
Endogenous dependencies    
  Transitive triangles 0.080 ** 0.006 
  Cyclic triangles -0.027 ++ 0.015 
Endogenous controls    
  In-degree popularity          0.421 ** 0.047 
  Out-degree popularity -0.360 * 0.147 
  Mutuality 0.634 ** 0.102 
Exogenous controls    
  Same region 0.659 ** 0.085 
  Same language 0.379 ** 0.065 
  Income * alter 0.097  0.305 
  Income * ego 0.726 * 0.242 
  Conflict * alter -0.010 ** 0.002 
  Conflict * ego -0.004 * 0.002 
Network rate function    
  Network rate period 1 12.222 ** 1.332 
  Network rate period 2 24.378 ** 3.728 
  Network rate period 3 25.396 ** 4.061 
Overall Maximum Convergence Ratio  0.098 
P-values: ++ (one-sided, p < 0.05); + (two-sided, p < 0.1); * (two-sided, p < 0.05); ** (two-sided, p < 0.001) 
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SAOM to Investigate International Migration Flows in the Americas, 1960-2000. 
Thresholding = Keep All Flows of Size > 50 
 
 Estimates S.E. 
Intercept/edges -2.767 ** 0.565 
Endogenous dependencies    
  Transitive triangles 0.104 ** 0.010 
  Cyclic triangles -0.071 * 0.023 
Endogenous controls    
  In-degree popularity          0.322 ** 0.072 
  Out-degree popularity -0.040  0.224 
  Mutuality 0.800 ** 0.114 
Exogenous controls    
  Same region 0.745 ** 0.110 
  Same language 0.376 ** 0.077 
  Income * alter 0.037  0.443 
  Income * ego 0.839 * 0.332 
  Conflict * alter -0.012 * 0.004 
  Conflict * ego -0.005 ++ 0.003 
Network rate function    
  Network rate period 1 8.250 ** 0.857 
  Network rate period 2 13.879 ** 1.578 
  Network rate period 3 17.095 ** 2.108 
Overall Maximum Convergence Ratio  0.096 
P-values: ++ (one-sided, p < 0.05); + (two-sided, p < 0.1); * (two-sided, p < 0.05); ** (two-sided, p < 0.001) 
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SAOM to Investigate International Migration Flows in the Americas, 1960-2000. 
Thresholding = Keep All Flows of Size > 100 
 
 Estimates S.E. 
Intercept/edges -3.203 ** 0.690 
Endogenous dependencies    
  Transitive triads 0.133 ** 0.016 
  Cyclic triads -0.121 ** 0.037 
Endogenous controls    
  In-degree popularity          0.301 ** 0.093 
  Out-degree popularity -0.104  0.292 
  Mutuality 1.021 ** 0.135 
Exogenous controls    
  Same region 0.803 ** 0.136 
  Same language 0.392 ** 0.091 
  Income * alter 0.241  0.493 
  Income * ego 0.821 + 0.422 
  Conflict * alter -0.012 * 0.005 
  Conflict * ego -0.006  0.004 
Network rate function    
  Network rate period 1 6.797  0.762 
  Network rate period 2 10.431  1.213 
  Network rate period 3 12.276  1.372 
Overall Maximum Convergence Ratio  0.085 
++ (one-sided p < 0.05); + (two-sided p < 0.1); * (two-sided p < 0.05); ** (two-sided p < 0.001) 
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APPENDIX A.3.10                                                                                                                           
Circlos Plots Including the US 
 
1960s  
 
 
Note. Countries can be identified as follows: Canada (aCA); Mexico (aMX); United States (aUS); Belize (bBZ); Costa Rica 
(bCR); El Salvador (bSV); Guatemala (bGT); Honduras (bHN); Nicaragua (bNI); Panama (bPA); Bolivia (cBO); Colombia 
(cCO); Ecuador (cEC); Peru (cPE); Venezuela (cVE); Argentina (dAR); Brazil (dBR); Chile (dCL); Paraguay (dPY); 
Uruguay (dUY); Antigua and Barbuda (eAG); Aruba (eAW); the Bahamas (eBS); Barbados (eBB); Cuba (eCU); Dominican 
Republic (eDO); French Guiana (eGF); Grenada (eWG); Guadalupe (eGP); Guyana (eGY); Haiti (eHT); Jamaica (eJA); 
Martinique (eMQ); Puerto Rico (ePR); St. Lucia (eWL); St. Vincent and the Grenadines (eWV); Suriname (eSR); Trinidad 
and Tobago (eTT).  
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1970s  
 
 
 
Note. Countries can be identified as follows: Canada (aCA); Mexico (aMX); United States (aUS); Belize (bBZ); Costa Rica 
(bCR); El Salvador (bSV); Guatemala (bGT); Honduras (bHN); Nicaragua (bNI); Panama (bPA); Bolivia (cBO); Colombia 
(cCO); Ecuador (cEC); Peru (cPE); Venezuela (cVE); Argentina (dAR); Brazil (dBR); Chile (dCL); Paraguay (dPY); 
Uruguay (dUY); Antigua and Barbuda (eAG); Aruba (eAW); the Bahamas (eBS); Barbados (eBB); Cuba (eCU); Dominican 
Republic (eDO); French Guiana (eGF); Grenada (eWG); Guadalupe (eGP); Guyana (eGY); Haiti (eHT); Jamaica (eJA); 
Martinique (eMQ); Puerto Rico (ePR); St. Lucia (eWL); St. Vincent and the Grenadines (eWV); Suriname (eSR); Trinidad 
and Tobago (eTT).  
 
 
 
  
 179 
 
1980s  
 
 
 
Note. Countries can be identified as follows: Canada (aCA); Mexico (aMX); United States (aUS); Belize (bBZ); Costa Rica 
(bCR); El Salvador (bSV); Guatemala (bGT); Honduras (bHN); Nicaragua (bNI); Panama (bPA); Bolivia (cBO); Colombia 
(cCO); Ecuador (cEC); Peru (cPE); Venezuela (cVE); Argentina (dAR); Brazil (dBR); Chile (dCL); Paraguay (dPY); 
Uruguay (dUY); Antigua and Barbuda (eAG); Aruba (eAW); the Bahamas (eBS); Barbados (eBB); Cuba (eCU); Dominican 
Republic (eDO); French Guiana (eGF); Grenada (eWG); Guadalupe (eGP); Guyana (eGY); Haiti (eHT); Jamaica (eJA); 
Martinique (eMQ); Puerto Rico (ePR); St. Lucia (eWL); St. Vincent and the Grenadines (eWV); Suriname (eSR); Trinidad 
and Tobago (eTT).  
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1990s  
 
 
 
Note. Countries can be identified as follows: Canada (aCA); Mexico (aMX); United States (aUS); Belize (bBZ); Costa Rica 
(bCR); El Salvador (bSV); Guatemala (bGT); Honduras (bHN); Nicaragua (bNI); Panama (bPA); Bolivia (cBO); Colombia 
(cCO); Ecuador (cEC); Peru (cPE); Venezuela (cVE); Argentina (dAR); Brazil (dBR); Chile (dCL); Paraguay (dPY); 
Uruguay (dUY); Antigua and Barbuda (eAG); Aruba (eAW); the Bahamas (eBS); Barbados (eBB); Cuba (eCU); Dominican 
Republic (eDO); French Guiana (eGF); Grenada (eWG); Guadalupe (eGP); Guyana (eGY); Haiti (eHT); Jamaica (eJA); 
Martinique (eMQ); Puerto Rico (ePR); St. Lucia (eWL); St. Vincent and the Grenadines (eWV); Suriname (eSR); Trinidad 
and Tobago (eTT). 
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